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Abstract
This thesis is an examination of the problem of tyranny from the perspective of
radical libertarianism. History is to be seen as a race and conflict between liberty and
power. After a brief introduction, the second section of this thesis is devoted to sketching
out a natural law and natural rights theory. With this as the foundation, the third section
analyzes the seminal work of Étienne de la Boétie’s The Discourse of Voluntary
Servitude in which he elucidates the nature of tyranny and the psychology of subjection.
All governments, even the worst tyranny, rest upon general popular acceptance. Religious
and political ideologies serve as the justification and motivation for resisting tyranny. The
role of ideology in revolutions, and the perennial conflict between liberty and power, are
illustrated in the fourth and fifth sections in the context of the American Revolution and
Founding, and Civil War. The sixth section sketches a radical libertarian critique of the
State as inherently tyrannical and counterproductive to the goal of securing individual
rights and social prosperity.
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I. Introduction
But O good Lord! What strange phenomenon is this? What name shall
we give it? What is the nature of this misfortune? What vice is it, or,
rather, what degradation? To see an endless multitude of people not
merely obeying, but driven to servility? Not ruled, but tyrannized over?
These wretches have no wealth, no kin, nor wife nor children, not even life
itself that they can call their own. They suffer plundering, wantonness,
cruelty, not from an army, not from a barbarian horde, on account of
whom they must shed their blood and sacrifice their lives, but from a
single man; not from a Hercules nor from a Samson, but from a single
little man.
– Étienne de la Boétie, The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, c. 1552531
WHEN in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one
People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with
another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and
equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle
them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.
WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness –
That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its
Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed will dictate that Governments
long established should not be changed for light and transient Causes; and
accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to
suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing
the Forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long Train of Abuses
and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to
reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to
throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future
Security.
– Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of Independence, 1776

1

Étienne de La Boétie, The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, translated by
Harry Kurz with an introduction by Murray Rothbard, (New York: Black Rose Books, 1997), pp. 47-48.
Boétie is pronounced “Bwettie” with a hard t.
1

Lord Acton once said, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts
absolutely”; he continued, “Great men are almost always bad men.”2 This last might
strike one as a curious statement, until one remembers that even Nero and Julius Caesar
were deeply mourned by their people. Tyrants are not always recognized as such by their
own people or even by subsequent generations. This can be explained by a failure to
understand the nature of tyranny and the value of liberty, which brings us to the
underlying theme of this essay: the problem of tyranny. To quote Murray Rothbard, “why
in the world do people consent to their own enslavement?”3 For this is the fundamental
insight of the sixteenth century Frenchman, Étienne de la Boétie, and the driving concern
of his Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, that all governments are grounded on the
consent of the governed, on general popular acceptance, even the worst tyranny.4
Tyranny is a perennial danger for mankind, recurring again and again throughout
history, and it has been a subject of discourse for many great thinkers from the ancient
Greeks to the present. The traditional conception of tyranny is twofold; it is either 1) the
usurpation of rightful power (typically the usurpation of a republic), or 2) government
against the “laws” (defined variously as customary law, divine law, or natural law), or
both. This traditional conception of tyranny focuses on the means by which the ruler
2

Lord Acton, letter, 3 April 1887, to Bishop Mandell Creighton (published in The Life and Letters of
Mandell Creighton. Louise von Glehn Creighton, ed. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913).
3
Murray N. Rothbard, “The Political Though of Étienne de La Boétie,” in The Politics of Obedience: The
Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, p. 13 (emphasis in original). I tend to agree with Rothbard that La Boétie
cuts to the heart of not merely the central problem of tyranny, but “of what is, or rather should be, the
central problem of political philosophy: the mystery of civil obedience” (Ibid.).
4
David Hume independently discovered this principle two centuries later: “Nothing appears more
surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the
many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments
and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall
find, that, as Force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but
opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most
despotic and military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular.” (David Hume, “Of the
First Principles of Government,” in Essays, Literary, Moral and Political (London: Oxford University
Press [1966, c1963])).
2

acquires power and the use made of that power. As we shall see, La Boétie goes beyond
this traditional conception and implicitly gets to the heart of the nature of power itself:
that the power of man over man is tyrannical. My own thoughts on liberty and tyranny,
liberty and power, exactly follows that of Murray Rothbard’s as expressed in the preface
to his four-volume work on American history from colonial times to the Revolution,
Conceived in Liberty:
My own basic perspective on the history of man, and a fortiori on the
history of the United States, is to place central importance on the great
conflict which is eternally waged between Liberty and Power, a conflict,
by the way, which was seen with crystal clarity by the American
revolutionaries of the eighteenth century. I see the liberty of the individual
not only as a great moral good in itself (or, with Lord Acton, as the highest
political good), but also as the necessary condition for the flowering of all
the other goods that mankind cherishes: moral virtue, civilization, the arts
and sciences, economic prosperity. Out of liberty, then, stem the glories of
civilized life. But liberty has always been threatened by the encroachments
of power, power which seeks to suppress, control, cripple, tax, and exploit
the fruits of liberty and production. Power, then, the enemy of liberty, is
consequently the enemy of all the other goods and fruits of civilization
that mankind holds dear. And power is almost always centered in and
focused on that central repository of power and violence: the state. With
Albert Jay Nock, the twentieth-century American political philosopher, I
see history as centrally a race and conflict between “social power” – the
productive consequence of voluntary interactions among men – and state
power. In those eras of history when liberty – social power – has managed
to race ahead of state power and control, the country and even mankind
have flourished. In those eras when state power has managed to catch up
with or surpass social power, mankind suffers and declines.5
In the following pages I attempt to sketch a radical libertarian natural law and natural
rights social ethic as I understand it. In doing so I do not claim to speak for all
libertarians; indeed, many libertarians would no doubt find something to disagree with in

5

Murray N. Rothbard, Conceived in Liberty Vol. I: The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century
(New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House Publishers, 1975), pp. 9-10.
3

this essay.6 I then give an explication of La Boétie’s analysis of the nature of tyranny and
voluntary servitude. In the two subsequent parts I attempt to illustrate the conflict
between liberty and power with an examination of events surrounding the American
Revolution and Founding, and Civil War. And finally, I sketch a radical libertarian
critique of the State.

6

The libertarian movement, not counting the anarchist socialists who also claim the label libertarian, is
divided into two groups: the minarchists, who support a limited government as either good or a necessary
evil, and the anarchists, who consider the State to be an unnecessary evil.
4

II. Natural Law and Natural Rights
The program of liberalism, therefore, if condensed into a single word,
would have to read: property, that is, private ownership of the means of
production... All the other demands of liberalism result from this
fundamental demand.
– Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism7
What motivated early Americans to resist English tyranny? How is such
resistance, whether violent or nonviolent, justified? I think these questions are related, not
merely because human beings act for reasons and need to justify their actions. I could
merely describe the motivations of the early Americans, and indeed I do so in part five of
this essay; but my intention here is also to demonstrate the justification for resistance to
tyranny in terms of a universally applicable ethical theory. This justification can be found
in the political ideology of the early Americans, which is the political philosophy of
(classical) liberalism. Libertarianism is a younger variant of liberalism that has taken its
fundamental principles to their logical conclusion.
Liberalism recognizes the principle that governments are founded upon the
consent of the governed. Indeed, liberalism not only recognizes this principle but carries
it further, arguing that the only just government is one that is formed voluntarily by the
people in order to protect their natural rights. This political philosophy has been most
popularly epitomized in the Declaration of Independence, quoted at the beginning of this
essay.8 Those who take a natural law9 approach to liberalism, rather than a merely

7

Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism: A Socio-Economic Exposition (Mission, KA.: Sheed Andrews and
McMeel, 1978 [1962]), p. 19.
8
The original draft of the Declaration, while more philosophically precise, appears to have been changed
for stylistic rather than substantive reasons. Regarding rights, it read as follows: “We hold these truths to be
sacred and undeniable: that all men are created equal and independent; that from that equal creation they
derive rights inherent and inalienable, among which are the preservation of life, and liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness.” (See Roderick T. Long, “Equality: The Unknown Ideal,” The Ludwig von Mises Institute:
http://www.mises.org/fullstory.asp?control=804, 2001.)
5

utilitarian one, recognize that every individual has an absolute ethical duty to deal with
others in a manner suitable for the life of a human being qua human being, that is,
noncoercively.10
Natural law holds that what is good and bad for Man is determined by his nature.
Man is defined by his essential characteristic, which is his faculty of reason; in other
words, Man is a rational being. He is neither omniscient nor omnipotent nor infallible and
possesses no innate instinctual knowledge, and because of this he must use his mind to
discover the ends he should pursue and the means by which to pursue them.
Self-ownership is the basis of liberal/libertarian natural law and natural rights
theory. In contradistinction to classical natural law theory, which “placed the locus of the
9

I take a supply-side virtue ethics approach to natural law here as opposed to traditional consequentialist
and deontological (“duty-centered”) demand-side approaches. The former, which has its roots in ancient
Greek (particularly Aristotelian) thought, focuses on the agent of moral activity, whereas the latter focus on
the patient of moral activity. For the former, the central question of ethics is not “What consequences
should I promote?” or “What rules should I follow?” but rather “What kind of person should I be?”
Certainly, demand-side approaches to natural law exist, but I would argue that they are not as
philosophically defensible. For the distinction between supply-side and demand-side ethics, I am indebted
to David Kelley and Roderick T. Long; see Long, “Slavery Contracts and Inalienable Rights: A
Formulation,” Formulations 2, No. 2 (Winter 1994-95), http://www.libertariannation.org/a/f22l1.html. For
the roots of liberal natural law and natural rights theory in Aristotle, see Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice,
and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and for a necessary amendment
to it, see Long, “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” The Review of Metaphysics 49 (June 1996): 775-802.
Finally, it is not the place of this essay to argue the ultimate source of natural law, whether it be God or the
logical structure of reality. Suffice to say that there is some dispute among natural law theorists on this
subject while they agree on the existence of natural law and its accessibility to reason.
10
Man is defined as a rational being. Libertarians recognize certain conditions such as childhood, mental
retardation, and insanity in which an individual’s faculty of reason is considered to be in an impaired,
disabled, or not fully developed state. There is little, if any, debate among libertarians, or among sensible
people for that matter, that it is a reasonable assumption that an adult is capable of making his or her own
decisions (even if he or she actually makes foolish ones). There is considerable debate among libertarians,
however, as to exactly when children develop an adult capacity for reason and cease being children. This
issue is complicated by the fact that children don’t all mature at the same rate. The level of a child’s
development is a matter of degree, leading to a diminished gap between the child’s expressed and true
preferences as he/she matures. The issue is not central to my purpose, but I think Roderick Long’s
suggested solution is the fairest one: “pick a single universal age of majority [say, 18], but allow exceptions
through litigation; the age of majority simply determines the point at which the presumption of incapacity
yields to a presumption of capacity, rather than serving as a rigid inescapable iron barrier. Once this
flexibility is introduced, the precise age that is picked as the cut-off for majority becomes less important”
(“Imagineering Freedom: A Constitution of Liberty, Part IV,” Formulations 2, No. 4 (Summer 1995),
http://www.libertariannation.org/a/f24l2.html). Until a child reaches the age of majority, it is the duty of the
parent(s) or guardian(s) to protect the child’s rights and supervise his/her choices. Such paternalism is not
justified for adults, however.
6

good and of virtuous action in the State, with individuals strictly subordinated to State
action[,]”
the Levellers and particularly John Locke in seventeenth-century
England…transformed classical natural law into a theory grounded on
methodological and hence political individualism. From the Lockean
emphasis on the individual as the unit of action, as the entity who thinks,
feels, chooses, and acts, stemmed his conception of natural law in politics
as establishing the natural rights of each individual. It was the Lockean
individualist tradition that profoundly influenced the later American
revolutionaries and the dominant tradition of libertarian political thought
in the revolutionary new nation.11
Consider the following passage from Locke’s “Second Treatise on Government”:
[E]very man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right
to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may
say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and
joined to it something of his own, and thereby makes it his property. It
being by him removed from the common state nature has placed it in, it
hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common
right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of
the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined
to…
He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples
he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to
himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask when did they
begin to be his?…And ‘tis plain, if the first gathering made them not his,
nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and
common. That added something to them more than nature, the common
mother of all, had done: and so they become his private right. And will
any one say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated,
because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his?…If such
a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the
plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by
compact, that ‘tis the taking part of what is common, and removing it out
of the state Nature leaves it in, which beings the property; without which
the common is of no use.12
11

Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 2002 [1982]), p. 21.
John Locke, “The Second Treatise of Government” in The Political Writings of John Locke, David
Wootton, ed. (New York: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1993), V.27-28, pp. 274-275. The process, herein
described, of original appropriation of property out of the state of nature is called the homesteading
principle.

12

7

In The Ethics of Liberty, Murray Rothbard makes a similar point:
The individual man, in introspecting the fact of his own consciousness,
…discovers the primordial natural fact of his freedom: his freedom to
choose, his freedom to use or not use his reason about any given subject.
In short, the natural fact of his “free will.” He also discovers the natural
fact of his mind’s command over his body and its actions: that is, of his
natural ownership over his self.13
This right to his person and property derives from Man’s reasoning mind. For individuals
to live a life proper to Man (i.e., a virtuous life), central place must be given to the
distinctively human faculty of reason. In dealing with others, one properly expresses this
faculty through reason and persuasion, rather than through the initiation of force
(including fraud, theft, and the threat of force).14 The virtue that defines the appropriately
human attitude towards the initiation of force is justice. A just person will refrain from
initiating coercion against others. From this obligation to behave justly (i.e., virtuously),
we derive the concept of natural rights.
A right is a moral concept; it is a principle of interpersonal ethics that acts as a
bridge between the ethical and the political. Rights, then, are a subset of moral principles
that govern the legitimate use of force in interpersonal relations. A right always pertains
only to action (or more precisely, to freedom of action). To a moral agent, a right is a
positive sanction for him to act on his own judgment; it is also a negative obligation on
him to use reason in his dealings with others, that is, to refrain from violating their rights
by initiating force. In other words, our obligation to live a maximally human life, which
is a life of reason, translates into a right, on the part of others, not to be aggressed

13

Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, p. 31.
Initiation of force here is used in contradistinction to retaliatory force, which itself is justified only
against those who have initiated force in the first place.

14

8

against.15 In this sense, the right to liberty, properly understood, is the right not to be
subject to the initiation of force. It is also important to point out that liberty, properly
understood, is complete and total liberty.16 If liberty consists in freedom from the
initiation of force; if it is unjust and therefore a violation of your liberty for me to initiate
force against you, and vice versa; then it is nonsensical to speak of the protection of our
rights as requiring the limitation of our rights, for by natural law none of us have the right
to aggress against each other. In other words, the rights of individuals do not overlap or in
any other way conflict with those of others; by definition, they cannot.
Just as we have a responsibility to conduct our affairs with others through reason
and persuasion, so too do we have a responsibility to resist the initiation of force against
us, for acquiescing to it prevents us from freely exercising our faculty of reason.
Defensive force is morally permissible as a proper means of restoring justice, but it is
hard to see how it can be mandated to the exclusion of nonviolent means of resistance.
Indeed, nonviolent resistance would seem to be more appealing to a life pursuant with a
dedication to reason. Aristotle argues, in his Politics, that man is a political animal; a man
who is by nature without a polis must be either a beast or a god, either subhuman or
superhuman, but being a god is impossible for man; either extreme is a vice. Similarly, in

15

As a point of clarification, this obligation is one that we owe ourselves as moral agents (and, for
Christians, to God as well and above all; similarly for other religions). In an Aristotelian virtue-ethics,
virtue is not merely instrumental to our happiness but constitutive of it.
16
This is analogous to Herbert Spencer’s Law of Equal Freedom: “Every man has freedom to do all he
wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man” (Spencer, Social Statics, New York:
D. Appleton and Company, 1897, p. 121). Murray Rothbard is correct, however, in pointing out that
Spencer’s Law is redundant; the first proviso implies the second. “For if every man has freedom to do all
that he wills, it follows from this very premise that no man’s freedom has been infringed or invaded. […]
The concept “equality” has no rightful place in the “Law of Equal Freedom,” being replaceable by the
logical qualifier “every.” The “Law of Equal Freedom” could well be renamed “The Law of Total
Freedom.” (Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State with Power and Market, Scholar’s Edition. Auburn: Mises
Institute, 2004 [1962, 1970], p. 1312).
9

his Nicomachean Ethics, he holds that a virtue is a mean between two vices.17 If
Aristotle is correct, and I think that he is, then neither an inhuman (or superhuman)
passivism nor an animalistic (subhuman) propensity to violence is appropriate to man. In
short, there is a point at which nonviolent resistance may no longer be moral and violent
resistance becomes obligatory, and vice versa. Exactly what that point is will have to be
judged contextually by the particular individual(s).
“The right of property implies the right to make contracts about that property: to
give it away or to exchange titles of ownership for the property of another person.”18 The
right of contract is not absolute, however, as it is derived from the right of property.
[The] only enforceable contracts (i.e., those backed by the sanction of
legal coercion) should be those where the failure of one party to abide by
the contract implies the theft of property from the other party. In short, a
contract should only be enforceable when the failure to fulfill it is an
implicit theft of property. But this can only be true if we hold that validly
enforceable contracts only exist where title to property has already been
transferred, and therefore where the failure to abide by the contract means
that the other party’s property is retained by the delinquent party, without
the consent of the former (implicit theft).19
This is the “title-transfer” theory of contracts. A contract is not made valid and therefore
legally enforceable because of promises made or expectations created but because title to
property has been transferred under certain agreed upon conditions. This is not to say that
breaking promises or not living up to expectations we foster in others is moral, quite the
contrary, but we are here concerned with justice and law.

17

Aristotle, Politics, 1253a1-5, 27-33; idem. Nicomachean Ethics; cf. Roderick T. Long, “The Irrelevance
of Responsibility,” Social Philosophy and Policy 16, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 118-145. “The Aristotelian
virtues, too, can be seen as a mean between the subhuman vice of overvaluing, and the superhuman vice of
undervaluing, our vulnerable embodiedness. To err on the side of the beasts is to be excessively concerned
with our animal nature, our physical desires and physical security[.] … To err on the side of the gods, by
contrast, is to treat human beings as disembodied intellects for whom the animal nature is irrelevant[.]”
(Long, p. 122.)
18
Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, p. 133.
19
Ibid. Emphasis in original.
10

Not all titles of ownership in property are transferable. Certainly the physical
property we own can be given away or sold by us as we please. Such property is
alienable. Man’s right to his own person and will, however, is inalienable; that is, he
cannot give or sell control of his person and will to another. Even if he did, in practice,
voluntarily subordinate his will and person to another, it is still he who decides to follow
every order given by that person. Moreover, no such voluntary slave contract can be
legally enforceable. There is no transfer of title in the agreement. If, at any time, the
individual changes his mind and refuses any longer to be a “slave,” he is legally entitled
to do so.
It follows from the foregoing that the only just government is one that protects
and respects the rights of its citizens. Some of the implications of this it would do to spell
out, because such a government as would be just according to a consistent adherence to
natural law and natural rights would hardly be recognizable as a government to most
people. It has been said that one of the requirements of a just government is the consent
of the governed. But what does this mean? Is it consent of the majority? Or of the
strongest party? Can one man or group of men declare consent for another?
Legal theorist and abolitionist Lysander Spooner, writing just after the Civil War,
answers these questions definitively in “No Treason No. 1 (1867).” Anyone who claim’s
that “his consent is necessary to the establishment or maintenance of government”
thereby admits that “every other man’s are equally necessary,” for one man’s rights are
just as good as everyone else’s. The opposite is also true: anyone who claims that
someone else’s consent is not necessary thereby admits that his own is not necessary
either. There is “no alternative but to say, either that the separate, individual consent of

11

every man, who is required to aid, in any way, in supporting the government, is
necessary, or that the consent of no one is necessary.” 20 Since we possess the right to life,
liberty, and property, it follows that the latter alternative must be rejected and that the
individual consent of everyone is necessary
Thus, applied to the United States Constitution, the phrase “We, the people” in the
preamble must be taken to mean simply: “We, the people of the United States, acting
freely and voluntarily as individuals, consent and agree that we will cooperate with each
other in sustaining such a government as is provided for in this Constitution.”21 The
whole authority of the Constitution rests upon the necessity for consent of “the people”
and if they do not consent it is of no validity, and insofar as it has any validity it is only
between those who actually consent to it.22 “No one’s consent could be presumed against
him, without his actual consent being given, any more than in the case of any other
contract to pay money, or render service. And to make it binding upon any one, his
signature, or other positive evidence of consent, was as necessary as in the case of any
other contract.”23 At most, the Constitution can be inferred only as offering membership.
Spooner notes that even those few who actually voted to adopt the Constitution
did not pledge their faith for any specific time, since no specific time was
named, in the Constitution, during which the association should continue.
It was, therefore, merely an association during pleasure; even as between
the original parties to it. Still less, if possible, has it been any thing more
than a voluntary association, during pleasure, between the succeeding
generations, who have never gone through, as their fathers did, with so
much even as any outward formality of adopting it, or of pledging their
faith to support it. […] The consent, therefore, that has been given,

20

George H. Smith, ed., The Lysander Spooner Reader (San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1992), p. 60
(emphasis in original).
21
Ibid., “No Treason No. 2 (1867),” p. 65 (emphasis in original).
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
12

whether by individuals, or by the States, has been, at most, only a consent
for the time being; not an engagement for the future.24
Thus, Spooner states in “No Treason No. VI” that the “Constitution [and any constitution,
for that matter] has no inherent authority or obligation. It has no authority or obligation at
all unless as a contract between man and man.”25
One also cannot infer from the Constitution that it is “an agreement between any
body but ‘the people’ then existing; nor does it, either expressly or impliedly, assert any
right, power, or disposition, on their part, to bind any body but themselves.”26 Indeed, no
constitution that purported to do so could be considered valid. In the preamble, it merely
expresses the hope that it will be useful to the original people’s posterity. Subsequent
generations would have to individually and voluntarily consent to the Constitution to be
bound by it.
It is thought by some that individuals express their consent by voting and paying
taxes, but even these actions cannot be taken to demonstrate consent. Certainly, even if
the act of voting were a legitimate demonstration of consent, it “could bind nobody but
the actual voters.”27 Furthermore, the act of voting cannot be said to be a demonstration
of a person’s support for the Constitution unless the act of voting were a perfectly
voluntary one. Yet the act of voting cannot properly be called a perfectly voluntary one
for many people (or even for most, or all, today). Many vote out of necessity, seeing it as
the only means they have of preventing the theft of their property or abuse of their rights
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by other voters. This is so, in part, because taxation is, at least in practice, compulsory.28
And as “we can have no legal knowledge as to who votes from choice, and who from the
necessity thus forced upon him, we can have no legal knowledge, as to any particular
individual, that he voted from choice; or consequently, that by voting, he consented, or
pledged himself, to support the government.”29 This is so because all voting is done
secretly. “No man can reasonably or legally be said to do such a thing as to assent to, or
support, the Constitution, unless he does it openly, and in a way to make himself
personally responsible for the acts of his agents, so long as they act within the limits of
the power he delegates to them.”30
Spooner trenchantly concludes:
The ostensible supporters of the Constitution, like the ostensible
supporters of most other governments, are made up of three classes, viz.:
1. Knaves, a numerous and active class, who see in the government an
instrument which they can use for their own aggrandizement or wealth. 2.
Dupes – a large class, no doubt – each of whom, because he is allowed
one voice out of millions in deciding what he may do with his own person
and his own property, and because he is permitted to have the same voice
in robbing, enslaving, and murdering others, that others have in robbing,
enslaving, and murdering himself, is stupid enough to imagine that he is a
“free man,” a “sovereign”; that this is “a free government”; “a
government of equal rights,” “the best government on earth,” and such
like absurdities. 3. A class who have some appreciation of the evils of
government, but either do not see how to get rid of them, or do not choose
to so far sacrifice their private interests as to give themselves seriously and
earnestly to the work of making a change.31
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Spooner goes on to argue that the “Constitution not only binds nobody now, but it
never did bind anybody.”32 This is so because it is a general principle of law and reason
that “all men’s important contracts”33 be written, signed, and delivered. And by delivered
is meant that it must be “delivered to the party (or to some one for him), in whose favor it
is made, before it can be binding on the party making it.”34 Just as he is free to refuse to
sign it, he is free to refuse to deliver it even after he has signed it. Once delivered,
however, he would be bound by the contract he has signed and delivered, so long as it is a
contract he had a natural right to consent to.
As the Constitution has no authority, Spooner asks, “on what authority does the
government practically rest?”35 Those who profess to administer it cannot name who their
principals are. They cannot specify who they are acting as agents for. They have no
“written authority…accrediting [them] as such.”36 “A secret ballot makes a secret
government; and a secret government is a secret band of robbers and murderers. […]
Men honestly engaged in attempting to establish justice in the world, have no occasion
thus to act in secret; or to appoint agents to do acts for which they (the principals) are not
willing to be responsible.”37 Thus the pretended agents of the people are really agents of
nobody and the government’s sole source of authority rests upon the use of force.
Spooner ends “No Treason No. VI” thus:
Inasmuch as the Constitution was never signed, nor agreed to, by anybody,
as a contract, and therefore never bound anybody, and is now binding
upon nobody; and is moreover such an one as no people can ever hereafter
be expected to consent to, except as they may be forced to do so at the
32
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point of the bayonet, it is perhaps of no importance what its true legal
meaning, as a contract, is. Nevertheless, the writer thinks it proper to say
that, in his opinion, the Constitution is no such instrument as it has
generally been assumed to be; but that by false interpretations, and naked
usurpations, the government has been made in practice a very widely, and
almost wholly, different thing from what the Constitution itself purports to
authorize. He has heretofore written much, and could write much more, to
prove that such is the truth. But whether the Constitution really be one
thing, or another, this much is certain – that it has either authorized such a
government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In either
case, it is unfit to exist.38
Thus has Spooner exploded (or refined) the very notion of the social contract theory of
government. Either government contractually rests upon voluntarily and explicitly
granted consent by each and every individual it purports to have authority over; or else it
is government by force and fraud, and we should dispense with talk of justice and
government by consent.
The consent of every individual is not the only requirement a government must
meet in order to be just. It must uphold its side of the bargain by protecting its citizens’
rights and it must not itself violate their rights. It follows then that a government cannot
justly violate an individual’s rights even if a majority of the voters support such an action.
Moreover, it is not the business of government to be legislating morality (apart from
protecting individual rights), because it cannot do so without violating an individual’s
rights. In “Vices Are Not Crimes: A Vindication of Moral Liberty (1875),” Spooner
makes a comprehensive argument that vices and crimes are two distinctly different
things. “Crimes are those acts by which one man harms the person or property of another.
Vices are simply the errors which a man makes in his search after his own happiness.”39
Vices, in and of themselves, involve neither criminal intent nor interference with the
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persons or property of others. As only interference with the persons or property of others
without their consent can violate their rights, “unless this clear distinction between vices
and crimes be made and recognized by the laws [i.e., unless vices are not treated as
crimes], there can be on earth no such thing as individual right, liberty, or property; no
such things as the right of one man to the control of his own person and property, and the
corresponding and coequal rights of another man to the control of his own person and
property.”40 History has shown that laws criminalizing vices, at best, do little or nothing
to suppress the vice and, at worst, encourage real crime to spring up around the vice as it
is forced underground (witness the fiasco that was the Prohibition, which aided the rise of
the big crime families). Certainly it cannot be said of laws that they make men more
virtuous (or just), for one must voluntarily choose to be moral; one who is forced to
perform or refrain from some act is not thereby made virtuous (or just) by it, though the
act may have been virtuous (or just) if performed (or not) voluntarily. A vice is still a
vice, however, and the foregoing does not in any way mean that members of society are
not free to impose nonviolent sanctions upon individuals they deem to be immoral (such
as boycotting, blacklisting, etc.).
It follows, also, that taxation (or any other means of expropriation or
redistribution of property and wealth), insofar as it is accomplished by force or the threat
thereof, is unjust. No one has put the matter more unequivocally than Lysander Spooner:
It is true that the theory of our Constitution is, that all taxes are paid
voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance company,
voluntarily entered into by the people with each other; that each man
makes a free and purely voluntary contract with all others who are parties
to the Constitution, to pay so much money for so much protection, the
same as he does with any other insurance company; and that he is just as
40
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free not to be protected, and not to pay any tax, as he is to pay a tax, and
be protected.
But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical
fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man:
Your money, or your life. And many, if not most, taxes are paid under
compulsion of that threat.
The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring
upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head, proceed to
rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that
account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful.
The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and
crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to
your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not
pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence
enough to profess to be merely a “protector,” and that he takes men’s
money against their will, merely to enable him to “protect” those
infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to protect themselves, or do
not appreciate his peculiar system of protection. He is too sensible a man
to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money,
he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you
on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful “sovereign,”
on account of the “protection” he affords you. He does not keep
“protecting” you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by
requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of
more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and
by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and
shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his authority, or resist
his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such
impostures, and insults, and villainies as these. In short, he does not, in
addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave.41
It must also be pointed out, in light of the mention of protection services, that an
individual has the right to purchase protection or legal services from entities other than
the government or to go into business providing such services himself, even in
competition with the government, or to rely solely upon himself if he so chooses. For a
government to attempt to monopolize such services would be for it to commit an
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injustice, for such an attempt by it would necessarily entail the initiation of force and
therefore the violation of people’s right to their person and property.
One of Spooner’s arguments within the context of what the Constitution does
authorize is pertinent to the issues raised in the previous paragraph as well as subsequent
ones. In “No Treason No. 2 (1867),” he addresses the treason clause in the Constitution.
He argues that like all other laws, criminal laws included, it must be interpreted “in the
sense most favorable to liberty and justice.”42 “The true and legitimate meaning of the
word treason, then, necessarily implies treachery, deceit, breach of faith. Without these,
there can be no treason. A traitor is a betrayer – one who practices injury, while
professing friendship. […] An open enemy, however criminal in other respects, is no
traitor.”43
As just governments are formed voluntarily by the people in order to protect their
rights, and as individuals have a right to resist violations of their rights, it follows that
individual citizens have a right to resist unjust governments. That is, individuals have the
right to resist a government that they have not consented to and/or that violates their
rights. Among the means of resisting an unjust government, it would seem the most
obvious in light of the foregoing is secession. Drawing on Austrian economist Jorg Guido
Hulsmann, I define secession as “the one-sided disruption of a hegemonic bond” by the
subject, but unlike Hulsmann I use it here only in the revolutionary, “all-or-nothing,”
sense of severing all hegemonic bonds with the tyrant.44 The act of secession, whether by
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an individual or a state, or resistance to rights violations, it should be obvious, are not
acts of treason.
Certainly, secession is not the only means of resisting a tyrant. Others exist, such
as tyrannicide, the slaying of the offending tyrant. Like secession, tyrannicide can be
committed by a lone individual, a small group acting in isolation, or even at the active
behest of a majority of the people. As Oscar Jászi and John D. Lewis point out, in Against
the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide, that tyrannicide is a controversial
doctrine. Some political thinkers have regarded it as a dangerous and/or immoral one;
others have defended the right of the individual to kill the tyrant, qualifying this, of
course, with the assumption that the individual would be acting on behalf of the people to
restore justice. It is not the purpose of this essay to deal with the morality (or immorality)
of tyrannicide, however; it is mentioned only in order to show that it is in fact an aspect
of other methods of resisting tyranny (see below).
The right to secede derives from the right of individuals to freely form their own
government and to resist rights violations. Certainly a lone individual could attempt to
secede, though as a lone individual his options would be limited: fleeing for the hills or to
another country, ignoring the state, tyrannicide, or some other form of resistance. Flight
has a chance of success, as does tyrannicide. Against the organized violence of the state,
however, he will not last long in attempting to ignore it or violently oppose it. With
tyrannicide, though a lone individual could succeed in slaying a tyrant, he might still have
to worry about the tyrant’s successor(s). Tyrants do not oppress only lone individuals,
however. Indeed, the victims usually make up a sizable plurality or majority of the
population.
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One can speak of an oppressed people, as a group of individuals, having the right
to revolution. “[I]t is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish [an unjust government],
and to institute a new Government”45, 46 in its place. A political revolution – as opposed
to political reformation, which involves change within a system rather than change of a
system – can be defined as a fundamental change in political organization, especially the
overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by
the governed.47 One can think of at least two different types of political revolution:
internal regime change48 and secession.49 With internal regime change, the goal of the
revolutionary (-ies) is the replacement of the existing regime. The goal of secession is
generally a separation of territory from the existing government, usually with the goal of
forming a new government in the seceding territory. Political revolutions are often
characterized by violence, but this need not always be so. Accordingly, the concept of
political revolution can, I think, be subdivided into a four-fold typology consisting of:
45
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1) violent regime change, 2) violent secession, 3) peaceful regime change, and 4)
peaceful secession.
There are historical examples for each of these types. Political revolutions are
often characterized by violence, and indeed types 1 and 2 have historically been the most
common forms of revolution. The French Revolution and the Russian Revolution are two
examples of violent regime change (type 1). The American Revolution and the misnamed
American Civil War are examples of violent secession (type 2). The adoption of the US
Constitution in place of the Articles of Confederation is an example of peaceful regime
change (type 3). And India’s successful independence from the British Empire is the
prime example of peaceful secession (type 4). Obviously, both types 1 and 2 can (but
need not) involve tyrannicide, while 3 and 4 cannot. Note, also, that 3 and 4 are
compatible with La Boétie’s solution to tyranny: mass nonviolent withdrawal of consent
(to be discussed later).
Which of these types of revolution is preferable? Secession should be the most
attractive to modern liberals (i.e., libertarians) for a number of reasons. It tends toward
the creation of smaller states with more limited governments. Moreover, secession
generally occurs over a contiguous territory within a larger state; it thus presents less of a
collective action problem as local communities will tend to be more homogeneous: those
who live near each other will tend to have closer ties and will have an easier time
communicating, coordinating activities, and lending support and aid. Other things being
equal, it will be more difficult to get a consensus for a regime change than it would for
secession due to the greater number of people and increasing diversity of interests and
beliefs.
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Though violent revolution has traditionally been the favored method of liberal
theorists, it is problematic. The state, especially the modern nation-state, typically
possesses the preponderance of military power. How are the people to match it?
Moreover, violent revolution, particularly violent regime change, often results merely in
the creation of a new set of elites in control of the political means. The people end up
exchanging one tyrant (or set of tyrants) for another. The new tyrant(s) might even be
worse! Intuitively, it may be difficult to see the advantage of nonviolent revolution.
However, it is more attractive in light of the neo-Aristotelian natural law theory sketched
above and in the eyes of the more pacific aspects of major world religions such as
Christianity and Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, as well as
other less common religions. It also has the advantage of creating a revolutionary soil that
is not as conducive to the growth of new tyranny. But is it an effective strategy? It is not
the purpose of this essay to make a decisive case for the effectiveness of nonviolent
revolution, but the theory and history of nonviolent resistance is promising.50
Libertarians, particularly of the Austrian school, have in recent years begun
extensive explorations into the theory and history of national defense. They question the
ability of the state to provide it, and explore private market-based production of security,
including applications to strategies of secession.51 Among these are private insuranceprotection firms and such strategies as guerrilla warfare and privateering. In the context
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of revolution and secession, nonviolent strategies, so successfully used by Gandhi in
India, have with few exceptions been neglected by libertarians, however.52
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III. Étienne de la Boétie on Tyranny, Voluntary Servitude, and Civil Disobedience
Resolve to serve no more, and you are at once freed. I do not ask that you
place hands upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply that you
support him no longer; then you will behold him, like a great Colossus
whose pedestal has been pulled away, fall of his own weight and break
into pieces.
– Étienne de la Boétie, The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude53
Étienne de la Boétie is an unfamiliar figure from Sixteenth Century France, a
century that saw the rise of the nation-state and absolute monarchy as well as religious
and civil wars sparked by the Reformation. His life was short, though in that time he was
a close friend of Montaigne and had a successful career as a royal magistrate. His
Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, which he wrote as a young man in college, appears to
be a masterful analysis of the nature of tyranny. In the paragraphs that follow, I first
briefly discuss his life and the events surrounding the writing of the Discourse. I then
explicate his definition of tyranny and explore his examination of the psychology of
obedience. Following this, I delve into his discussion on the structure and specific
mechanisms of tyrannical (or more generally, state) authority, the motives of those who
obey and those who command, and the phenomenon of obedience in the absence of force.
In the process, I attempt to make the case for the role of ‘those few who keep liberty
alive’ in helping the people achieve their liberty.
Étienne de la Boétie “was born in Sarlat, in the Périgord region of southwest
France, in 1530, to an aristocratic family.”54 He was orphaned at an early age, raised by
his uncle, and received his law degree from the University of Orléans in 1553. The
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following year, he was given a royal appointment to the Bordeaux Parlement despite
being too young for the position.
There he pursued a distinguished career as judge and diplomatic negotiator
until his untimely death in 1563, at the age of thirty-two. La Boétie was
also a distinguished poet and humanist, translating Xenophon and
Plutarch, and being closely connected with the leading young Pléiade
group of poets, including Pierre Ronsard, Jean Dorat, and Jean-Antoine de
Baif.55
He wrote the Discourse while a law student at the University. During this time France
was experiencing “a period of questing and religious ferment,” and the University was “a
noted center of free and untrammeled discussion.”56 His mentor was the notable
Huguenot martyr, Anne du Bourg, and his best friend there was Du Bourg’s favorite
student, Lambert Daneau. La Boétie himself was never connected with the Huguenot
cause, however. The University later became a center for Calvinism and some of his
fellow students became Huguenot leaders.
There is some dispute as to exactly when the Discourse was written. It was not
published by La Boétie and was only circulated in manuscript form. Nannerl Keohane
speculates that it was written
under the immediate stimulus of the harsh repression of the revolte des
gabelles in Bordeaux, which led to the execution of a number of city
fathers who had failed to act with sufficient firmness against the rebels, as
well as to the suppression of the parlement of Bordeaux and the
humiliation of the city.57
It is certainly likely that such an event would have a significant impression on the young
La Boétie. Paul Bonnefon adds further elucidation on the subject:
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The teaching of the law [during the sixteenth century] was a preaching
rather than an institution, a sort of search for truth, carried on by teacher
and student in common, and which they feverishly undertook together,
opening up an endless field for philosophic speculation.58
The radical views expressed in the Discourse may have been an important reason for its
being withheld from publication. It did achieve considerable fame in local intellectual
circles, however, as evidenced by the fact that Montaigne had read it long before he and
La Boétie met in 1559 as fellow members of the Bordeaux Parlement. They became
extremely close friends. It was Montaigne who claimed first that La Boétie had written
the essay at the youthful age of eighteen and then later at the even younger age of sixteen.
Harry Kurz accepted the former and the date of 1548 as the date the essay was likely
written.59 Keohane (in 1980), however, dates the writing of the essay to 1550, when La
Boétie was around nineteen or twenty years old. The reason for this dating is not clear,
however.60 Rothbard, citing (in 1975) recent scholarship that Keohane seems to have
overlooked, argues that the claims of Montaigne are incorrect. Montaigne was probably
trying
to guard his dead friend’s reputation by dissociating him from the
revolutionary Huguenots who were claiming La Boétie’s pamphlet for
their own. Extreme youth tended to cast the Discourse in the light of a
work so youthful that the radical content was hardly to be taken seriously
as the views of the author.61
Both internal evidence and the erudition evinced in the essay indicate that it was likely
written in 1552 or 1553 when La Boétie was twenty-two.
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What is it that makes the Discourse so radical? Its abstract and timeless nature is
one aspect of the answer to this question. As Rothbard points out in his introduction, the
essay is structured around a single axiom: that all governments rest upon the consent of
the governed. On the basis of this insight, La Boétie elucidates the nature of tyranny,
transcending the two-fold classical conception of tyranny as either usurpation of power or
government against the laws by exploring the nature of power itself. Contrary to earlier
theorists, tyranny does not depend on the means of acquiring power.
There are three kinds of tyrants; some receive their proud position through
elections by the people, others by force of arms, others by inheritance.
Those who have acquired power by means of war act in such wise that it is
evident they rule over a conquered country. Those who are born to
kingship are scarcely any better, because they are nourished on the breast
of tyranny, suck in with their milk the instincts of the tyrant, and consider
the people under them as their inherited serfs; and according to their
individual disposition, miserly or prodigal, they treat their kingdom as
their property. He who has received the state from the people, however,
ought to be, it seems to me, more bearable and would be so, I think, were
it not for the fact that as soon as he sees himself higher than the others,
flattered by that quality which we call grandeur, he plans never to
relinquish his position. Such a man usually determines to pass on to his
children the authority that the people have conferred upon him; and once
his heirs have taken this attitude, strange it is how far they surpass other
tyrants in all sorts of vices, and especially in cruelty, because they find no
other means to impose this new tyranny than by tightening control and
removing their subjects so far from any notion of liberty that even if the
memory of it is fresh it will soon be eradicated. Yet, to speak accurately, I
do perceive that there is some difference among these three types of
tyranny, but as for stating a preference, I cannot grant there is any. For
although the means of coming into power differ, still the method of ruling
is practically the same; those who are elected act as if they were breaking
in bullocks; those who are conquerors make the people their prey; those
who are heirs plan to treat them as if they were their natural slaves.62
From this passage alone one might interpret the Discourse as an indictment of all
personal power, that is, all forms of monarchy. Indeed, Keohane and other La Boétie
scholars do so. This conclusion is incorrect, however. If La Boétie meant his analysis to
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apply only to monarchy, surely he would not have remarked thus in the opening
paragraph of his essay: “Yet in the light of reason, it is a great misfortune to be at the
beck and call of one master, for it is impossible to be sure that he is going to be kind,
since it is always in his power to be cruel whenever he pleases. As for having several
masters, according to the number one has, it amounts to being that many times
unfortunate.” Tyranny, then, is the exercise of power over others, whether by one tyrant
or many.
La Boétie was not an anarchist as some earlier scholars have supposed.63 He
remarks that he does “not wish at this time to discuss this much debated question, namely
whether other types of government are preferable to monarchy[.]”64 The Discourse does
not present an explicit indictment of republican government or of government in general,
and indeed, La Boétie evinced a clear conservative bent during his career as a
government official. As Rothbard points out, it is certainly not unusual for a radical
young student to “settle into a comfortable and respectable conservatism once well
entrenched in a career bound to the emoluments of the status quo.”65 Rothbard may well
also be right in his suggestion that the very abstractness and universality of the Discourse
allowed La Boétie to divorce theory from practice, permitting him “to be sincerely radical
in the abstract while continuing to be conservative in the concrete.”66 It would seem this
argument is strengthened by Montaigne’s contention (if it can be entirely trusted) that the
Discourse was treated by La Boétie “only by way of an exercise, as a common theme
hashed over in a thousand places in books” though Montaigne has “no doubt that [La
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Boétie] believed what he wrote, for he was so conscientious as not to lie even in jest.”67 I
think that Rothbard is also correct, however, that La Boétie’s analysis is sufficiently
vague to allow one to easily extend it to anarchist conclusions (though this would no
doubt have caused La Boétie no little distress). Keohane seems to obliquely address this
issue when she remarks: “If all authority is tyrannical, it matters little whether one is
ruled by an Egyptian pharaoh, a senate, or a Valois king.”68 Her contention that the only
liberty possible to human beings is mental or spiritual liberty is overly pessimistic,
however.
La Boétie’s motivation for writing the Discourse is lucidly evident:
I should like merely to understand how it happens that so many men, so
many villages, so many cities, so many nations, sometimes suffer under a
single tyrant who has no other power than the power they give him; who is
able to harm them only to the extent to which they have the willingness to
bear with him; who could do them absolutely no injury unless they
preferred to put up with him rather than contradict him. Surely a striking
situation! Yet it is so common that one must grieve the more and wonder
the less at the spectacle of a million men serving in wretchedness, their
necks under the yoke, not constrained by a greater multitude than they…69
He is not merely puzzled and curious but appalled.
Shall we call subjection to such a leader cowardice? Shall we say that
those who serve him are cowardly and faint-hearted? If two, if three, if
four, do not defend themselves from the one, we might call that
circumstance surprising but nevertheless conceivable. In such a case one
might be justified in suspecting a lack of courage. But if a hundred, if a
thousand endure the caprice of a single man, should we not rather say that
they lack not the courage but the desire to rise against him, and that such
an attitude indicates indifference rather than cowardice? When not a
hundred, not a thousand men, but a hundred provinces, a thousand cities, a
million men, refuse to assail a single man from whom the kindest
treatment is the infliction of serfdom and slavery, what shall we call that?
Is it cowardice? Of course there is in every vice inevitably some limit
beyond which one cannot go. Two, possibly ten, may fear one; but when a
67
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thousand, a million men, a thousand cities, fail to protect themselves
against the domination of one man, this cannot be called cowardly, for
cowardice does not sink to such a depth…What monstrous vice, then, is
this which does not even deserve to be called cowardice, a vice for which
no term can be found vile enough, which nature herself disavows and our
tongues refuse to name?70
The subject is all the more disturbing once we realize that violence is not required to
overthrow this single tyrant, “for he is automatically defeated if the country refuses to
consent to its own enslavement: it is not necessary to deprive him of anything, but simply
to give him nothing; there is no need that the country make an effort to do anything for
itself provided it does nothing against itself.”71
In light of the above, La Boétie concludes that it is the people themselves who
bring about their own subjection. They enslave themselves by choosing to be vassals
instead of free men. If they but “cease to submit they would put an end to their
servitude.”72 In keeping with this conclusion, La Boétie does not urge tyrannicide or
violence of any kind, though he does not explicitly disapprove of such action. Rather, he
argues as if to encourage people to resist tyranny by showing them that it does not require
great boldness or entail heavy cost.
If in order to have liberty nothing more is needed than to long for it, if
only a simple act of the will is necessary, is there any nation in the world
that considers a single wish too high a price to pay in order to recover
rights which it ought to be ready to redeem at the cost of its blood, rights
such that their loss must bring all men of honor to the point of feeling life
to be unendurable and death itself a deliverance?
Just as a fire requires fuel to burn or a tree nourishment to grow, so too does a
tyrant. If he is simply not obeyed, he will become “naked and undone and as
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nothing,”73 but the more he is yielded to the stronger and more insatiable he
becomes.
For this reason, La Boétie exhibits a degree of contempt for the stupid and
cowardly who long for liberty but make no effort to claim it. He laments that if they but
did so, they would be happy and contented, but wonders that it seems liberty is the only
joy men do not insist upon.
Poor, wretched, and stupid peoples, nations determined on your own
misfortune and blind to your own good! You let yourselves be deprived
before your own eyes of the best part of your revenues; your fields are
plundered, your homes robbed, your family heirlooms taken away. You
live in such a way that you cannot claim a single thing as your own; and it
would seem that you consider yourselves lucky to be loaned your
property, your families, and even your lives. All this havoc, this
misfortune, this ruin, descends upon you not from alien foes, but from the
one enemy whom you yourselves render as powerful as he is, for whom
you go bravely to war, for whose greatness you do not refuse to offer your
own bodies unto death. He who thus domineers over you has only two
eyes, only two hands, only one body, no more than is possessed by the
least man among the infinite numbers dwelling in your cities; he has
indeed nothing more than the power you confer upon him to destroy you.
Where has he acquired enough eyes to spy on you, if you do not provide
them yourselves? How can he have so many arms to beat you with, if he
does not borrow them from you? The feet that trample down your cities,
where does he get them if they are not your own? How does he have any
power over you except through you? How would he dare assail you if he
had no cooperation from you? What could he do to you if you yourselves
did not connive with the thief who plunders you, if you were not
accomplices of the murderer who kills you, if you were not traitors to
yourselves? You sow your crops in order that he may ravage them, you
install and furnish your homes to give him goods to pillage; you rear your
daughters that he may gratify his lust; you bring up your children in order
that he may confer upon them the greatest privilege he knows – to be led
into his battles, to be delivered to butchery, to be made the servants of his
greed and the instruments of his vengeance; you yield your bodies unto
hard labor in order that he may indulge in his delights and wallow in his
filthy pleasures; you weaken yourselves in order to make him the stronger
and the mightier to hold you in check. From all these indignities, such as
the very beasts of the field would not endure, you can deliver yourselves if
you try, not by taking action, but merely by willing to be free. Resolve to
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serve no more, and you are at once freed. I do not ask that you place hands
upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply that you support him no
longer; then you will behold him, like a great Colossus whose pedestal has
been pulled away, fall of his own weight and break into pieces.74
The rhetoric of this passage implies that people are not free when their will is not their
own, that is, when someone else controls how they make use of their person and property.
A people are collectively complicit in their subjection to a tyrant, however. La Boétie
sharply criticizes fighting someone else’s war and working for someone else’s interest to
the exclusion of your own. What he advocates as a solution is clearly secession, the onesided severance of a hegemonic bond. Highly hierarchical and militarized organization,
and organized mass violence, are not necessary; the people, or some critical mass of
them, need only withdraw consent. Without a significant portion of the people’s help, the
tyrant’s power to dominate dissipates. As we will see in part five, the French Revolution
greatly violated the spirit of this passage; in overthrowing a tyrannical monarch the
people became cogs in a new tyrannical machine, victims and/or petty tyrants in a
popular despotism.
The complicity of the people in their own subjection begs two questions: why do
people give up their natural liberty and is it really in man’s nature to be free?
La Boétie answers the second question first with a definite affirmative. He argues
“that nature, the handmaiden of God, governess of men, has cast us all in the same mold
in order that we may behold in one another companions, or rather brothers.”75 It is true,
he admits, that men are not born with equal abilities, but he maintains that our own
natures and that of the world are such that we need not live life as if in a battlefield but
rather we are eminently suited to cooperation. “One should…conclude that in distributing
74
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larger shares to some and smaller to others, nature has intended to give occasion for
brotherly love to become manifest, some of us having the strength to help others who are
in need of it.”76 We all have the gift of speech and, as the faculty of reason is our main
advantage over other animals, for we do not possess the advantageous physical traits of
other species, it is in our mutual best interest to pursue cooperation rather than conflict.
The advantage of cooperation is such that La Boétie argues “there can be no further doubt
that we are all naturally free, inasmuch as we are all comrades. Accordingly it should not
enter the mind of anyone that nature has placed some of us in slavery, since she has
actually created us all in one likeness.”77 Liberty, then, is natural: one cannot be held as a
slave without being wronged. This is reminiscent of Aristotle’s arguments that, since man
is a political animal, a life pursuant with his nature is one of reason and discourse not
force.78 Finally, as freedom is our natural state, we have a natural urge to defend it.
Indeed, La Boétie holds that this fact is so self-evident that even the lower animals are
seen to possess this urge, and that only the severely corrupted could fail to recognize it.
Man’s natural liberty, and his seeming readiness to give it up and forget about it,
leads La Boétie to wonder how such a tragedy could come about. What could so denature
man “that he, the only creature really born to be free, lacks the memory of his original
condition and the desire to return to it?”79 He can see only two ways that a free man could
allow himself to become enslaved: he must either be driven into it by force or else led
into it by deception. A people can be conquered or duped. Moreover, he finds that when a
people loses “their liberty through deceit they are not so often betrayed by others as
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misled by themselves.”80 This often happens during crisis, for example, when a people,
thrust into war, entrust a general with a large army and emergency powers. Upon his
victorious return he is greeted as a hero, transforms himself into a king and then into a
tyrant.
La Boétie finds it to be amazing how quickly and easily a people fall “into such
complete forgetfulness of their freedom” once they become subject; they can scarcely “be
roused to the point of regaining it,” so easily and readily do they obey.81 In the beginning,
force and constraint are generally necessary to compel submission. Successive
generations, however,
obey without regret and perform willingly what their predecessors had
done because they had to. This is why men born under the yoke and then
nourished and reared in slavery are content, without further effort, to live
in their native circumstance, unaware of any other state or right, and
considering as quite natural the condition into which they were born.82
The first explanation, then, for man’s readiness to give up his natural liberty and submit
to slavery is custom, “namely, habituation to subjection.”83 Just as a man can build up an
immunity to poison by slowly imbibing greater amounts of it, so too does man “learn to
swallow, and not to find bitter, the venom of servitude.”84 La Boétie foreshadows the
modern ‘nature vs. nurture’ debate, ascribing a far greater role in man’s mental formation
to custom rather than to biology. Like a seed our faculty of reason and love of liberty
must be nurtured if it is to bear good fruit; if it is planted in poor soil and abused, it will
grow stunted at best, be entirely perverted or destroyed at worst.
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Custom, then, “becomes the first reason for voluntary servitude.”85 “[A]ll those
things to which [man] is trained and accustomed seem natural to [him]” whereas that
which is truly native to him is that “which he receives with his primitive, untrained
individuality.”86
Men will grow accustomed to the idea that they have always been in
subjection, that their fathers lived in the same way; they will think they are
obliged to suffer this evil, and will persuade themselves by example and
imitation of others, finally investing those who order them around with
proprietary rights, based on the idea that it has always been this way.87
Not all men, however.
There are always a few, better endowed than others, who feel the weight
of the yoke and cannot restrain themselves from attempting to shake it off:
these are the men who never become tamed under subjection…who…
cannot prevent themselves from peering about for their natural privileges
and from remembering their ancestors and their former ways. These are in
fact the men who, possessed of clear minds and far-sighted spirit, are not
satisfied, like the brutish mass, to see only what is at their feet, but rather
look about them, behind and before, and even recall the things of the past
in order to judge those of the future, and compare both with their present
condition. These are the ones who, having good minds of their own, have
further trained them by study and learning. Even if liberty had entirely
perished from the earth, such men would invent it. For them slavery has
no satisfactions, no matter how well disguised.88
But these men face an obstacle. Tyrants are well aware that education undermines their
authority and so seek to suppress learning or, more so in modern times, to pervert it into
supporting the status quo. These few may have difficulty finding one another, particularly
if they have lost freedom of action and speech; however, though this might lead lovers of
liberty to despair, La Boétie reminds us of history’s many examples of heroes who have
not “failed to deliver their country from evil hands when they set about their task with a
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firm, whole-hearted, and sincere intention. Liberty, as if to reveal her nature, seems to
have given them new strength.”89
Keohane has a different interpretation of the Discourse, however. She initially
focuses on La Boétie’s condemnation of tyranny and analysis of the psychology of
subjection and explains away his call for nonviolent withdrawal of consent as mere
rhetoric to facilitate the former. She argues that unlike his friend, he had nothing but
contempt for the popular will and evinced “none of the ability to identify with ordinary
people that Montaigne developed with the years.”90 As we have seen, the Discourse is
indeed an elitist essay. But is it, as Keohane suggests, an attempt to rationalize a narrowly
delimited sphere of joy out of an essentially bleak worldview? She argues that La Boétie
“holds out a vision of a community of brothers, a fraternity of educated men throughout
the ages that binds together the natural free spirits.”91 In support of this thesis, she points
out an obscure and isolated reference to the “liberty of the Republic of Plato.”92 Further
evidence is that the radicalism of the Discourse is never expressed in his public life. His
later friendship with Montaigne is yet further evidence. Certainly, Keohane’s thesis is
compatible and even complementary to Rothbard’s explanation for La Boétie’s
conservatism.
I am not convinced that La Boétie’s “beautiful vision of a transtemporal
fraternity” is the whole story, however. It may very well have been the underlying theme
of his essay, and it does indeed provide solace to lovers of liberty who find their bodies
but not their minds subjected to slavery. Yet, in light of his celebration of liberty and of
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heroes who help free their country, and given his superlative analysis of the nature of
tyranny, how it comes about, and how people can be rid of it, it seems to me that we
would be remiss in not also interpreting the Discourse as a call, to those who will hear it,
to throw off our shackles and embrace liberty in mind and body. Surely, in the spirit of
the brotherhood of mankind that La Boétie expresses so well in his explanation of natural
liberty, it is the great task of those who keep freedom alive to educate their brothers and
help them be free, both in mind and body, when and however possible. Even if escaping
the cave is only possible for a select few – those with a philosophic temperament – one
need not necessarily infer that the philosophers have no obligation to help (when and
however possible) the great mass of the people achieve what liberty they can, that is,
political liberty.
To return to our analysis of tyranny and subjection: “the essential reason why men
take orders willingly is that they are born serfs and are reared as such. From this cause
there follows another result, namely that people easily become cowardly and submissive
under tyrants.” Valor is lost with liberty. Many Americans have had the immediate
experience in the twentieth century of seeing firsthand the superiority of a voluntary army
over a conscripted one. This is because, as La Boétie rightly observes,
Among free men there is competition as to who will do most, each for the
common good, each by himself, all expecting to share in the misfortunes
of defeat, or in the benefits of victory; but an enslaved people loses in
addition to this warlike courage all signs of enthusiasm, for their hearts are
degraded, submissive, and incapable of any great deed. Tyrants are well
aware of this, and, in order to degrade their subjects further, encourage
them to assume this attitude and make it instinctive.93
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Due to his precarious position, the tyrant must always fear his subjects. For this reason,
he cannot “consider his power firmly established until he has reached the point where
there is no man under him who is of any worth.”94
Tyrants throughout history have used countless ingenious methods of deceiving
and stultifying their subjects. Among the more blatant examples cited by La Boétie is that
of Cyrus. In order to quell a rebellion in the recently conquered capital city of the
Lydians, rather than squashing the city by force of arms or establishing a garrison to
police it, Cyrus “established in it brothels, taverns, and public games, and issued a
proclamation that the inhabitants were to enjoy them.”95 La Boétie marvels at how
suspicious city dwellers are of those who have their welfare at heart and yet are so
gullible toward those who would fool them. So easily are they duped by such things as
“[p]lays, farces, spectacles, gladiators, strange beasts, medals, pictures, and other such
opiates”; such things “were for ancient peoples the bait toward slavery, the price of their
liberty, the instruments of tyranny.”96
By these practices and enticements the ancient dictators so successfully
lulled their subjects under the yoke, that the stupefied peoples, fascinated
by the pastimes and vain pleasures flashed before their eyes, learned
subservience as naively, but not so creditably, as little children learn to
read by looking at bright picture books. Roman tyrants invented a further
refinement. They often provided the city wards with feasts to cajole the
rabble, always more readily tempted by the pleasure of eating than
anything else. The most intelligent and understanding amongst them
would not have quit his soup bowl to recover the liberty of the Republic of
Plato. Tyrants would distribute largess, a bushel of wheat, a gallon of
wine, and a sesterce: and then everybody would shamelessly cry, “Long
live the King!” The fools did not realize that they were merely recovering
a portion of their own property, and that their ruler could not have given
them what they were receiving without having first taken it from them. A
man might one day be presented with a sesterce and gorge himself on a
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public feast, lauding Tiberius and Nero for handsome liberality, who on
the morrow, would be forced to abandon his property to their avarice, his
children to their lust, his very blood to the cruelty of these magnificent
emperors, without offering any more resistance than a stone or a tree
stump.97
The mob has always behaved this way, and so have tyrants. Indeed, one has merely to
look around to see the above mentioned practices being performed, merely modern
variations on the same theme.
Another favorite tactic of the Roman emperors was to claim to be a man of the
people. The emperors generally assumed the title of Tribune of the People, traditionally
an office of sacred trust, dedicated to the defense and protection of the people. Indeed, the
rulers of Rome and La Boétie’s France are little different: “they never undertake an
unjust policy, even of some importance, without prefacing it with some pretty speech
concerning public welfare and common good.”98 The people themselves will even create
their own myths to glorify the nation to which they belong.
La Boétie also remarks on the frequent use by tyrants of religion to support their
rule. Tyrants often wrap themselves in divinity. The kings of the Assyrians and the
Medes would show themselves as little as possible in public so as to encourage the
imaginations of their people into making them out to be more than men. La Boétie does
not spare even his own kingdom. Even the leaders of France have “employed…certain
similar devices, such as toads, fleur-de-lys, sacred vessels, and standards with flames of
gold.”99
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The absence of criticism of the Catholic Church in the foregoing is a curious one.
To be sure, La Boétie sharply criticizes attempts by tyrants to wrap themselves in divinity
and cloak themselves behind religion. This would seem to extend logically to the ‘divine
right of kings’ doctrine embraced by medieval European monarchs. La Boétie’s further
(apparently sarcastic) remarks about the French kings may shed some light on the
subject:
I do not wish, for my part, to be incredulous, since neither we nor our
ancestors have had any occasion up to now for skepticism. Our kings have
always been so generous in times of peace and so valiant in time of war,
that from birth they seem not to have been created by nature like many
others, but even before birth to have been designated by Almighty God for
the government and preservation of this kingdom. Even if this were not so,
yet should I not enter the tilting ground to call in question the truth of our
traditions, or to examine them so strictly as to take away their fine
conceits. Here is such a field for our French poetry…These poets are
defending our language so well that I dare believe that very soon neither
the Greeks nor the Latins will in this respect have any advantage over us
except possibly that of seniority. And I should assuredly do wrong to our
poesy…I should do the Muse great injury if I deprived her now of those
fine tales about King Clovis…Certainly I should be presumptuous if I
tried to cast slurs on our records and thus invade the realm of our poets.100
King Clovis was the first Christian (Catholic, to be precise) king of France. The Frankish
king, one of the first of the line known as Merovingians, was baptized in 496. Three
thousand of his warriors soon followed him in baptism, thus beginning the conversion of
Gaul (France) to Catholicism.101
Kurz, Rothbard, and Keohane all indicate that La Boétie was Catholic himself,
however. Indeed, Rothbard and Keohane refer to only one other political writing
attributed to him and written shortly before he died, Memoir Concerning the Edict of
January, 1562, in which he wrote approvingly of the “king’s Catholic cause against the
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[Protestant] Huguenots”102 and advised the government to “punish Protestant leaders as
rebels, [and] to enforce Catholicism upon France[.]”103 Yet Kurz, writing about four
decades earlier, refers to the same work as approving of the Chancellor of France’s edict
“conferring greater freedom of worship upon the Huguenots.”104 These two accounts
appear to be in direct conflict. Rothbard and Keohane make no mention of this apparent
discrepancy whatsoever, making it a fruitful area for future research. The Edict itself,
promulgated under Charles IX, was an attempt to avoid civil war by declaring over two
thousand French Protestant churches to be legal and repealing many restrictive laws.
Rothbard indicates that in the Memoir La Boétie also calls for “reform [of] the
abuses of the Church moderately and respectably by the agency of the king and his
Parlements.”105 And Kurz mentions that during the last three years of his life, La Boétie
was extremely active at Agen, a hotbed of angry dispute where churches
were violently entered and images destroyed. […] His sense of fairness
generally led him to assign to the disputants different churches, and, in
towns with only one place of worship, different hours for religious
services.106
Without an English translation of the Memoir available, it is pure speculation on my part,
but it appears these differing accounts might be at least partially reconcilable through the
Discourse. La Boétie is critical of tyrants and their use of religion to bolster their power.
Yet in the absence of any call on the people to commit tyrannicide or violence of any
kind; with an apparent call instead to withdraw their consent; coupled with his remarks
praising liberty, reason, and the brotherhood of mankind, it might be that La Boétie
detested abuse of authority and violence by French officials, Catholics, and Protestants
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alike. Weight is lent to this conjecture by the conservatism he evinced in life and
Montaigne’s claim regarding his devotion “to the tranquillity of his country” and his
hostility “to the commotions and innovations of his time.”107
To return from this digression to the text of the Discourse: Tyrants have used the
above-mentioned tricks and more “to train their people not only in servility and
obedience toward themselves, but also in adoration,”108 yet identification of these varied
instruments of tyranny does not get us to the heart of the matter. La Boétie observes that
the guards and armies employed by tyrants are rather more for ceremony and show of
force than for any practical effect of security they can provide; they offer little protection
from stealthy assassins, for example. He also notes the frequency with which tyrants are
slain by their own followers.
Ultimately, La Boétie finds a hierarchical pyramid of privilege to be “the
mainspring and the secret of domination, the support and foundation of tyranny.”109
[T]here are only four or five who maintain the dictator, four or five who
keep the country in bondage to him. Five or six have always had access to
his ear, and have either gone to him of their own accord, or else have been
summoned by him, to be accomplices in his cruelties, companions in his
pleasures, panders to his lusts, and sharers in his plunders. These six
manage their chief so successfully that he comes to be held accountable
not only for his own misdeeds but even for theirs. The six have six
hundred who profit under them, and with the six hundred they do what
they have accomplished with their tyrant. The six hundred maintain under
them six thousand, whom they promote in rank, upon whom they confer
the government of provinces or the direction of finances, in order that they
may serve as instruments of avarice and cruelty, executing orders at the
proper time and working such havoc all around that they could not last
except under the shadow of the six hundred, nor be exempt from law and
punishments except through their influence.110
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In this way, the tyrant’s regime permeates through society until “not the six thousand but
a hundred thousand, and even millions, cling to the tyrant by this cord to which they are
tied.”111 By handing out favors and profits, large and small, “all the wicked dregs of the
nation…all those who are corrupted by burning ambition or extraordinary avarice, these
gather around him and support him in order to have a share in the booty and to constitute
themselves petty chiefs under the big tyrant.”112 The structural incentives of the
tyrannical regime bind men into a web of interest and ambition.
Thus the tyrant divides his people against one another. He uses some of his
subjects to subdue the others and “thus is protected by those from whom, if they were
decent men, he would have to guard himself[.]”113 Consequently, while toppling the
tyrant appears at first glance to be a simple matter of withdrawing consent, in light of this
insight the matter turns out to be far more complicated. It is evident that the subjects face
a collective action problem. Would-be resisters face many obstacles, from having to
operate underground to possessing inferior firepower and training to organizing and
motivating resistance in the face of danger to life and limb. The revolutionaries have to
deal with the problem of free riders, for there is ample temptation to avoid the risk of
losing one’s life and property by letting others do all the work. But they also have to
contend with the temptation for illicit gain through selling out to the tyrant.
Defenders of liberty possess a powerful ally in the unnatural lives of the tyrant
and his followers, however. Such is the nature of a tyrant that even his followers suffer at
his hands. Such men will “endure evil if permitted to commit it, not against him who
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exploits them, but against those who like themselves, submit, but are helpless.”114 Yet
ultimately to live in such a way is folly. Such men are still slaves, albeit privileged ones.
Indeed, La Boétie argues that while their lives may be materially better than those whom
they exploit, the helpless people they exploit are actually freer and better off. The
downtrodden are merely forced to do what they are told when they are told to do it. By
contrast, the tyrant’s followers are constantly in competition amongst themselves to woo
him and gain his favor. They must not only anticipate his every desire but do so before
their competitors, necessarily to the neglect of their own preferences. Not a moment of
their lives is really their own. A moment’s failure can spell the end. “What condition is
more wretched than to live thus, with nothing to call one’s own, receiving from someone
else one’s sustenance, one’s power to act, one’s body, one’s very life?”115 And this is
often the reason why so many tyrants have died at the hands of their followers, even
“their closest favorites who, observing the nature of tyranny, could not be so confident of
the whim of the tyrant as they were distrustful of his power.”116 To ally with men such as
this in order to be free of a tyrant is to risk exchanging an old tyrant for a new and
possibly worse tyrant, however.
La Boétie’s solution to tyranny – mass nonviolent withdrawal of consent – is not
the only possible solution. As I have noted, traditional political thought and history have
favored violent resistance to tyranny. La Boétie’s theory, despite its originality, had little
if any influence on subsequent theorists until the nineteenth century, over two hundred
years after the Discourse was written. It is almost certain that Henry David Thoreau was
at least indirectly influenced by La Boétie; his close friend Ralph Waldo Emerson was
114
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familiar with the Discourse117 and Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience bears a striking kinship
to it as we shall see. Leo Tolstoy’s nonviolent anarchism was directly influenced by La
Boétie; he quotes a passage from the Discourse in his The Law of Love and the Law of
Violence. Such important twentieth century figures as Mohandas Gandhi and Martin
Luther King, Jr., were indirectly influenced by La Boétie as well. Though Gandhi had
already begun to develop his own doctrine of nonviolent resistance independently,
Tolstoy’s Letter to a Hindu had a deep influence on him.118 Gandhi also read and was
influenced by Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience.119 And King was certainly influenced by
Gandhi and Thoreau.120
Until Thoreau and Tolstoy, resistance to tyranny continued to be equated with
violence. This was the case even for such eminent resistance theorists of seventeenthcentury England as Milton, Sidney, and Locke. These thinkers had a profound influence
on the colonization of North America, as the colonists fled the religious oppression of
England; on the subsequent struggle of the colonists from English tyranny; and on the
formation of the United States of America.
There are many lessons would-be revolutionaries can learn from La Boétie’s
Discourse aside from how to identify the means by which a tyrant acquires and maintains
his power. Consider the discussion of the tyrant’s followers in the previous paragraph.
Not all men who serve a tyrant are necessarily evil, without a decent bone in their bodies.
Moreover, a friendless life of sycophancy is far from a happy one. Also, observing and
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carrying out atrocities may weigh on one’s conscience. This is particularly true of the
followers of the lowest rank, the soldiers and police who see and carry out the oppression
firsthand, who often have chosen their jobs, if they have chosen them at all, merely to
make a living and/or purchase some measure of security. While defending oneself, even
against these, is certainly justified, fighting tends to polarize the two sides and makes
conversion more difficult. Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. developed civil
disobedience tactics that have proven in theory and practice to be effective at changing
the hearts and minds of others. The genius of nonviolent resistance is that it creates a
tension in the minds of the doers of injustice. It forces one to confront the cognitive
dissonance that must exist between one’s actions and what one knows to be right; it
forces the recognition of the fundamental humanity of those who are oppressed.121
Consider also La Boétie’s claim that it is difficult for ‘those few who keep
freedom alive’ to find one another. Advanced communication technology such as the
internet can make it far easier for interested people to find one another, promote their
ideas, and coordinate their activities. Talk of strategy and tactics is moot, however, if the
people lack the motivation and organization to resist their oppressors. The people need to
be made aware of their rights and of their power to resist. Advanced means of
communication can also be a medium for revealing that, indeed, the emperor has no
clothes. Yet economists have a difficult time explaining how the collective action
problem, which becomes all the more complicated in a democracy due to the obscured
line between ruler and ruled, can be surmounted. The explanation, at least with regard to
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our subject, is ideology. Despite the seemingly insurmountable obstacles in the way of
freedom, there are countless examples of peoples rising up to overthrow their oppressors.
Invariably, such freedom movements were motivated by religious and political ideologies
of varying degrees of sophistication. I will now turn to an illustration of the role of
religious and political ideology in revolutions, and of the conflict between liberty and
power.

48

IV. The Role of Religious and Political Ideology
in the American Revolution and Founding
WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness – That to
secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government,
laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in
such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness.
– Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of Independence, 1776
Some scholars have correctly pointed out that natural law is inherently radical and
revolutionary. Lord Acton wrote, “Liberalism wishes for what ought to be, irrespective of
what is.”122 This means that the individual, “armed with natural law moral principles, is
then in a firm position from which to criticize existing regimes and institutions, to hold
them up to the strong and harsh light of reason.”123 The very fact that “natural-law
theorists derive from the very nature of man a fixed structure of law independent of time
and place, or of habit or authority or group norms, makes that law a mighty force for
radical change.”124 I am indebted to Rothbard for bringing to my attention the following
pertinent observation by conservative political scientist Samuel Huntington:
No ideational theory can be used to defend existing institutions
satisfactorily, even when those institutions in general reflect the values of
that ideology. The perfect nature of the ideology’s ideal and the imperfect
nature and inevitable mutation of the institutions create a gap between the
two. The ideal becomes a standard by which to criticize the institutions,
much to the embarrassment of those who believe in the ideal and yet still
wish to defend the institutions.
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He then adds in a footnote: “Hence any theory of natural law as a set of transcendent and
universal moral principles is inherently non-conservative…Opposition to natural law
[is]…a distinguishing characteristic of conservatism.”125
In what follows I attempt to illustrate the conflict between liberty and power by
sketching the role of religious and political ideology in the American Revolution and in
the later Founding of the United States through the ratification of the Constitution. I
begin by tracing the roots of these ideas through the Protestant Reformation and
revolutionary Seventeenth Century England, then their role in motivating the colonists to
secede from England are discussed, though space limitations obviously prevent this from
being even close to an exhaustive treatment. Following this is a discussion on whether the
Revolution was radical or conservative, or, not necessarily the same thing, (classical)
liberal or conservative. Finally, I pose the question of whether the Constitutional
Convention represented a liberal innovation or a conservative counter-revolution (or,
alternatively, as Albert Jay Nock put it, an industrial coup d’Etat). These issues bear on
the overall focus of this entire essay, which is not merely voluntary subjection to tyranny
and what motivates people to withdraw their consent but also what constitutes tyranny.
Different peoples at various times in history have had different definitions of what
constitutes tyranny. However, if there is such a thing as natural law, and I believe there is,
then by improving our understanding of it we can arrive at an increasingly refined
conception of what constitutes tyranny. The seed of this understanding was already
present in early liberalism. It had only to be brought to its logical conclusion by
subsequent liberals (i.e., libertarians).126
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IV.1 The Role of Religious and Political Ideology in the American Revolution
In America today, we take for granted the separation of church and state. Indeed,
at least in part due to the complications arising from an extensive public education
system, the separation of church and state that we have today appears more like a jagged
wound when compared to the separation of church and state as it was conceived in
Jefferson’s day. The phrase “separation of church and state” does not actually appear in
the Constitution. The 1st Amendment reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The phrase “separation of church
and state” originated from Jefferson as his interpretation of the 1st Amendment in his
January 1, 1802 letter to the Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association; therein, he
called it a "wall of separation between church and State." In comparison to the American
experience leading up to the framing of the Constitution, the Constitution itself is a
secular document influenced by classical republicanism, English constitutionalism, and
Lockean (classical) liberalism. The 1st Amendment was not meant to completely expunge
religion from government as is commonly supposed these days by modern Leftist
liberals, judges, and atheists, however. It was merely meant to protect freedom of religion
by prohibiting the establishment of a federal religion as well as the enforcement or
prohibition of specific religious practices by the state. The early Americans were, with
few exceptions, a profoundly religious people. Religion played a powerful role in the
colonization of America, the subsequent development of the colonies, and the American
Revolution. Contrary to prevailing opinion, the early United States of America was
126
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shaped not only by classical republicanism, English constitutionalism, and (classical)
liberalism but by the Christian religion also.127 As we shall see, for the early Americans,
religious and political ideology were intimately intertwined.
IV.1.1 The English Roots of American Religious and Political Ideology128
Before delving into the role of religious and political ideology in the American
Revolution, it is important to trace the roots of these beliefs back to the Protestant
Reformation, English constitutionalism, and the upheaval that was the SeventeenthCentury Revolution in England. Of particular interest to us is the political thought of John
Milton, Algernon Sidney, and John Locke, for their influence on the Founders was
profound. Let us begin, then, by setting the stage for the Protestant Reformation; if it was
not for this monumental event in history the United States of America might never have
been founded.
Prior to the Reformation, Medieval Europe was subject to canon and feudal law.
In his essay “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” John Adams called these
institutions the “two greatest systems of tyranny.”129 Both systems are derived and
perverted from Christianity in order to gratify the passions of the “great.” According to
Adams and other Protestants, they are lies promulgated by the great to keep the poor
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willingly in subjection. The canon law was the province of the Catholic Church. Its
clergy
persuaded mankind to believe, faithfully and undoubtingly, that God
Almighty had entrusted them [the clergy] with the keys of heaven, whose
gates they might open and close at pleasure; with a power of dispensation
over all the rules and obligations of morality; with authority to license all
sorts of sins and crimes; with a power of deposing princes and absolving
subjects from allegiance; with a power of procuring or withholding the
rain of heaven and the beams of the sun; with the management of
earthquakes, pestilence, and famine; nay, with the mysterious, awful,
incomprehensible power of creating out of bread and wine the flesh and
blood of God himself.130
Such beliefs were instilled and maintained in the people by keeping them ignorant and by
instilling in them a religious aversion to letters and knowledge, and thereby keeping them
in awe of the clergy.
The feudal law is similar to canon law, albeit not as subtle and refined. It too
serves to keep the people in ignorance and poverty, relegated to the bottom of a rigid
social hierarchy. The general or chief or king claimed all the land of a given territory as
his property. All of the lesser lords and officers down to the common people themselves
held their lands
by a variety of duties and services, all tending to bind the chains the faster
on every order of mankind. In this manner the common people were held
together in herds and clans in a state of servile dependence on their lords,
bound, even by the tenure of their lands, to follow them, whenever they
commanded, to their wars, and in a state of total ignorance of every thing
divine and human, excepting the use of arms and the culture of their
lands.131
While the use and threat of force by the elites was no doubt more prevalent in the
enforcement of feudal law than in canon law, La Boétie and Hume have shown us that all
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governmental institutions ultimately depend for their continuation upon general popular
acceptance, even the worst tyrannies, and even such institutions as the Catholic Church.
The unholy alliance of canon and feudal law, of Pope and monarch, with each
giving legitimacy to and reinforcing the other, held the people “in ignorance, [without]
liberty, and with her, knowledge and virtue too.”132 Thanks in no small part to the
invention of the printing press, which made available cheap mass produced copies of the
Bible in the vernacular, the Protestant Reformation broke the monopoly of the Catholic
Church on Christ’s teachings and, in so doing, disrupted the ties between King and
Church. The door was opened to individual interpretation of the Bible and, consequently,
there was an increased incentive among the general population to become literate and, in
general, educated. This in turn increased demand for books and the further development
of printing.133 With the diffusion of Biblical knowledge came a desire for religious
liberty. The decentralization of the Christian religion was soon followed by a desire for
political liberty and political decentralization. If we are all equal in the eyes of God, why
not in our political relations as well?134 Along with the diffusion of religious knowledge
came a religion-inspired desire among the people for the realization of their political
rights; it brought them the realization that they were the rightful and actual source of
political power, not their rulers. A rigid and hierarchical society of status was disrupted
and gradually dismantled, to be replaced by a dynamic and voluntary society of contract.
The Bible became a living document in England and in continental Europe. The
English had already extracted some measure of protection for their rights by limiting the
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power of the king with the Magna Carta in 1215. England in the seventeenth-century was
experiencing two countervailing forces, however. On the one hand, the people were
finding compelling support and motivation in the Bible for greater political liberty. On
the other hand, the kings, particularly Charles I, saw this trend as a threat to their power
and sought to consolidate power in their hands to suppress it. As Hill notes, “Direct
access to the sacred text gave a sense of assurance to laymen which they had previously
lacked, and so fortified long-standing criticisms of the church and its clergy.”135 Quarrels
broke out between Protestants and Catholics, and between divergent groups of
Protestants, as to the meaning of Scripture. Each side was able to find support in the
Bible for its position. Biblical scholarship exploded as positions were laid out and
defended, and the accuracy of the text itself was questioned. What “had been muttered in
ale-houses could now be read by anybody.”136 And debate was not limited to merely
theological matters; the Bible was used to support various and conflicting political beliefs
as well.
England in the seventeenth-century did indeed experience a cultural revolution.
The Bible became an integral part of every aspect of life. Hill cites the Puritan oracle,
William Perkins, who “declared that Scripture ‘comprehendeth many holy sciences’,
including ethics, economics, politics, academy (‘the doctrine of governing schools
well’).”137 In 1642, Milton “spoke of the Bible as ‘that book within whose sacred context
all wisdom is enfolded’.”138 In response to Sir Robert Filmer’s defense of absolute
monarchy, Patriarcha, both Sidney and Locke employed the authority of the Bible. All
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sides were agreed, however, in the wake of the Reformation, that “[c]hurch and state in
Tudor England were one.”139
As early as the first half of the sixteenth-century, censorship was attempted. King
Henry VIII tried to “abolish ‘diversity of opinions’ by Act of Parliament,” though he was
not very successful, and neither were his successors.140 Matters came to a head during the
reign of Charles I. “In 1628 Charles I was outraged when the Commons called for the
Petition of Right – the first significant modification of the royal prerogative – to be
printed, because he did not want ordinary people to read or discuss it.”141 He dissolved
Parliament in 1629 and ruled personally for eleven years. Desperately needing money to
subdue the Scots, he recalled Parliament in 1640; it became known as the Short
Parliament because within three months he dissolved it again when they proved
unamenable to his wishes. After another military defeat he was once again persuaded to
recall Parliament, now known as the Long Parliament. “In 1641 a proposal to print the
Grand Remonstrance, a list of the Commons’ grievances against Charles I’s government,
led to uproar in the House, in which swords were drawn for the only recorded time in
history. It presaged civil war, in which Parliament had to appeal to the common people if
Charles was to be defeated.”142
Into this period strides John Milton with Areopagitica, a compelling though
ultimately (concerning its practical purpose) ineffective call for a free press. Milton had
expected prior censorship to be relaxed under the new revolutionary regime. His hopes
and the cause of liberty were delivered a setback when the new Parliament passed a bill
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that provided for the licensing of the press. In Areopagitica, Milton appealed to the new
regime to reconsider its decision and free England’s press from its restraints.
To Milton, a free and unlicensed press was of paramount importance: “Give me
liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all
liberties.”143 His central argument for freedom of conscience is that mature adults must
learn the great virtue of temperance, but they can only do so by the light of their own
reason and through hard-earned experience. This task God has given to every man, by
giving each free will; each must be free to choose, to make mistakes and to learn from
them.144 Without the possibility of vice there can be no virtue, or at least virtue would be
a pale and pathetic thing: impure. We are purified by trial, i.e., confronting that which is
contrary to the good and/or to what we know (or think we know).145 It is for this reason
that we must be free to exercise our own conscience. And it is the need for freedom of
conscience, founded in human nature, that is at the root of Milton’s other arguments. He
further argues that the knowledge contained in a corrupt book will not defile the
conscience of the pure, for “To the pure all things are pure.”146 Whereas even the best
books are to a “naughty mind…not unappliable to occasions of evill.”147 Bad books, on
the other hand serve a “discreet and judicious Reader…in many respects to discover, to
confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate.”148 Truth will emerge from the healthy discourse of
free and open debate that an unlicensed press allows. In contrast, censorship will help to
prolong error and falsehood. Among others, he also makes a consistency argument: “If
143
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we think to regulat Printing, thereby to rectifie manners, we must regulat all recreations
and pastimes, all that is delightful to man.”149
In his other works, Milton defended the revolution and the practice of regicide.
Milton argues that all men were born naturally free150 and that while “the Magistrate was
set above the people, so the Law was set above the Magistrate.”151 Moreover, “if the King
or Magistrate prov’d unfaithful to his trust, the people would be disingag’d,” meaning
that they would have no obligation towards him.152 Milton agreed with the lawyer and
churchman, Lord Henry de Bracton, that “kings ought to use the power of law and right
as God’s servant and viceregent; the power to do wrong is the Devil’s, and not God’s;
when the king turns aside to do wrong, he is the servant of the Devil.”153 Milton
favorably quotes a passage from Seneca: “There can be slaine/No sacrifice to God more
acceptable/Then an unjust and wicked King.”154 The revolution, conducted “under the
inspection of God first implored, and under his manifest guidance, setting examples and
performing deeds of valor, the greatest since the foundation of the world – delivered the
Commonwealth from a grievous domination, and religion from a most debasing
thralldom.”155 In “The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Commonwealth,” Milton
criticizes centralized government and lays out his vision of an essentially republican
government that included an aristocratic and a popular assembly.
Like his contemporary, John Locke, and his predecessor, John Milton, Algernon
Sidney argues in Discourses Concerning Government that good government must be
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founded upon the consent of the governed. Like Locke, Sidney strongly stresses the
individual’s right to liberty. For Sidney and Locke, liberty means a natural equality of
authority, of an “independency upon the will of another,”156 for “God is our lord by right
of creation, and our only lord, because he only hath created us.”157 Unlike Locke,
however, who is far more a modernist, Sidney’s thought harkens back to the classical
philosophers in that he criticizes “liberty without restraint” (licentiousness158) as being
“inconsistent with any government, and the good which man naturally desires for
himself, children, and friends.”159 Rational liberty is supported by virtue, and
consequently, good government, contra Locke, does not merely protect liberty but
rewards virtue and punishes vice.160 The form of government that best performs these
functions, Sidney argues, is a mixed-constitution republic, consisting not only of
monarchic elements but also of aristocratic and democratic. Further, government must be
restrained to operate only within the general principles of law or else the people will be
ruled by the arbitrary whims of men. In arriving at this conclusion and his refutation of
absolute monarchy, he criticizes blind faith, arguing instead for the importance of
reasoning from first principles,161 though his arguments make liberal use of Scripture as
well as reason and historical experience.
It is with Locke that we find what has become the best known, perhaps the
standard, liberal doctrine for the proper purpose of government. As the meat of his
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political philosophy has already been dealt with in part two and will be again in part six,
discussion of his importance to the American Revolution is dealt with in the next section.
IV.1.2 Religious and Political Ideology in the American Revolution
It is as an outgrowth of the religious ferment in revolutionary Seventeenth
Century England that the settlement of America by English Protestants fleeing
persecution, and the later Revolution and Founding, are to be understood. Milton, Sidney,
Locke, and others had argued that God had bestowed upon mankind the tools that made
him fit to judge what is best in matters religious and civil. The settlers fled to America in
search of the liberty to do just that.
America was viewed as a promised land. Under the reign of Charles I, John
Winthrop, the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, preached his famous
“City on a Hill” sermon, which was based on Matthew 5:14 (“You are the light of the
world. A city set on a hill cannot be hid."). In this sermon, he urged the soon-to-be
Puritan colonists of New England to make their new community a “city on a hill,” an
example to the Christian world. Puritans believed that the Anglican Church had fallen
from grace by accepting Catholic rituals. Moreover, Winthrop and other Puritans
believed that all nations have a covenant with God, and since England had violated this
covenant, the Puritans had to leave the country. It was his hope and theirs that
Christianity would be purified in the New World and serve as an example of a proper
Protestant community to the Old World. He warned his fellow colonists, “if wee shall
deale falsely with our god in this worke wee have undertaken and soe cause him to
withdrawe his present help from us, wee shall be made a story and a byword through the
world, wee shall open the mouthes of enemies to speake evill of the wayes of god and all
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professours for Gods sake."162 Massachusetts maintained exceedingly strict regulations
on religious and moral conduct early on, particularly in contrast to the loosely-bound
societies of the Chesapeake Bay and Jamestown colonies. In general, however, religious
‘liberty’ in early colonial America meant only freedom from Canterbury and Rome; that
is, from the Anglican and Catholic Churches. Even after the Constitution was ratified
some states still had established religions – only the national government was prohibited
from establishing religion.
In the 1730s and 1740s, America experienced a spiritual revolution called the
Great Awakening. “Narrowly construed as occurring in the years 1739 to 1742,”163 the
Great Awakening was a religious revival movement that sought a return to the Pilgrim’s
strict Calvinist roots and to reawaken the fear of God. It was brought on in response to a
decline in religiosity that had been occurring for decades, perhaps due in part as a
reaction to the Salem witch trials. Alan Heimert and Perry Miller write that the Great
Awakening “clearly began a new era, not merely of American Protestantism, but in the
evolution of the American mind.”164 Indeed, it was perhaps the first truly “American”
event and, as such, it represented a step towards a common identity in the hearts and
minds of the colonists. Throughout the period and later as well, itinerant preachers sprang
up across the colonies calling themselves the “New Lights.” In contrast to the “Old
Lights,” as the new brand of preachers called them, “who eschewed emotion and

162

John Winthrop, “A Modell of Christian Charity (1630),” in Political Thought in America: An Anthology,
2nd Edition, Michael B. Levy, ed. (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 1992), p. 12.
163
Elis Sandoz, ed., Political Sermons of the American Founding Era, 1730-1805, Vol. 1, 2nd Edition
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998), p. xv.
164
Quoted in Sandoz, p. xv.
61

experimental religion,”165 the New Lights sought to revive religious feeling in the
colonists. The intent was for each person to experience a
vivid communion with God…, with the consequence that this concourse
becomes the transformative core for that person, who therewith sees
himself as a “new man”: initially in the conversion experience
(represented as a spiritual rebirth) and subsequently in the continuing
meditative nurture of the soul, pursued by every means but chiefly, in
American Protestantism, through prayer, sermons, and scriptural
meditation.166
“The great cry of the awakeners was for a converted ministry, one able to revive religious
communities lacking vitality and zeal, so as to make the presence of God with his people
a palpable reality.”167
The New Lights did not confine themselves to theological issues solely. American
preachers had several means available for expounding Protestant political theology.168
Among these were election sermons “preached annually to the governor and legislature
after the election of officers.”169 Other vehicles were artillery sermons, convention
sermons, sermons given on holidays such as the day Charles I was executed, sermons on
holy days, and century sermons such as the Glorious Revolution’s centenary in 1788, and
more. Thousands of sermons were examined for inclusion into Dr. Sandoz’s anthology;
of these, fifty-five were selected. As a measure not merely of the quality of published
political sermons but also of the quantity preached in colonial America, “very few of the
sermons preached ever were published; thus, Samuel Dunbar, an Old Light minister of
Stoughton, Massachusetts, wrote out some eight thousand sermons during his long career
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but published only nine of them.”170 Due to space constraints I will limit myself to citing
just a few of the political sermons from Sandoz’s anthology.
Though not the only one to do so, Elisha Williams is notable for his seamless
melding of a Lockean framework and Scriptural foundation for natural rights. Though his
sermon does not primarily deal with the general purview of civil government but rather
with the right to liberty of conscience, he nevertheless provides an excellent treatment of
the origin and end of government, and his argument is easily generalizable beyond
religious liberty. He notes that “the sacred scriptures are the alone rule of faith and
practice to a Christian…that every Christian has a right of judging for himself what he is
to believe and practice in religion according to that rule,” which he finds “perfectly
inconsistent with any power in the civil magistrate to make any penal laws in matters of
religion.”171
Christ alone is our master in matters of religion, and matters of religion for a
Christian covers quite a lot of ground. The Scriptures are Christ’s Word and our means of
knowing his Will, therefore as God has created us with free will and the faculty of reason,
we alone bear the responsibility of interpreting it.
[F]or any to assume the power of directing the consciences of men, not
leaving them to the scriptures alone, is evidently a declaring them to be
defective and insufficient to that purpose; and therefore that our Lord who
has left us the scriptures for that purpose, did not know what was
necessary and sufficient for us, and has given us a law, the defects of
which were to be supplied by the wisdom of some of his own wiser
disciples. How high an impeachment this is of his infinite wisdom, such
would do well to consider, who impose their own doctrines, interpretations
or decisions upon any men by punishments, legal incapacities, or any
other methods besides those used and directed to in the sacred scriptures.
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And as all imposers on men’s consciences are guilty of rebellion against
GOD and CHRIST, of manifest disobedience to and contempt of their
authority and commands; so all they who submit their consciences to any
such unjust usurp’d authority[.]172
This is not merely an indictment of the interference of civil government in religious
matters but of private interference as well. Everyone must be free to join, leave, or form
any worshipping assembly that their judgment sees fit to join, leave, or form, or to
worship singly, so long as they do so peaceably.
Williams’s line of reasoning in matters of religious liberty is fascinatingly
paralleled by Christian-Lockean arguments on the origin and end of government, and for
resisting tyranny. Consider Williams’s own. “For the freedom of man and liberty of
acting according to his own will (without being subject to the will of another) is grounded
on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by,
and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will.”173 All men are
naturally equal in authority. Our natural liberty consists not in being free to do absolutely
anything we please, that is, to satisfy our whims of the moment. Rather, “it consists in a
freedom from any superior power on earth, and not being under the will or legislative
authority of man, and having only the law of nature (or in other words, of its Maker) for
his rule.”174 Consequently, every man has an equal right to his person, and to performing
the legitimate actions necessary for his preservation, which means that he has a right to
his property as well and the right to defend his person and property from those who
would take it against his will. In typical Lockean fashion, Williams argues that men come
together to form civil governments in order to provide a measure of security unavailable
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in a state of nature. This then is the just, if rarely the historical, origin of government. The
only just end of government is thus the protection of person and property from the
initiation of force. Christians not only have a right but a duty to resist an unjust
government.
Jonathan Mayhew, writing in the wake of the repeal of the Stamp Act, affirmed
that Americans “were free-born…so we have a natural right to our own, till we have
freely consented to part with it, either in person, or by those whom we have appointed to
represent, and to act for us.”175 This natural right is “affirmed and secured to us, as we are
British subjects, by Magna Charta; all acts contrary to which, are said to be ipso facto
null and void[.]”176 At issue were an American aversion to being taxed without
representation and fears of the money being used to support an oppressive standing army
and state religion. He nevertheless urged the Christian “duty of cultivating a close
harmony with the mother-country, and a dutiful submission to king and Parliament, our
chief grievances being redressed;” however, he means not to “disswade people from
having a just concern for their own rights, or legal, constitutional privileges.”177
Americans must be ever on their guard, for Christ is the only King “that, in a religious or
moral sense, ‘can do no wrong’.”178 While “men sleep, then the enemy cometh and
soweth tares, which cannot be rooted out again till the end of the world, without rooting
out the wheat with them.”179 He reminds his listeners that “God gave the Israelites a king
[or absolute monarch] in his anger, because they had not sense and virtue enough to like a
free commonwealth, and to have himself for their king; that the Son of God came down
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from heaven to make us ‘free indeed’; and that ‘where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
liberty’; this made me conclude, that freedom was a great blessing.”180
In a more radically patriotic and revolutionary sermon, regarding the Gaspee
affair, John Allen appeals to the Earl of Dartmouth’s Christianity: “The law of GOD
directs us to do unto others, as we would they should do unto us.”181 What true Christian,
he asks, then, “will oppress his fellow-creatures?”182 He remarks threateningly that “such
men, who will take away the rights of any people, are neither fit for heaven; nor earth,
neither fit for the land or the dunghill.”183 Again, the issue was taxation without
representation. The Gaspee had been burned in response to the oppressive mission of its
crew to expropriate the peoples’ property against their will. The grievance was
compounded with England’s intent to try the perpetrators not in an American court under
American law, but in a special Admiralty court three thousand miles from their homes
under English law, for treason. Quoting Scripture, Allen contends that “where there is no
Law, there is no transgression.”184 America is the native right of Americans. The King
“can have no more right to America, than what the people have, by compact, invested
him with, which is only a power to protect them, and defend their rights civil and
religious; and to sign, seal, and confirm, as their steward, such laws as the people of
America shall consent to.”185 The Americans, therefore, were in the right to defend their
property. He echoes Mayhew in professing that Americans have a Christian love and duty
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to their King and mother-country, but warns against provoking a revolution that could
destroy both England and America.
Two passages of Christ’s teachings, quoted in Elisha Williams’s sermon convey
the general theme of the political sermons. The first is “no Man can serve two Masters,
but he must unavoidably prefer the one and neglect the other.”186 The second is “For one
is your Master even Christ, and all ye are Brethren: And call no Man your Father upon
Earth; for one is your Father which is in Heaven: Neither be ye called Masters; for one is
your Master even Christ.”187 Taken together, these two passages indict all earthly
authority, aside from, as we have seen, each individual’s conscience in interpreting
Scripture, though a man can choose to delegate his authority voluntarily to a
representative in civil government who is tasked with looking after his interests.
The political sermons were not the only medium through which politics and
religion met in colonial America. Religion played a direct role in the conduct, debate, and
policies of government officials from the lowliest town selectman to the colonial
legislatures and governors. Politics and religion also met in print via newspapers in the
form of open letters to the people as well as in the activity known as pamphleteering.
Among those who took active part in both of these mediums was John Adams, one of the
Founding Fathers, a man whom Benjamin Rush called “the Atlas of American
Independence.”188 Rush “thought there was a consensus among the generation of 1776
that Adams possessed ‘more learning probably, both ancient and modern, than any man
who subscribed the Declaration of Independence.’”189 He “wrote some of the most
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important and influential essays, constitutions [most notably that of Massachusetts in
1780], and treatises of the Revolutionary period.”190
Like his contemporaries, John Adams defends the preexisting liberties of the
American people from English oppression. Though he recognized the policies of England
as growing increasingly tyrannical towards the colonies, he did not mean to suggest
overturning the English form of government. David McCullough argues that Adams
viewed English constitutionalism in an extremely positive light.
The English constitution, Adams declared – and knowing he would be
taken to task for it – was the ideal…it was “the most stupendous fabric of
human invention” in all history. Americans should be applauded for
imitating it as far as has been done, but also, he stressed, for making
certain improvements in the original[.]191
To Adams, the English system of government was not the problem but rather the current
government was.
To be more precise, the current policies towards the colonies, because they were
crafted without the consent of the colonists since the colonies were not represented in
Parliament, were tyrannical. In 1765, Adams “called for a town meeting in order to
instruct its representative to the General Court on how the colony should respond to
Parliament and the Stamp Act.”192 In “Instructions of the Town of Braintree to Their
Representative,” Adams argues that the “Stamp Act is unconstitutional and therefore void
because it deprives Americans of their traditional English rights to taxation by consent
and trial by jury.”193 He laments the current situation:
Such is our loyalty to the King, our veneration for both houses of
Parliament, and our affection for all our fellow-subjects in Britain, that
190

Ibid.
David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 375.
192
Thompson, p. 38.
193
Ibid.
191

68

measures which discover any unkindliness in that country towards us are
the more sensibly and intimately felt. And we can no longer forbear
complaining, that many of the measures of the late ministry, and some of
the late acts of Parliament, have a tendency, in our apprehension, to divest
us of our most essential rights and liberties.194
The forcing of laws upon the colonists without their consent could only lead to slavery. In
“Novanglus,” he argues against an apologist for England that the potential revolutionaries
in the colonies
can hardly be losers if unsuccessful; because, if they live, they can be but
slaves, after an unfortunate effort, and slaves they would have been if they
had not resisted. So that nothing is lost. If they die, they cannot be said to
lose, for death is better than slavery. If they succeed, their gains are
immense. They preserve their liberties.195
Revolution, then, was the only reasonable choice for the colonists, if England could not
be persuaded to restore justice.
“In late 1775, Adams assumed a leading role in the Continental Congress to
encourage the thirteen colonies to begin designing and constructing new
governments.”196 In his “Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present State of the
American Colonies,” he lays out, by popular request, the general principles that he
thought most essential to framing a just and proper government. Building on English
constitutionalism and classical republicanism, Adams was strongly in favor of a
separation of powers between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of
government. The legislature should be divided into two houses. This separation of
powers, he thought, would better ensure the effective functioning of government as well
as restrain potential abuses of power by posing each branch (and house, in the legislature)
as a check on the other.
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Adams echoes Sidney when he declares that “the happiness of man, as well as his
dignity, consists in virtue. […] The noblest principles and most generous affections in our
nature, then, have the fairest chance to support the noblest and most generous models of
government;”197 namely, a republican one. Moreover, the preservation of liberty and just
government rests upon the virtue of the citizens, which in turn is supported by proper
education. Small wonder, then, that in “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” he
praises the Puritans whose “civil and religious principles, therefore, conspired to prompt
them to use every measure and take every precaution in their power to propagate and
perpetuate knowledge. For this purpose they laid very early the foundations of colleges,
and invested them with ample privileges and emoluments.”198 And in “Thoughts on
Government,” he argues that “[l]aws for the liberal education of youth, especially of the
lower class of people, are so extremely wise and useful, that, to a humane and generous
mind, no expense for this purpose would be thought extravagant.”199 In the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution, he went further by including provisions that made it a
requirement to be Christian in order to be elected to public office. Also constitutionalized
was recognition of and support for the university of Massachusetts, Harvard College,
which was a seminary at the time. Too, support was stipulated in the Massachusetts
Constitution for
the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the
towns; to encourage private societies and public institutions, rewards and
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce,
trades, manufactures, and a natural history of the country; to countenance
and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public
and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their
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dealings, sincerity, good humor, and all social affections and generous
sentiments of the people.200
Like Sidney, Adams recognizes that the longevity of a just government depends
fundamentally upon the continued virtue of its citizens. What both failed to understand is
that government is the last institution one should want attempting to inculcate virtue.
While the New Light preachers and figures such as John Adams and the other
Founders played important roles in arousing the colonists’ passion for liberty, two of the
most important figures in this regard were Locke himself, by proxy, and Thomas Paine.
Not long after the battles of Lexington and Concord, Paine issued a fiery pamphlet
entitled Common Sense. In it he openly called for American independence, as the only
alternative to slavery to Britain. He attacked the very principle of monarchy and was
perhaps the first to openly denounce King George as the villain. And he criticized socalled republican government in England, with its mixed constitution and checks and
balances such that each branch was supposed to act as a check on the other. This
complicated system of government made it difficult for the people to determine where
responsibility lay when they had grievances. Moreover, the monarchic and aristocratic
elements were independent of the people. In reality, the complexity of the system masked
the repression of the democratic element. And, in any event, for the government to act,
one branch had to be at least temporarily dominant; the checks of the other branches at
best served to gum up the works, so to speak, and slow the progress of the dominant
branch. He favored instead, simple republican governments with single-chamber
legislatures, and spoke of ordinary farmers and artisans as making “the best
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governors.”201 He also favored free trade with the world rather than the mercantilist
policies of Britain. He makes a libertarian distinction between society and government:
“Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness; the former
promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by
restraining our vices.”202 He also, while taking a Lockean stance on the nature and
purpose of government, correctly recognizes that the origin of government has almost
invariably been through conquest not voluntary social contract. Common Sense spread
like wildfire and inspired many others to similar exertions.
We have already seen how at least one preacher incorporated Lockean natural
rights arguments into popularized Christian political theology. Among other more notable
writers were John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon of Cato’s Letters, which were
published from 1720 to 1723. Indeed, in his book Seedtime of the Republic, historian
Clinton Rossiter once remarked that “no one can spend any time in the newspapers,
library inventories, and pamphlets of colonial America without realising that Cato’s
Letters rather than Locke’s Civil Government was the most popular, quotable, esteemed
source of political ideas in the colonial period.”203 Trenchard and Gordon, many
preachers, and others, popularized dry and theoretical arguments and were extremely
influential in America. Consider Gordon’s thoughts on what is liberty:
By Liberty I understand the Power which every Man has over his own
Actions, and his Right to enjoy the Fruits of his Labour, Art, and Industry,
as far as by it he hurts not the Society, or any Members of it, by taking
from any Member, or by hindering him from enjoying what he himself
201
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enjoys. The Fruits of a Man's honest Industry are the just Rewards of it,
ascertained to him by natural and eternal Equity, as is his Title to use them
in the Manner which he thinks fit: And thus, with the above Limitations,
every Man is sole Lord and Arbiter of his own private Actions and
Property.204
From such a foundation, Trenchard and Gordon made passionate arguments in defense of
freedom of speech and conscience. The colonists eagerly imbibed their rhetoric that
“government in general, and the British government specifically, was the great violator of
such rights, and warned also that power – government – stood ever ready to conspire to
violate the liberties of the individual. To stop this crippling and destructive invasion of
liberty by power, the people must be ever wary, ever vigilant, ever alert to conspiracies of
the rulers to expand their power and aggress against their subjects.”205 And the colonists’
conspiracy view of the British government turned out to be justified.
IV.2 The American Revolution: Radical or Conservative?
At this point it would be fruitful to compare the American Revolution with one
that it helped to inspire, the French Revolution. Many Americans were at first elated by
this event and initially gave it high praise. Elation soon turned to horror, however, as the
French Revolution transformed into the worst tableau of tyranny: popular despotism.
What was the difference? What had gone wrong? Many conservative scholars,
particularly neoconservatives, hold that the difference lies in the fact that the American
Revolution was essentially a conservative revolution. The Americans sought only to
restore justice by overthrowing tyranny, to defend preexisting rights and traditions that
England was violating. It was also a holy revolution in the Christian sense of the word.
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In so far as the French Revolution sought liberty, says Noah Webster, its cause
was “the noblest ever undertaken by men. It was necessary; it was just.”206
The feudal and papal systems were tyrannical in the extreme; they fettered
and debased the mind; they enslaved a great portion of Europe. While
legislators of France confined themselves to a correction of real evils, they
were the most respectable reformers: they commanded the attention, the
applause and the admiration of surrounding nations. But when they
descended to legislate upon names, opinions and customs, that could have
no influence upon liberty or social rights, they became contemptible; and
when faction took the lead, when a difference of opinion on the form of
government proper for France, or a mere adherence to a solemn oath,
became high treason punishable with death, the triumphant faction [the
Jacobins] inspired even friends of the revolution, with disgust and horror.
Liberty is the cry of these men, while with the grimace of a Cromwell,
they deprive every man who will not go all the lengths of their rash
measures, of both liberty and life [and property]. A free republic, is their
perpetual cant; yet to establish their own ideas of this free government,
they have formed and now exercise throughout France a military
aristocracy, the most bloody and despotic recorded in history.207
While in its initial fazes the French Revolution sought to secure liberty, its ultimate
mission became a complete and total overturning of the old order. The hubris of the
utopian visionaries of the French Revolution led them to believe they could remake the
entire social order in all its infinite complexity and do so through central planning. They
forgot that human reason has its limitations; and one of the traditions they threw off was
the Christian doctrine of original sin, which served the function of reminding man that he
is not infallible or omniscient. “In seeking liberty, France [had] gone beyond her.”208
But if the French Revolution was radical, does that necessarily make the
American Revolution conservative, even if only by comparison? To the American
colonists, the fight for independence was intimately a matter of both reason and faith,
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mind and heart, civil and religious tradition. These intertwined elements were the
motivation and raison d’etre of the American Revolution. This is no better expressed than
in the Declaration of Independence.
Are not all revolutions inherently radical, however? A political revolution is a
fundamental change in political organization. Such an event can hardly be termed
conservative. But as revolutions go – that is, relatively speaking – was it a conservative
revolution? In a certain sense, it is possible to speak of all revolutions as “conservative”
in that all are reactions against increasing oppression; they are generally attempts to
restore some previous better condition. But to use the word “conservative” in this way is
to make it meaningless. The Declaration of Independence makes clear “that mankind is
more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing
the forms to which they are accustomed.” To overthrow such habits, even in the face of a
long train of abuses leading them into slavery, is a fundamentally radical act.209
The ideology of natural rights, individual liberty, and popular sovereignty is an
inherently revolutionary one, overthrowing the old orders of feudal and canon law as well
as their more modern descendants and all forms of oppression. We have seen how it
began in Seventeenth Century England and became more radical in America, culminating
in the Revolution, the liberating spirit of which motivated the colonists to resist not only
English tyranny but tyranny at home as well. The liberating spirit of Revolution also
induced many colonists, mostly in the North, to challenge slavery.210
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As Murray Rothbard argues in his four-volume work, Conceived in Liberty, there
were other ways in which the American Revolution was radical. “It was the first
successful war of national liberation against western imperialism.”211 It was also a
people’s war and, insofar as it was successful, it was won with guerrilla strategy and
tactics against an otherwise superior army.212 Moreover, the Revolution resulted
in permanent expulsion of 100,000 Tories from the United States. Tories
were hunted, persecuted, their property confiscated, and themselves
sometimes killed…Thus, the French Revolution was, as in so many other
things, foreshadowed by the American. The inner contradiction of the goal
of liberty and the struggle against the Tories during the Revolution
showed that revolutions will be tempted to betray their own principles in
the heat of battle. The American Revolution also prefigured the misguided
use of paper money inflation, and of severe price and wage controls which
proved equally unworkable in America and in France.
The Americans had a long tradition of spontaneous local government that started at the
town level. Their tendency to form spontaneous local and county committees, quasianarchistic institutions that paralleled or replaced old and established governmental ones,
only increased with the Revolution.213 Herein lies the primary difference between the
American and French Revolutions. The American Revolution was largely a grass-roots,
decentralized revolution and the ideology of natural rights, individual liberty, and popular
sovereignty was deeply ingrained in the hearts and minds of the people. By contrast, the
French Revolution was far more collectivist, organized rigidly and planned from the top
down, though there were elements of this in the American Revolution as well.214 And the
French people were experientially lacking in the tradition of liberty the Americans had
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come to take for granted. The French did not truly understand liberty, small wonder that
they went so far beyond her.
We can identify two major sides within the American Revolution, the liberals and
the conservatives, though this is not to say that the conservatives did not hold classical
liberal ideas.215 The former were more local in their interests, democratic, radical, and
more consistent proponents of the ideology of natural rights and individual liberty and of
popular sovereignty. The conservative movement emerged as a reaction to the liberals.
After the Revolution got underway and the British-supported governments and favorites
were overthrown, the problem of who would rule at home arose. The conservatives were
made up of those who were radical in their desire for independence from Britain but
highly conservative on domestic affairs as well as quasi-Tories who opposed
independence until the last minute. The conservatives tended to be strongly aristocratic
and nationalist, and distrusted the will of the people. Rothbard summarizes the tension
between the liberals and conservatives nicely:
The basic issue in internal affairs was simply: Would the American
governments remain as they had emerged at the outset of the Revolution:
spontaneous, libertarian, democratic, and responsive to the checks of the
people? Or would they revert to something very like oligarchic British
rule: strong government, with an executive and upper legislative house far
removed from the people and only partially checked by them? Would
oligarchic power be resumed by a new set of Tory lords in another
guise?216
Men like Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson generally fell into the liberal camp,
while men like John Adams, George Washington, and Alexander Hamilton generally fell
into the conservative camp. We have already glimpsed the work of John Adams and,
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indeed, his “Thoughts on Government” was written in reaction to Thomas Paine’s
Common Sense.217 In contrast to Paine, Adams strongly favored a mixed constitution with
three branches and checks and balances. He favored aristocracy, though not hereditary
aristocracy; few people in America favored hereditary aristocracy. He distinguished
between ‘artificial aristocracy’, “those inequalities of weight and superiorities of
influence which are created and established by civil laws,” favoring instead what he
called ‘natural aristocracy’, which he defined as “those superiorities of influence in
society which grow out of the constitution of human nature.”218 His definition of
aristocracy, however, was decidedly republican: “By aristocracy, I understand all those
men who can command, influence, or procure more than an average number of votes; by
an aristocrat, every man who can and will influence one man to vote besides himself.”
Even the most ‘democratic’ of the Founders, Thomas Jefferson, held this position:
There is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue
and talents... There is also an artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and
birth, without either virtue or talents; for with these it would belong to the
first class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of
nature for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. And,
indeed, it would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man for
the social state and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to
manage the concerns of the society. May we not even say that that form of
government is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure
selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government? The
artificial aristocracy is a mischievous ingredient in government, and
provision should be made to prevent its ascendency.219
However, it was not on the existence of a natural aristocracy that the liberals and
conservatives disagreed, but rather they disagreed on how it would be expressed in the
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form and function of government. Men like Adams saw the natural aristocracy primarily
in terms of the wealthy and well-born, and the politico-economic policies of the
conservatives tended to create an artificial aristocracy whether or not they intended them
to.
Not only was “Thoughts on Government” a reactionary document, but so too was
Adams’s 1780 Massachusetts Constitution. By the time it was written, most of the other
states had already written new constitutions.
The worst example in the eyes of the gentry was that of Pennsylvania,
where in the summer of 1776 “radical” forces [influenced by Paine] had
gained control and fashioned a document without any system of “checks
and balances.” Written by Revolutionaries, it discriminated against all
those who opposed taking up arms against the king, Quaker pacifists as
well as Tories. Yet, in its treatment of those who supported the war effort,
it was remarkably “democratic,” empowering poor men as well as rich
men, privates as well as generals.
[…]
[T]he new Pennsylvania constitution established a single, all-powerful
legislature, elected annually by taxpaying males over the age of twentyone. There were no property qualifications for holding office. And instead
of a powerful governor with a veto, there was a plural executive consisting
of a president and a council, whose job was to simply carry out the will of
the legislature.
[…]
A year later Vermont took the Pennsylvania model a step further. In just
six days [Ethan Allen’s] Green Mountain Boys drafted a constitution that
largely copied the Pennsylvania document, except that it also banned
slavery and enhanced the power of local governments, even allowing
towns to decide such matters as legal fees. In the eyes of many in western
Massachusetts, Vermont was an example to be followed. Strengthening
town government, enhancing the power of town meetings, was clearly the
direction in which to move. In the eyes of the Massachusetts gentry,
however, Vermont was an outlaw state and its constitution was an
abomination.
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Rhode Island, which did not even bother to write a new constitution but rather “simply
deleted all references to the British crown from its old colonial charter,” had a similar
form of government and was viewed in much the same light as Vermont by the
Massachusetts gentry.220
The new Massachusetts constitution was highly conservative and had much in
common with Maryland’s. In it Adams advocated a high property-value qualification for
suffrage. Real estate was made the sole qualification for eligibility to public office;
money and other personal property would not count. Intervals between elections longer
than those of Pennsylvania were established. The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution was,
in many ways, a prototype of the US Constitution. The executive and upper house of the
legislature were strong and independent; both were highly aristocratic. The upper house
was designed to represent the interests of the wealthy. And the judiciary was independent
of the control of ordinary people. The governor had veto power and complete control
over the military. He could appoint all judges, whose tenure rested on good behavior
unless removed by him and his council.
This constitution, which followed on the heels of the rejected conservative
Constitution of 1778, was bitterly contested.
The heaviest opposition to the constitution came over the declaration of
rights and its weakness in insuring freedom of speech or habeas corpus.
Many towns opposed the property qualifications, as well as the appointive
power of the executive and the oligarchy of independent judges. Also
bitterly fought in the press and in the towns was the clause on
establishment of religion.221
The greatest opposition to the property qualifications came from the western towns, the
backcountry of Massachusetts, which were made up mostly of yeoman farmers. They
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pointed out the inconsistency of property qualifications with the revolutionary principle
of no taxation without representation. “Other demands by opposition towns were for
election of local officials, a tight rein on the governor, a unicameral legislature [like that
of Vermont and Rhode Island], and a loosening of the highly restrictive provisions for
amendment of the constitution.”222
No small amount of chicanery was involved in getting this constitution ratified.
The 1778 constitution had required unqualified support of a two-thirds majority, the
entire document would be rejected if any detail was objected to, and so it was rejected.
Having learned from this, the proponents of the new constitution contrived
a ratification process that virtually guaranteed approval of their
handiwork. Instead of requiring unqualified support, this time a town
might suggest scores of amendments and still be counted as a ‘yes’ vote.
Every town was to vote on the constitution, clause by clause, and state
objections to any clause that did not obtain a majority. Then the adjourned
constitutional convention was to look at the results, and if there appeared
to be a two-thirds majority for each clause to declare the constitution
ratified, and if there did not appear to be a two-thirds majority to make
alterations ‘in accord with the popular will’.
What if there was no popular will? What if sixty towns objected to a
provision for one reason, and another sixty for the opposite reason? Such
was the case when it came to the relationship of church to state. And what
if a town never took a vote on an article it objected to? If it had just
suggested an amendment and voted on the amendment? Should the votes
for the amendment be counted as votes against the original article? That
might seem logical, but that is not what happened. In fact, most towns
never took a vote on an article that the majority clearly opposed, just on
the substituted amendment, and these votes were not counted against the
original article. Similarly, the vote counters decided other ticklish issues in
behalf of their creation. Every article thus passed by a landslide.223
It did not sit well with the people of the backcountry that the new constitution took power
out of their hands and gave it to the Boston gentry. In addition to the objections already
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mentioned, many of the western towns preferred “superior court judges to be either
elected or appointed annually,…justices of the peace to be elected,” and “censured the
new constitution for allowing the house to do business when only sixty members were
present. This, they argued, was especially biased in favor of the mercantile elite and the
eastern part of the state.”224
The conflict between liberals and conservatives also manifested in the Continental
Army under George Washington. The citizen militias of the colonists were individualistic
and democratic in spirit. “[T]he officers of the militia were elected by their own men, and
the discipline of repeated elections kept the officers from forming an aristocratic ruling
caste typical of European armies of the period. The officers often drew little more pay
than their men and there were no hierarchical distinctions of rank imposed between
officers and men. As a consequence, officers could not enforce their wills coercively on
the soldiery.”225 These militias were eminently well-suited to guerrilla warfare and a
libertarian-style revolution. Washington, however, proceeded to mold the new
Continental Army on the European model. He “insisted on distinctive decorations of
dress in accordance with minute gradations of rank” and, despite the unfeasible expense
involved, “tried to stamp out individuality in the army by forcing uniforms upon
them[.]”226 He also introduced extensive inequality in pay between the officers and
common soldiers. Strict and harsh discipline was enforced.
The Continental Army proved expensive, not only for the Continental Congress
which went heavily into debt financing the war, but also for the soldiers who, when they
were paid, were paid in depreciating paper notes. Being away from their farms for
224
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extended periods of time, they too went into debt. Many of the officers, particularly those
not independently wealthy, were no better off, despite their higher pay; “Washington
wanted his officers to be more like European officers, to dress elegantly, to have an
enlisted man as a body servant, to haul around lots of personal baggage, to ride a horse
rather than march, to dine in taverns rather than in field messes.”227
It has already been noted that the Revolutionary War was a people’s war. The war
had the support of a majority of the people and could not have been won without it. The
British military possessed superior firepower and fought with conventional military
strategy and tactics. In recent decades scholars have become increasingly aware of the
effectiveness of guerrilla warfare in wars of liberation, both in terms of strategy and
tactics as well as morale and monetary cost. The Revolutionary War, insofar as it was
successful, was largely won due to the fact that it was a people’s war fought with
guerrilla-style strategy and tactics (including privateering). Attempts to fight a
conventional war resulted in many of the Americans’ worst defeats, required an
increasing consolidation of power in the Congress, and enriched well-connected
individuals while saddling the people with debt.228
By 1780, with the victories in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the war was
already winding down. Congress and the several states had put severe strain on the
economy with rampant inflation and price controls begun early in the war. As Secretary
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of Finance between 1780-83, Robert Morris consolidated immense power under his
control, virtually every function of government, including America’s first central bank.
Congress created quasi-independent executive departments each headed by a nonelected
bureaucrat. Morris demanded and received from Congress the power to hire anyone for
his own department and fire anyone in any other department. The naval and admiralty
boards were consolidated under his department. In other departments, he helped friends
and associates into positions of power. “[E]very Monday night Morris called together the
major executive officers of government…in an informal but effective cabinet
meeting.”229 He also demanded and received advance sanction for any private business
dealings he might have while in office. With the Bank of North America, Morris issued
his own notes called “Morris notes” and “Morris warrants” which depreciated rapidly,
and he amassed a considerable public debt on behalf of Congress. Morris, it seems,
“wanted to bind the national government to powerful ‘private interest,’ to the ‘interests of
monied men.’” Alexander Hamilton, too, it is well known, favored mercantilist policies;
he wrote that
there are some who maintain that trade will regulate itself, and is not to be
benefited by the encouragements, or restraints, of government. Such
persons will imagine, that there is no need of a common directing power.
This is one of those wild speculative paradoxes which have grown into
credit among us, contrary to the uniform practice and sense of the most
enlightened nations.230
Rather than apportioning the Congressional debt among the states as befit the idea behind
the Articles of Confederation, the conservatives pushed for Congress to assume all of the
public debt, even that held by the several states, which would help tie the interests of the
nation to a central government and bureaucracy. In other words, as the passage by
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Hamilton indicates, the idea was to recreate a version of the mercantilist States of Europe
in America.231
In the foregoing I have attempted to illustrate the conflict between the liberals and
the conservatives. I have not attempted to tell the whole story here, for such would be
impossible. The American Revolution, insofar as it was a revolution against England,
was fundamentally a radical event. The conflict between the liberals and conservatives
was over the question of the extent to which the principles of the Revolution were to
apply at home with the end of British rule. By the early 1780s, conservatives had swept
into power in most states. In 1781, conservatives pushed for a federal tariff that was
narrowly defeated by Rhode Island’s failure to ratify the necessary amendment to the
Articles of Confederation and Virginia’s last minute repeal of its ratification. Insofar as
there was a revolution at home, the conflict between the liberals and the conservatives
was not decided until 1787. It is in this light that the Constitutional Convention and
ratification of the Constitution can be evaluated. Do these events represent a liberal
innovation in government? Or a conservative counter-revolution?
IV.3 The American Constitution:
Liberal Innovation or Conservative Counter-Revolution?
The Federalist Papers, letters written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
and John Jay in support of the newly proposed Constitution, are well known and well
read even over two hundred years after they were written.232 Collectively, these letters are
considered a milestone in American political science. While they present a systematic
defense of the Constitution, this fundamental document did not yet include the Bill of
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Rights we are so familiar with today. It is the less well-known and less well-studied
writings of the opponents of the Constitution, the so-called Anti-Federalists, that we have
to thank for this much needed addition. The opponents of the Constitution were as
diverse in their reasons for opposing it as were the supporters of the proposed new
system. However, one can find common themes that run through many of the AntiFederalists’ writings. Among these is a distrust of the elites, the aristocratic class, who
were promoting the new system of government and no doubt would assume a prominent
role within it. The Anti-Federalists also feared, and rightly so, what they perceived as
features of the new Constitution that would inevitably lead to a consolidation of power in
the national government. The state governments would be abolished, or at the very least
be so subordinated to the national government as to have been stripped of sovereignty.
Such a government would be tyrannical. As it turns out, history has proven the AntiFederalists right in many respects and wrong in others. Ultimately, they failed in
preventing the ratification of the Constitution, though they were instrumental in forcing
the Federalists to add the Bill of Rights. Why did they oppose the Constitution? And what
did they find so objectionable about it?
First, in order to gain perspective on the arguments of the Anti-Federalists and the
Federalists, it would be fruitful to delve briefly into the background history that led to the
framing of the Constitution in the first place. The United States were at the time a federal
republic.233 The word federal was used differently at the time, our current form of
government not having been invented yet. A federal form of government, or
confederation, consists of a council (which the later Federalists would define as a weak
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central government) that serves certain delegated functions for, and whose powers are
delegated by, a number of sovereign states. In this sense, The Impartial Examiner was
correct when he argued that the Anti-Federalists were the true Federalists.234 The term
confederation is now used solely to identify this form of government, while federation or
federalism has shifted in meaning to identify a form of government that is structurally
similar to that of a confederation but with a significantly stronger central government that
shares sovereignty with its component regions.
The United States were governed by the Articles of Confederation. The men who
would become known as Federalists saw three principal deficiencies in the current form
of government. It became apparent, in the wake of the Revolution, that Congress was
unable to pay off the national debt that had been taken on in order to fight the war for
independence; Congress was unable to raise revenue by taxation or force the states to pay
up. It also did not have sufficient power to regulate relations between the states and
foreign nations. Congress could not force the states to abide by treaties or prevent them
from signing their own at cross-purposes with each other. Thus it was recognized by
many that the Articles of Confederation had to be strengthened. But these were not
sufficient reasons to jettison the old system of government entirely, so the AntiFederalists thought.
The third principal deficiency of the Articles of Confederation was the perceived
weakness of the national and state governments in the face of civil unrest and
insurgencies. The immediate catalyst of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was an
event in Massachusetts called Shays’s Rebellion. This event was used by the ruling elites
as an impetus for improving the system of government and, later, as a justification for the
234
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dire need of ratifying the new Constitution. Most importantly, it was this event, as it was
reported to him by his friends, that stirred George Washington out of his retirement and
convinced him to preside over the Constitutional Convention. His presence was pivotal,
as it gave the convention and the controversial Constitution a special air of legitimacy,
for though the “other delegates…were men of great prestige,…none as yet had been
deemed demigods. Washington, in contrast, was already a towering figure, larger than
life, the nation’s most influential citizen. With Washington as presiding officer, everyone
in the country had to take notice.”235
Of the rebellion that occurred in Massachusetts in 1786-87, Washington was
informed by his former aide, Daniel Humphreys, that the uprising was due to the
“licentious spirit prevailing among the people”; that the malcontents were “levellers”
determined to “annihilate all debts public & private.”236 The rebels had shut down courts,
allegedly to suspend debt suits, and had attempted to seize the national arsenal at
Springfield to do…what? The arsenal would have made the rebels better armed than the
state of Massachusetts had they been successful.237 Reports from Humphreys, Henry
Knox, and others instilled in Washington a fear that the political fabric of the nation was
unraveling and that something drastic had to be done to save it.
This popular account of Shays’s Rebellion is a highly distorted one, however. Far
from being a mob of destitute farmers, Shays and his approximately 4,000 fellow rebels
ranged from the heavily indebted and poor to the wealthy and well-to-do. Moreover,
there is absolutely no correlation between debt and the backcountry towns of
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Massachusetts that rebelled. A large number of the rebels were veterans of the
Revolutionary War, including Daniel Shays. The rebellion had popular support in
western Massachusetts. Even those who did not actively take up arms were sympathetic
to the rebel cause. Indeed, nearly all of the citizen militia of Massachusetts either refused
to suppress the rebellion or joined forces with the rebels. And the authorities in Boston
were well aware of this.
If it was not to suspend debt suits and eradicate ‘all debt, public and private’, why
did the farmers of the Massachusetts backcountry rebel? In their eyes, they were fighting
an unjust government. They were the victims of a regressive tax system, an overly
expensive and complicated judicial system, and were not adequately represented in the
Massachusetts government, which was dominated by the Boston gentry and unresponsive
to their needs. In short, their rebellion was in the spirit of the Revolution; they saw
themselves as “Regulators…for the Suppressing of tyrannical government in the
Massachusetts State,”238 a state that was no better than the British colonial rule they had
so recently fought to throw off. It is a not unimportant fact that the government Shays and
his fellows were rebelling against was established by John Adams’s 1780 constitution.
Shays’s Rebellion was sparked by a sharp rise in regressive taxes. The taxes
themselves were increased as part of the plan to pay off the state debt in less than ten
years, and enrich the few at the expense of the many in the process. During and after the
Revolutionary War, the states had issued notes to the soldiers as payment for their
services. Few of these soldiers could afford to wait until their state was able to pay off its
debts, particularly in the face of depreciating paper money, so they often sold them at a
fraction of their value to speculators in order to receive payment that was more
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immediately useful for paying expenses. Large portions of these notes ended up in the
hands of a relative few, note speculators, many of whom had political connections. The
mercantile-dominated legislature managed to get the state debt consolidated at face value,
twice the value necessary to make the state creditworthy, and intended to have it paid off
quickly. Thus, taxes were raised to an oppressive level. Especially hard hit were the
backcountry farmers, particularly those with grown sons. To make matters worse,
payment had to be made in hard money (that is, in gold).
The Massachusetts elite was able to put a negative spin on Shays’s Rebellion.
Their version of the event not only served as the catalyst for the Constitutional
Convention and got Washington out of retirement, but intensified the distrust felt among
the elite about the ability of the common people to govern themselves. “The general
conviction was that ordinary people, especially in Rhode Island and Massachusetts, were
out of control and that there were “combustibles,” as Washington termed them, in every
state.”239 Madison proclaimed, “The insurrections in Massachusetts admonished all the
States of the danger to which they were exposed.”240 Even Elbridge Gerry, who would
later oppose the Constitution, declared, “The evils we experience flow from the excess of
democracy.”241 Indeed, the new Constitution was decidedly aristocratic, especially the
Senate – elected indirectly by the people through their state legislatures and designed
with strong powers to counter the more popularly elected House of Representatives – and
the President, who would be elected indirectly by the people through the Electoral
College. The Supreme Court Justices are not elected at all, but even further removed from
the people in that they are nominated by the President and approved by the Senate.
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Suffrage requirements were left up to the several states and, though property
qualifications were not included for federal officials, the very nature of the offices would
virtually ensure that the wealthy and well-born would tend to dominate them.
The Massachusetts towns that produced Shays’s Rebellion had much in common
with the Anti-Federalists. Most of the former voted against the new Constitution. Like
many of the Anti-Federalists, they distrusted a powerful, unrepresentative government in
the hands of a wealthy and aristocratic elite. Richards points out that in Massachusetts
chicanery was involved in the ratification process of the national Constitution as well.
The document “began with ‘We the People’, but it was not the ‘people’ who had
demanded a new national government. Instead, the Constitution was the handiwork of a
small segment of governing elite, and everyone knew it.” Some of the people’s main
criticisms were the direct tax clause, the three-fifths clause, and the lack of a bill of
rights. “To prevail, noted George Richards Minot, the clerk of the state legislature, King
and his allies had ‘to pack a Convention whose sense would be different from that of the
people.” Even Minot, “an ardent Federalist [himself] and a seasoned observer of dealmaking, was appalled. ‘Never was there a political system introduced by less worthy
means,’ wrote Minot.”242
As Richards also shows, Shays’s Rebellion was not unique; the Regulator
movement was not confined to Massachusetts. These most prominent examples received
nationwide attention: Backcountry yeoman farmers attempted to rebel against tyrannical
state government in North Carolina in 1768 and in South Carolina later in the year; the
former were crushed, while the latter were generally successful in their more limited
aims. A failed insurgency had occurred in New York two years earlier in 1766. And in
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the 1770’s Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys succeeded in carving the
independent republic of Vermont out of New York and New Hampshire.243 The new
Constitution would enable the national government to put an end to such rebellions,
however. One might say, with Richards, that Shays’s Rebellion was the final battle of the
Revolution.
Though not recognizing the justness of Shays’s Rebellion, The Federal Farmer
nevertheless percipiently identifies the aristocratic elite pushing for the adoption of the
Constitution.
Though I have long apprehended that fraudulent debtors, and embarrassed
men, on the one hand, and men, on the other, unfriendly to republican
equality, would produce an uneasiness among the people, and prepare the
way, not for cool and deliberate reforms in the governments, but for
changes calculated to promote the interests of particular orders of men.244
The latter party, in reaction to the former (Shays & Co.), “in 1787, has taken the political
field, and with its fashionable dependents, and the tongue and the pen, is endeavoring to
establish in great haste, a politer kind of government.”245 Though he does not necessarily
identify the Convention delegates as all being part of this group, he nevertheless holds
that this group of “aristocrats support and hasten the adoption of the proposed
constitution, merely because they think it is a stepping stone to their favorite object.”246
Though the tactics used in other states were not as underhanded as in
Pennsylvania, it will be instructive to have a look at the ratification process in the first
state to call a convention on the Constitution. Samuel Bannister Harding informs us:
In the State were two parties, embittered by a dozen years of violent
struggle. On the one side, and for the moment in power, stood the greater
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proportion of the men of property, of education, of large ideas, and federal
views; six of the eight delegates sent by the State to the Federal
convention had come from their number, and the other two – Franklin and
Ingersoll – if not neutral, were at most but moderate Constitutionalists. On
the other side [the Constitutionalists] the leadership had been assumed by
men of obscure birth, of little education or property, and of the narrowest
views. Small wonder, then, that the cause espoused by the first met with
the violent condemnation of the second, and that the contest which ensued
was unprecedented in virulence and animosity.247
The Republican-controlled legislature moved quickly to call a ratifying convention before
the opposition could get organized or obtain thorough information. Sixteen of the AntiFederalist legislators attempted to prevent a quorum by fleeing the assembly. Two were
rounded up and forcibly detained, so that a quorum was established; a vote was
eventually taken and the Constitution was ratified. Though each article was debated, the
dissenting opinion of the minority was kept out of the official record and no amendments
were allowed to be proposed. Moreover, the sixty-nine delegates that made up the
quorum represented a mere ten percent of eligible voters. Less than a week later, an open
letter was published by a person or group claiming to be the Pennsylvania Minority.248
After criticizing the lack of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution, a sticking point
for the Anti-Federalists, and recommending fourteen, the Pennsylvania Minority goes on
to raise three general objections. The first raises the point that, “the most celebrated
writers on government, and…uniform experience, [tell us] that a very extensive territory
cannot be governed on the principles of freedom, otherwise than by a confederation of
republics, possessing all the powers of internal government; but united in the
management of their general, and foreign concerns.”249 The only other way to govern
such a vast territory is through despotism. This position echoes that of the Federal
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Farmer, who elaborated further “that one government and general legislation alone, never
can extend equal benefits to all parts of the United States: Different laws, customs, and
opinions exist in the different states, which by a uniform system of laws would be
unreasonably invaded.”250 Well aware of how large a territory the United States were and
how fast they were expanding, he notes:
the laws of a free government rest on the confidence of the people, and
operate gently – and never can extend their influence very far – if they are
executed on free principles, about the centre, where the benefits of the
government induce people to support it voluntarily; yet they must be
executed on the principles of fear and force in the extremes – This has
been the case of every extensive republic of which we have any accurate
account.251
Agrippa, too, argues that no extensive empire can or has been “governed upon republican
principles, and that such a government will degenerate into a despotism, unless it be
made up of a confederacy of smaller states, each having the full powers of internal
regulation.”252
The Anti-Federalists feared that the Constitution, at least partly due to the large
territory of the United States but also on its own merits (or demerits), would lead to a
consolidated government and the abolition of the states, in fact if not in name. Brutus
acknowledges that “although the government reported by the convention does not go to a
perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed,
certainly and infallibly terminate in it.”253 The Federal Farmer,254 Pennsylvania Minority,
and Agrippa agree. Brutus goes further, arguing that such is the very object of the
Constitution itself. The preamble of the Constitution established the United States as “a
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union of the people…considered as one body” and does not secure the existence of the
state governments.255 Its stated purpose is “To form a more perfect union” but a more
perfect union of this kind would necessitate the abolition of “all inferior governments,
and to give the general one compleat legislative, executive and judicial powers to every
purpose.”256 So too with its professed purposes of establishing justice and ensuring
domestic tranquillity. The Pennsylvania Minority echo this argument, pointing out that
“We the people of the United States” is “the style of a compact between individuals
entering into a state of society, and not that of a confederation of states.”257
The Pennsylvania Minority conclude that “consolidation pervades the whole
constitution”258 and Brutus agrees that the declared intention of the preamble “proceeds
in the different parts”259 of the Constitution. Two very important issues to the AntiFederalists, relating to the size and diversity of the United States, were “full and equal
representation of the people in the legislature, and the jury trial of the vicinage in the
administration of justice.”260 The Federal Farmer defines full and equal representation as
that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the
people themselves would were they all assembled – a fair representation,
therefore, should be so regulated, that every order of men in the
community, according to the common course of elections, can have a
share in it – in order to allow professional men, merchants, traders,
farmers, mechanics, etc. to bring a just proportion of their best informed
men respectively into the legislature, the representation must be
considerably numerous.261
The number of legislators allotted to the House of Representatives and the Senate was far
too few to effect full and equal representation. In an era without the automobile or the
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train, this deficiency was aggravated by the extensive territory of the United States; “it
would be impossible to collect a representation of the parts of the country five, six, and
seven hundred miles from the seat of government”262; only the wealthy would be able to
afford being elected. But, as I have previously noted, full and equal representation is
precisely what the framers of the Constitution did not want. A jury trial of the vicinage,
or vicinity, meant a jury trial of your peers from the nearby area in which you lived. The
Anti-Federalists were afraid that this vital tradition would be obviated by the single
supreme judiciary under the new Constitution, even with its inferior courts.263
Brutus argues that the general welfare clause in Section 8 of Article 1 grants
Congress the authority to do anything “which in their judgment will tend to provide for
the general welfare, and this amounts to the same thing as general and unlimited powers
of legislation in all cases.”264 The Federal Farmer agrees that the powers lodged in the
general government under the new Constitution are “very extensive powers – powers
nearly, if not altogether, complete and unlimited, over the purse and the sword.”265 Brutus
fears, however, that:
In a republic of such vast extent as the United States, the legislature cannot
attend to the various concerns and wants of its different parts. It cannot be
sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition and wants
of the different districts, and if it could, it is impossible it should have
sufficient time to attend to and provide for all the variety of cases of this
nature, that would be continually arising.
In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon
become above the controul of the people, and abuse their power to the
purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing them. The trust
committed to the executive offices, in a country of the extent of the United
States, must be various and of magnitude. The command of all the troops
262

Ibid.
See “Letter of The Federal Farmer,” p 40.
264
Ibid., p. 170.
265
Ibid., p. 41.
263

96

and navy of the republic, the appointment of officers, the power of
pardoning offences, the collecting of all the public revenues, and the
power of expending them, with a number of other powers, must be lodged
and exercised in every state, in the hands of a few. When these are
attended with great honor and emolument, as they will be in large states,
so as greatly to interest men to pursue them, and to be proper objects for
ambitious and designing men, such men will be ever restless in their
pursuit after them. They will use the power, when they have acquired it, to
the purposes of gratifying their own interest and ambition, and it is
scarcely possible, in a very large republic, to call them to account for their
misconduct, or to prevent their abuse of power.266
Something like this has indeed come to pass in the United States. The problems foreseen
by Brutus in the first long passage have plagued every centralized state lawmaking body
and bureaucracy throughout history, such is inherent in their nature. As for the
pronouncements of the second long passage, one has only to look at the vast proliferation
and intrusive growth of federal bureaucracies in nearly every aspect of life that we have
seen in the last century. To name just a few examples: the EPA, IRS, OSHA, DEA, ATF,
FCC, FTC, NTSB, etc.267 Although the potential power of the executive branch was one
to be feared, the Anti-Federalists were far more concerned at the moment with the
consolidating powers of the legislative and judicial branches.
Among the powers of Congress that most disturbed the Anti-Federalists were its
powers of internal taxation, its expansive power to maintain a standing army and regulate
militias, its powers to regulate commerce and trade, and its treaty-making power. All of
these would tend toward a consolidation of power in the national government. Internal
taxation was disliked by the American people in general and the first two together,
internal taxation and the power over the military, left room for an alarming degree of
discretionary power. The two year limit on appropriations would hardly prevent Congress
266

Ibid., p. 116.
For details, see Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American
Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
267

97

from simply renewing them every two years. In light of the discussion on Shays’s
Rebellion, it is interesting to point out that the Constitution gave the national government
the power not merely to repel invasions but also to suppress insurrections. Such a
provision could be used to prevent secession or rebellion, by states or within states, be it
just or unjust. Standing armies were widely recognized by Federalists and AntiFederalists alike as a bane to free republics; they are a tool of repression and a vehicle for
conformity and uniformity, of social engineering. Anti-federalists were also afraid that
the concurrent powers of taxation, held by both the national and state governments,
would eventually lead to the national government crowding the state governments out
and depriving them of revenue. With power over commerce and trade and over the
making of treaties, and with the laws and treaties passed and ratified by Congress as the
supreme law of the land, there was also the danger that the national government could by
way of these whittle away at the sovereignty of the several states. Most of these fears
have to a great extent been realized, albeit largely a century or more after the Constitution
was ratified.
The judiciary was also seen as a major feature of the Constitution that would tend
to abolish the state governments or at least greatly emasculate them. Brutus complains
that the power of judging the constitutionality of the laws is best left up to the people,
who can decide to whether or not to re-elect legislators. Instead, in the Constitution, the
unelected Supreme Court is given the sole authority of judging the constitutionality of the
laws, and neither the “people, nor state legislatures, nor the general legislature can
remove [the Supreme Court Justices] or reverse their decrees.”268 He also was concerned
that the national judiciary would contribute to the “entire subversion of the legislative,
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executive and judicial powers of the individual states.”269 This would be accomplished
through its original jurisdiction in cases between states and between states and citizens of
other states, and through its appellate jurisdiction and its power to judge the
constitutionality of state laws. Just thirty years later, Thomas Jefferson had similar fears
of the judiciary: “Our government is now taking so steady a course as to show by what
road it will pass to destruction; to wit: by consolidation first and then corruption, its
necessary consequence. The engine of consolidation will be the Federal judiciary; the two
other branches the corrupting and corrupted instruments."270
As a final indignity in the eyes of the Anti-Federalists, the nail in the coffin so to
speak, Articles Six of the Constitution stipulates that it and all the laws and treaties made
in pursuance thereof would be the supreme law of the land. Moreover: “The senators and
representatives before-mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and
all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States, and of the several states,
shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution.” Brutus exclaims: “It
is therefore not only necessarily implied thereby, but positively expressed, that the
different state constitutions are repealed and entirely done away, so far as they are
inconsistent with this, with the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, or with
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States[.]”271
The Federalist Papers were written both to promote the new Constitution and to
rebut the objections of the Anti-Federalists. While many of the Anti-Federalists were
concerned with the possibility of consolidation through it, the Federalists feared the
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opposite; they feared that if the Constitution were not adopted, the Union would not last.
Hamilton, as Publius, argues in Federalist #1 that the Articles of Confederation were
insufficient to the task. A more ‘energetic’ government was needed. He presents the issue
in stark either-or terms: either adopt the new Constitution or face a dismemberment of the
Union, a false alternative to be sure. The situation was not as urgent and dire as the
Federalists made it out to be, and at least one alternative was available, amending the
Articles of Confederation so as to rid it of its deficiencies, which is what the
Constitutional Convention had been tasked to do.
In perhaps the most famous of the Federalist Papers, #10, Madison addresses the
issue of faction in connection with representation and an extensive republic. The most
important issue in a popular government is to control the violence of faction. Madison
argues that direct democracies are so tumultuous because it is easy for a majority faction
to gain control of the government and do away with the minority faction’s rights. A
republic or representative democracy, on the other hand, can serve to control majority
faction by filtering the passions of the people through their representatives. However, in a
republic it is possible that men “of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister
designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and
then betray the interests of the people.”272 Madison argues that a large republic would be
better able to prevent this than a small one:
In the first place it is to be remarked that however small the republic may
be the representatives must be raised to a certain number in order to guard
against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be they must be
limited to a certain number in order to guard against the confusion of the
multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being
in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportionally greatest
in a small republic, it follows that if the proportion of fit characters be not
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less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a
greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater
number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more
difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts
by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people
being more free, will be more likely to center on men who possess the
most attractive merit and the most diffuse and established characters.273
Yet if the number of fit characters in a large republic is likely to be greater than in a small
one, does it not seem just as likely that the number of unfit characters will be greater as
well? Furthermore, it seems counterintuitive that the people will be able to better judge
the fitness of character in a candidate whom they know less well due to a more extensive
territory and a smaller proportion of representatives.
Madison also argues that a larger republic will make majority faction control of
the government less likely due to a greater diversity of interests. This may be true to
some degree. A two party system developed early on, however, and though the national
parties had to build platforms on broad issues, once in office politicians could pursue
whatever specific policies interested them or their friends. Moreover, by the very nature
of things one of these two parties had to be dominant at any given time. And while the
tyranny of the majority may have been avoided or dampened, except in times of severe
crisis, a multiplicity of special interest groups have not faced the collective action
problem of the majority. Politicians, especially in the twentieth century, have not failed to
make compromise deals with each other to support these interests.
With regards to the nature of representation itself, in Federalist #56 Madison
attempts to answer contention of the Federal Farmer and other Anti-Federalists that the
federal government should have a full and equal representation that possesses the same
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varied interests as the people themselves would have if they all assembled. He agrees that
indeed representatives “ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his
constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and
interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate.”274 For the federal
legislature, the three most important objects are the regulation of commerce, taxation –
largely through tariff duties, and the militia. Therefore, the representatives did not need
knowledge of “a variety of minute and particular objects” for this.275 In America today,
however, the objects of the federal legislature extend into a wide array of subjects.
Among the chief differences between the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution were the latter’s expansive powers over commerce, taxation, and the
military. The Constitution did achieve the object of the Federalists, which was to create a
more energetic and efficient central government. For example, Hamilton was afraid that,
far from the states wreaking havoc with each other’s commerce, tariffs would be too low
without the Constitution:
In America it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means of
revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it excises must be
confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill brook
the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the
farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies in the
unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; and personal
property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any
other way than by the imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption.
[…]
The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which they
are intersected and of bays that wash their shores; the facility of
communication in every direction; the affinity of language and manners;
the familiar habits of intercourse – all these are circumstances that would
conspire to render an illicit trade between them a matter of little difficulty
274
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and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each
other. The separate States, or confederacies, would be necessitated by
mutual jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade by the
lowness of their duties.276
It is therefore evident that one national government would be able at much
less expense to extend the duties on imports beyond comparison, further
than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any partial
confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted that these
duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three percent. In
France they are estimated at about fifteen percent, and in Britain the
proportion is still greater. There seems to be nothing to hinder their being
increased in this country to at least treble their present amount.277
But to what end? Tariffs higher than a few percent would begin to constitute protective
tariffs. As he indicates in Report on Manufactures (1791) that is precisely what he wants
in order to encourage the growth of certain industries. Hamilton was also in favor of
internal improvements as well as a national bank. Not all of the Federalists agreed with
Hamilton on these issues, but a sizable number of them did. It is also interesting to note
that the first quoted passage seems to indicate that Hamilton looked forward to a time
when the people would not be so adverse to direct taxes.
Regarding the Anti-Federalists’, and Jefferson’s, fears of the judiciary, Hamilton,
who wrote all of the Federalist Papers on the subject, thought it to be the weakest of the
three branches of government.278 The judiciary has no control over the purse or the
sword. It may be a minor quibble, but how are the three branches supposed to balance
and check each other if they are not roughly equal in strength? The greatest fear of the
Anti-Federalists and Jefferson was that the judiciary would, either out of weakness or
complicity, allow the gradual increase and consolidation of power in the federal
government not necessarily through action solely but also through inaction. With the
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federal judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular, set up as the ultimate arbiter of
what is constitutional, this was a very real danger.
Over two centuries after the ratification of the Constitution, many of the fears of
the Anti-Federalists have been realized, though not necessarily in the way that they or
even the Federalists would have expected. It is also true that most of these
transformations took a century or more after they wrote to begin in earnest. It is my
opinion that the Bill of Rights and the tradition of republicanism and liberty prevailing
among the people helped to slow this process down. Ultimately, the greatest degree of
consolidation into the hands of the national government (and the executive in particular)
has occurred during times of crisis, such as the Civil War, the Great Depression, and
World Wars I & II.279 The seeds were sown in the Constitution, however. And the road
was embarked upon right in the beginning.
Alexander Hamilton sought, as the first Secretary of the Treasury, and succeeded
in, tying the interests of the wealthy and well-born to the national government by
consolidating the debts of all the states into the hands of the national government and
paying off the notes at face value, thus enriching the wealthy speculators such as those in
Massachusetts. He rightly recognized that the wealthy were a threat to any government
that got in their way, but with political connections and the expansive power of the new
government at their disposal they would also prove to be a threat to liberty.280
The Constitution was a compromise document in many ways. It was a
compromise between large and small states, between the Northern free states and the
Southern slave states; and it was a compromise between liberal ideas and conservative
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ideas. Among the liberal innovations were the Bill of Rights, particularly the
establishment clause and freedom of religion clause in the 1st Amendment, and the lack
of constitutionalized property qualifications for suffrage and eligibility for office.
Madison’s Notes on the Convention Debates show us that there were indeed
compromises made between the Southern slaveholders and the Northern merchants. The
Southern slaveholders attempted to ensure that their already politically supported
economic interests continued to be so in the new government, giving the North various
concessions such as the simple majority rather than two-thirds majority requirement to
regulate commerce.
Albert Jay Nock traces the merchant-State in America back to the colonial
governments (and beyond them, to England herself). In light of what we have seen, it
may come as no surprise that he favored the Articles of Confederation over the
Constitution as a more tolerable form of government. The Articles more closely
approximated the classical liberal principles of the Revolution and the Declaration of
Independence although British mercantilism had not been completely shaken off.
Consequently, he saw the Constitution, with its greater centralization and expansive
powers, as an ominous step back. Nock describes the Constitutional Convention as an
industrial coup d’Etat.281 He identifies the Convention as being made up “wholly of men
representing the economic interests of the first division. The great majority of them,
possibly as many as four-fifths, were public creditors; one-third were land-speculators;
some were money-lenders; one-fifth were industrialists, traders, shippers; and many of
them were lawyers.”282 Rather than strengthening the Articles of Confederation, as the
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convention was expressly called for, the delegates tossed the Articles “into the
wastebasket” and drafted a “constitution de novo.”283 The provision for amendment of the
Articles provided by the Articles themselves was ignored. As we have seen, the
ratification process was manipulated in favor of the Federalists, and the Constitution
passed by a slim margin with only a fraction of the population voting. The United States
government was successfully transformed into a new and improved version of the British
merchant-state, though it would be many years until the mercantilists would be able to
use the powerful new central government to institute their programs in full.
Against Nock it might be argued that he was relying upon the outdated BeardBecker “economic-determinist” model of human motivation.284 That the Constitution had
wealthy opponents is not in itself an argument against Nock’s thesis. The criticism
implies the unlikely situation that every wealthy person would see his economic interests
as being better served by a stronger central government, that they would recognize its
potential benefit to them, and that they were in a position to benefit. It also implies that
none of them placed the value of classical liberal ideas higher than their economic
interests.
Rothbard, in volume three of Conceived in Liberty, argues that the Beard-Becker
approach is indeed flawed. While it serves admirably in the analysis of statist government
activities, it fails miserably when applied to antistatist events like the American
Revolution. The Beard-Becker approach fails to appreciate the “necessarily primary role
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of ideas in guiding any revolutionary or opposition movement.”285 The rhetoric of the
Declaration, of the political sermons, of Paine’s Common Sense, of Cato’s Letters, and
other such speeches and writings, were indispensable to the Revolution. For people to be
motivated by them, they had to believe the ideas conveyed in them and that belief
generally had to be passionate enough to overcome the economic incentives of “selling
out.” Rothbard argues:
Statists tend to be governed by economic motivation, with ideology
serving as a smokescreen for such motives, while libertarians or
antistatists are ruled principally and centrally by ideology, with economic
defense playing a subordinate role. By this dichotomy we may at last
resolve the age-old historiographical dispute over whether ideology or
economic interests play the dominant role in historical motivation.286
Another flaw in the Beard-Becker approach is that it fails to “understand that
there are no inherent economic conflicts in the free market; without government
intrusion, there is no reason for merchants, farmers, landlords, et al. to be at loggerheads.
Conflict is created only between those classes that rule the state and those that are
exploited by the state.” The colonists did not begin coming into conflict with each other
until some began to employ the State for their own benefit and/or the “nation.”
The conflict between the liberals and the conservatives, which can be traced back
to its roots in England and is evident in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution,
hints at a fundamental flaw in classical liberalism, which will become more apparent in
part five.
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V. Post-Founding and the War of Southern Secession
When a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be the
refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and
conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it
is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize
– Henry David Thoreau
Part five of this essay is concerned with major events and figures surrounding the
American Civil War, with particular emphasis on the growing abolitionist and
individualist anarchist movements. I focus mainly on the abolitionist writings of
individualist anarchists Henry David Thoreau287 and Lysander Spooner. I argue also that
the war, though not inevitable, was prefigured in the Constitution through the
compromises on slavery and the extensive powers granted to the federal government. In
so doing, I briefly sketch American history before, during, and after the war.
V.1 The Problem of Slavery
The founding of the United States of America under a written constitution was a
monumental event in human history. Never before had a group of people come together
to design and agree upon the structure of their own government. To be sure, not everyone
had a say in the ratification of the new Constitution. The number of eligible voters was
but a fraction of the total population of the several States. Forty-two of these were the
representatives of each state (except for Rhode Island) sent to Philadelphia to discuss
revising the Articles of Confederation. From May 25th, 1987 through September 17th,
1987, these representatives engaged in the project of crafting the Constitution. In the end,
three refused to sign the document, largely because it lacked a Bill of Rights. All of the
states eventually ratified the Constitution, and the familiar Bill of Rights was introduced
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and ratified by December 15th, 1791. There have been seventeen amendments since the
Bill of Rights. The Constitution was not perfect when it was first ratified and it is not
perfect now, despite twenty-seven amendments, yet it has lasted longer than any other
written form of government (though the US is certainly not the longest lived government
in history). One of the flaws in the Constitution helped bring about one of the most
catastrophic events in our country’s history: the attempted secession of the southern
slave-holding states, popularly known as the Civil War, but more properly termed the
War of Southern Secession. This flaw in the Constitution was the embodiment of a
fateful compromise over the issue of slavery between the northern and southern states.
About a third of the way through the Constitutional Convention, James Madison
made the prescient observation that the main division of interests was in fact between the
northern and southern states rather than between the large and small states. The states
“were divided into different interests not by their size, but by other circumstances; the
most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of
their having or not having slaves.”288
The issue of slavery constituted not merely economic and political divisions, but
growing cultural and moral ones as well.289 Already in the convention, northern delegates
were beginning to pose moral objections to slavery. Some, at least, in the North,
recognized slavery as a violation of the principles human equality and individual liberty
embodied in the Declaration of Independence. Roger Sherman of Connecticut remarked
that he regarded the slave trade as iniquitous. Gouverneur Morris echoed Sherman,
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regarding slavery as a nefarious institution. Morris demanded, “Upon what principle is it
that the slaves shall be computed in the representation? Are they men? Then make them
Citizens and let them vote."290 Luther Martin of Maryland also recognized slavery as
being “inconsistent with the principles of the revolution and dishonorable to the
American character[.]”291
The issue of state’s rights was already present in the convention as well. Oliver
Elsworth of Connecticut took a position not unsympathetic to that of other delegates:
“The morality or wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging to the States
themselves.”292 Sherman, however, observed “that the abolition of Slavery seemed to be
going on in the U.S. & that the good sense of the several States would probably by
degrees compleat it.”293 He and others failed to see, however, how the compromises made
over slavery would serve to artificially support the institution in the South.
The slavery compromise-flaw in the Constitution was given form in three separate
places in the document. Let us have a look at the clauses:
Art. I, Sec. 2, Para. 3: Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this
Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined
by adding the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths
of all other Persons.
Art. I, Sec. 9, Para. 1: The Migration or Importation of such Persons as
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred
and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
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Art. IV, Sec. 2, Para. 3: No Person held to Service or Labour in one
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in
Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to
whom such Service or Labour may be due.
“Three fifths of all other Persons” was political code for black people held as slaves in
the South. This first clause, the so-called “three-fifths compromise,” insured that every
“five slaves counted as three free persons for both political representation and direct
taxes.”294 Slaves, of course, were not themselves represented in the South, unless you
count their masters as their representatives. Thus, Southern representation would be
artificially inflated. Presciently, Gouverneur Morris argued that direct taxation is not of
equal importance to representation, “for direct taxes would only be levied four times in
the next seventy-two years, while the larger voice that southern slave masters obtained in
the House and the electoral college had enormous impact, affecting not only scores of
congressional decisions but virtually every aspect of the nation’s political fabric.”295
The second clause, as well as the third, together with the decision to enable
Congress to regulate commerce by majority vote rather than two-thirds, became known
as the “dirty compromise.”296 The South had little need to regulate commerce (at least at
the time of the convention). The New England delegates and merchants, on the other
hand, had an interest in regulating commerce to protect their young and growing
industries. A two-thirds requirement would make regulating commerce exceedingly hard
and give the minority group in Congress disproportionate leverage. On the other hand, a
mere majority vote requirement would eventually give the Northern states power over
commerce that could be injurious to the South as their populations grew to exceed that of
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the Southern states even with slaves partially counted. The second clause prevented
Congress from banning the importation of slaves (i.e., from ending the international slave
trade to the US) for twenty years until 1808, upon which time they promptly did so. The
final clause, which became known as the “fugitive slave clause,” supported the Fugitive
Slave Laws, obligating northern states to assist Southern slaveholders by hunting down
and returning runaway slaves, effectively subsidizing the South’s institution of slavery.
One after another, northern states, starting with Vermont in 1777 and ending with
New Jersey in 1804, set about to end slavery in the north either through “outright
abolition or gradual emancipation.”297 An event transpired on July 13, 1787 that altered
and amplified the North-South dynamic. The Continental Congress, under the Articles of
Confederation, passed the Northwest Ordinance. The Northwest Ordinance created the
Northwest Territory, the first organized territory of the United States, and banned slavery
within it and any states arising out of it. This mapped the future westward expansion of
the country, creating a geographical dividing line between free states and slave states,
between the North and the South. National politics between the North and the South after
ratification of the Constitution was flavored by the tension of maintaining a balance
between the two in Congress and the Electoral College, a balance that collapsed
following the Mexican War (1846-48).
It was not until the decade following the War of 1812 that slavery came to “fully
divide the South from the North.” The last attempts to legalize slavery in Indiana and
Illinois were defeated and “the free states were beginning to overwhelm the slave states
in total population,” in large part due to immigration. “Already in 1819, the North
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outvoted the South in the lower house of Congress, 105 to 81. Only the Senate
maintained a balance between the country’s two sections: eleven free states to eleven
slave states.”298
When the territory of Missouri petitioned Congress for admission to the Union it
was fought over by the North and the South. Would it be admitted as a free state or as a
slave state? A remark from one of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, Senator
Rufus King, highlights the fact that the division of slavery was not merely a moral one:
“The disproportionate power and influence allowed to the slave-holding states, was a
necessary sacrifice to the establishment of the constitution[.] But the extension of this
disproportionate power to the new states would be unjust and odious. The states whose
power would be abridged, and whose burdens would be increased by the measure, cannot
be expected to consent to it.”299 The famous Missouri Compromise, proposed by
Kentucky slaveowner and Speaker of the House, Henry Clay, maintained the sectional
balance between the North and the South by admitting Missouri as a slave state and
admitting Maine, a former district of Massachusetts, as a free state. Additionally, the
remainder of the Louisiana Territory, with the exception of Missouri, would be closed to
slavery north of the line running west from Missouri’s southern border and open to
slavery south of the line.
The conflict over Missouri galvanized the South to seek the expansion of slavery,
however, while the North was not yet united in stopping the expansion of the institution.
In the wake of the Missouri Compromise, Southerners also became ardent defenders of
inviolate states’ rights. They feared the power of the federal government to endanger their
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slave institution. John Randolph of Roanoke in particular saw that if the Constitution’s
war powers authorized the federal government to finance “roads, canals, and other
internal improvements” then they would also authorize the emancipation “of every slave
in the United States.”300
The conflict over slavery in the territories subsided for nearly a quarter of a
century, but states’ rights remained a contentious issue. Though a strict construction
interpretation of the Constitution allowed tariffs for the purpose of revenue only,
protectionist tariffs saw a steady rise after the War of 1812. The election of John Quincy
Adams to the presidency in 1824 with the alleged aid of the so-called “corrupt bargain”
with Henry Clay – which made possible the Tariff of Abominations, the rise of the
Democratic Party, the subsequent victory of Andrew Jackson over Adams in 1828 – and
Adams’s famous career as an abolitionist Congressman afterward, helped to further
polarize the country.301 South Carolina, the state most heavily reliant on slavery,
denounced the Tariff of Abominations as unconstitutional.
Vice-President John C. Calhoun developed the Doctrine of Nullification, which
held that states had a right to nullify within their borders federal laws that were
unconstitutional. The Nullification Doctrine was based on the compact, or contract,
theory of the Constitution, which originated in the Constitutional Convention and the
ratification process and held that in ratifying the Constitution the states had entered into a
compact, the federal government was the agent of the states, and the states had a right to
judge its infractions of the Constitution. South Carolina did not invoke nullification until
1832 when it nullified both the Tariff of Abominations and the Tariff of 1832. It
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threatened to secede if coerced. Henry Clay, the “Great Pacificator” staved off armed
conflict again with the Compromise Tariff of 1833,302 though out of principle, South
Carolina nullified the Force Act of 1833, which permitted the President to use the
national military to enforce the laws.
Calhoun revealed in a letter, however, that the contest over tariffs was actually
about slavery. “I consider the Tariff act as the occasion, rather than the real cause of the
present unhappy state of things[.] The truth can no longer be disguised, that the peculiar
domestick institution of the Southern States, and the consequent direction, which that and
her soil and climate have given to her industry, has placed them in regard to taxation and
appropriations in opposite relation to the majority of the Union.”303 He argued that
“[w]ithout the protection of states’ rights,” Southerners would have to rebel or submit and
have their interests sacrificed.304
Also out of the tariff and nullification controversy we see the first systematic
defenses by nationalists of the notion of perpetual Union that Lincoln would later adopt
as a justification for preventing secession. “A permanent consolidated government had
been what many of the Constitution’s framers had hoped for.”305 In 1830, Daniel Webster
of Boston argued that the people ratified the Constitution not the states. In doing so they
had created a consolidated government. The states therefore did not have a right to
secession or to nullify national laws. Webster called for “Liberty and Union, now and
forever, one and inseparable!”306 “Webster’s theory did not have the venerable tradition
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to match that of the compact theory[,]”307 however, and prohibition of secession would
violate natural law in any case.
Over a decade later, President James Polk fought hard “to preserve national unity
in the face of intense divisive pressures imposed by the proponents of slavery.”308
Ultimately, however, his aggressive war against Mexico (1846-48) in pursuit of
“Manifest Destiny” opened up new territory for the North and the South to fight over.
Senator Stephen Douglas was able to pass the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, which
potentially opened up the two territories to slavery by applying to them the doctrine of
popular sovereignty. As Minnesota and Oregon were preparing to enter the Union as free
states, this sparked off a race between both sides to populate Kansas and resulted in a
good deal of fighting between the settlers. Kansas ended up rejecting a pro-slavery
constitution, but the South was handed a victory by the Supreme Court with the Dred
Scott decision. It was deemed that blacks were not citizens and never could be; they
therefore could not sue in a federal court. Even more importantly, it was decided that the
Missouri Compromise excluding slavery from the territories was unconstitutional, and
that the “property rights of a slaveholder to his slaves merited full protection under the
Constitution, particularly the protection of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause”
even if the slave(s) was taken to live in a free state or territory for an extended period of
time.309 Tellingly for future events, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, over fifty years
earlier on July 13, 1787, mentioned that he thought the distinction between the North and
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the South groundless, but if it were “real, instead of attempting to blend incompatible
things, let us at once take a friendly leave of each other.”310
V.2 The Abolitionists
The “world’s first antislavery society” was organized in Philadelphia in 1775 by
Quakers inspired by the liberating spirit of the Revolution, “and soon [after] similar
organizations dotted the colonies.”311 Following the Revolution and the ratification of the
Constitution, it was thought that slavery would eventually wither away in America. It is
notable that the Constitution contains no mention of the term “slavery,” instead referring
to slaves only obliquely by phrases like “other persons.” In the wake of ratification, antislavery fervor died down. At the same time that slavery was being ended around the
world through emancipation and slave revolts, “American slavery enjoyed an economic
resurgence,” thanks in large part to a cotton boom.312
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel explains that “the last expression of Revolutionary
antislavery” was the “colonization scheme,” which entailed “the removal of freed blacks
to Africa[.]”313 This policy was favored by abolitionists who, like Jefferson (though not
an abolitionist himself) and Lincoln, “believed that a biracial American society was
untenable.”314 Though several thousand free blacks colonized the nation of Liberia that
was established by the American Colonization Society after the War of 1812, in general
freed blacks were not enthusiastic about the idea.315
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In the 1830s, however, a young group of radical abolitionists swept onto the
national scene.316 They were strongly opposed to colonization. “Exasperated at the
betrayal of the Revolutionary promise that American slavery would wither away, and
marshaling all the evangelical fervor of the religious revivals then sweeping the country,
they demanded immediate emancipation.”317 One such radical abolitionist was William
Lloyd Garrison. To him and his fellow abolitionists, slavery was a moral evil that must be
condemned. He denounced colonization as racist and demanded immediate emancipation
without compensation to the slaveholders as well as immediate and full political rights
for all blacks.318 He eschewed politics, however, opting instead for
[m]oral suasion and non-violent resistance…strategies. By agitation, he
hoped to shame slaveholders into repentance. Indeed, he went so far as to
denounce the Constitution for its proslavery clauses as ‘a covenant with
death and an agreement with hell’. During one 4th of July celebration, he
publicly burned a copy, proclaiming: ‘So perish all compromises with
tyranny!’ He believed that if anything the North should secede. [And he
was not the only one.] That way it could become a haven for runaway
slaves.319
On January 1, 1831, in Boston, he started a new weekly paper called The Liberator, on
whose masthead appeared the slogan “No Union with Slave-Holders.”320 And in 1833, he
“helped to organize the American Anti-Slavery Society[.] Two thousand local societies
with 200,000 members had sprung into existence by 1840.”321 This was a small
percentage of the northern population, to be sure, but they were a vocal group and made
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themselves heard, and they were seen as part of an international movement by
Southerners.
Another important abolitionist, on whom I am focusing because his work appears
to have been influenced by La Boétie, was Henry David Thoreau. In 1848, he worked on
an essay that was never published in his lifetime, called “Reform and the Reformers,” in
which he “argued that persons feeling the urge to reform others should begin with
themselves[.]”322 His famous essay entitled “Resistance to Civil Government,” but
popularly known as “Civil Disobedience,” is a “classic statement of the relation of the
individual to the state.”323 He wrote it in response to being jailed for his refusal to pay his
poll tax in protest over the Mexican-American War, which he considered immoral. In
“Civil Disobedience,” first published in 1849, he argued that moral principles “are the
private domain of the individual citizen, and governments are oppressive which attempt
to legislate them.”324 In 1854, applying the principles set forth in “Resistance to Civil
Government, he gave a speech titled “Slavery in Massachusetts” that was printed by
Garrison in The Liberator on July 21. The speech, “a response to the apprehension in
Boston in 1854 of the fugitive slave, Anthony Burns, and his forced return by state
authorities to his owner in Virginia,” was given before anti-slavery protesters at
Framingham.325
Thoreau begins his essay “Resistance to Civil Government” with a quotation from
Thomas Jefferson but continues with a devastatingly insightful addendum:

322

Wendell Glick, ed., Great Short Works of Henry Davíd Thoreau (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), p.
118.
323
Ibid., p. 133.
324
Ibid.
325
Ibid., p. 246.
119

I heartily accept the motto, - “That government is best which governs
least;” and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and
systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which I also believe,
- “That government is best which governs not at all;” and when men are
prepared for it, that will be the kind of government they will have.
Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually,
and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. The objections which
have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and
weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a
standing government. The standing army is only an arm of the standing
government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the
people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and
perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present
Mexican war, the work of comparatively few individuals using the
standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not
have consented to this measure.
This American government, - what is it but a tradition, though a recent
one, endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each
instant losing some of its integrity?326
He admits that the American government is necessary, “for the people must have some
complicated machinery or other, and hear its din, to satisfy that idea of government which
they have.”327
[Y]et this government never of itself furthered any enterprise, but by the
alacrity with which it got out of its way. It does not keep the country free.
It does not settle the West. It does not educate. The character inherent in
the American people has done all that has been accomplished; and it
would have done somewhat more, if the government had not sometimes
got in its way. For government is an expedient by which men would fain
succeed in letting one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is most
expedient, the governed are most let alone by it. Trade and commerce, if
they were not made of India rubber, would never manage to bounce over
the obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way; and, if
one were to judge these men wholly by the effects of their actions, and not
partly by their intentions, they would deserve to be classed and punished
with those mischievous persons who put obstructions on the railroads.328
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These passages, reminiscent of La Boétie, highlight an understanding of the role of
custom in supporting and maintaining the institution of government. They also evince a
Lockean understanding of the proper role of government and a sound grasp of economic
theory.
His purpose, Thoreau says, is to speak not as an anarchist but as a practical
citizen. He does not ask for “at once no government, but at once a better government.”329
He asks for a government in which individual conscience, not majorities, decides right
and wrong. “[W]e should be men first, and subjects afterward”; consequently, it “is not
desirable to cultivate a respect for the law,” to resign conscience to the legislator, but
rather it is desirable to cultivate a respect for the right.330 The only obligation any of us
has a right to assume is to do what we think is right.
Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for
it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice. A
common and natural result of an undue respect for law is, that you may
see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys
and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against
their wills, aye, against their common sense and consciences, which makes
it very steep marching indeed, and produces a palpitation of the heart.
They have no doubt that it is a damnable business in which they are
concerned; they are all peaceably inclined. Now, what are they? Men at
all? or small moveable forts and magazines, at the service of some
unscrupulous man in power?331
Thoreau continues to identify three classes of men who serve the State. One class is the
mass of men who serve the State mindlessly with their bodies. Another class includes the
“legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and office-holders” who serve the state
primarily with their minds; “and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as
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likely to serve the devil, without realizing it, as God.”332 The third class are “heroes,
patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men, [who] serve the State with their
consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly
treated by it as enemies.”333
How then should a man of conscience relate to the American government?
Thoreau argues that men cannot, in good conscience, and without being disgraced, be
associated with it. He “cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my
government which is the slave’s government also.”334 “All men recognize the right of
revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to and to resist government, when its
tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable.”335 To those who argue that things
were not that bad, he replies that he would not make a fuss about taxes on certain
imports. “All machines have their friction” and it would be a moral evil to make much
ado about relatively nothing. However,
when friction comes to have its machine, and oppression and robbery are
organized, I say, let us not have such a machine any longer. In other
words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to
be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country [Mexico] is
unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to
military law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and
revolutionize.336
Voting is not the answer; it is like a game, playing with justice, and like any game it is
accompanied by betting. As a voter we are each one voice out of many and are thus
leaving the thing voted on up to the majority to decide. When we vote, we must not then
be vitally concerned with the outcome, because even by voting for the right thing we
332
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have not done anything for it but rather merely expressed a feeble wish that it should
prevail. By the time the majority votes for the abolition of slavery they will have done so
because they have become indifferent to it or because it has all but withered away
already. “A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to
prevail through the power of the majority.”337 Thoreau echoes Garrison in rejecting any
political means of effecting reform, even to the point of stating: “in this case the State has
provided no way: its very Constitution is the evil.”338
He calls on all abolitionists to withdraw their support from the State. If the law
requires you to commit injustice against another, then break the law. Against the charge
that resisting even an unjust law is a cure worse than the disease, he points out that
insofar as this is true it is because the government has made it so by being resistant to
reform. “Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man
is also a prison.”339 “Cast your whole vote,” he argues,
not just a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence. A minority is
powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then;
but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is
to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will
not hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their taxbills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would
be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent
blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such
is possible. If the tax-gatherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one
has done, “But what shall I do?” my answer is, “If you really wish to do
any thing, resign your office.” When the subject has refused allegiance,
and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is
accomplished. But even suppose blood should flow. Is there not a sort of
blood shed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man’s
real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting
death. I see this blood flowing now.340
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The only thing the state can reach, and punish, is our bodies. It possesses only superior
physical strength (and that, as La Boétie has shown, is only what we as a people give it).
It is we who compromise our minds. We are obligated by a higher law not to.
Thoreau ends his essay on “Resistance to Civil Government” with a restatement
and extension of the promise of the Declaration of Independence and the Revolution:
The authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to…is
still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and
consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and
property but what I concede to it. The progress from an absolute to a
limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress
toward a true respect for the individual. Is a democracy, such as we know
it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a
step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man? There
will never be a really free and enlightened State, until the State comes to
recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which
all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly.341
So long as the abolitionists believed that the Constitution sanctioned slavery, they
were left with no other recourse but to amendment (a dubious prospect) or reject it as a
moral evil. The Liberty Party, which viewed the Constitution “as antislavery in spirit”
and accused the South of betraying the implicit constitutional understanding that slavery
should disappear within United States[,]” was formed in 1839.342 In 1845, Lysander
Spooner gave them ammunition when he applied his legal genius to a demonstration of
the unconstitutionality of slavery (in a book of that name). Spooner himself eschewed
politics and recognized a higher law than that of man-made law, higher even that the
Constitution, that is, natural law. If and insofar as the Constitution sanctioned slavery, it
341
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could have no binding force or authority. While he held slavery to be in violation of
natural law, his purpose here was a final attempt to salvage the Constitution, to show that
on its own terms the Constitution holds slavery to be illegal and unjust.
In The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, Spooner argues that the Constitution is a
legal contract. As such, it must be evaluated using the ordinary legal rules of
interpretation, the most important of which is
that all language must be construed “strictly” in favor of natural right. This
rule is laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in these
words, to wit: “Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles
are overthrown, where the general system of the law is departed from, the
legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to
induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.”343
He then proceeds to demonstrate in exhaustive detail that slavery has never had any
constitutional existence in this country, from the colonial charters and statutes to the state
constitutions to the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution itself. The colonists
brought with them “the common law of England, including the writ of habeas corpus (the
essential principle of which…is to deny the right of property in man,)” and the “trial by
jury.”344 Moreover, the Declaration of Independence declared that “all Men are created
equal” with unalienable rights to “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”
Spooner explicates thirteen other rules of interpretation and applies them to the
Constitution. Among these are that “the intention of the instrument must prevail”345; “the
intention of the constitution must be collected from its words”346; “we are always, if
possible, to give a word some meaning appropriate to the subject matter of the instrument
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itself”347; “where technical words are used, a technical meaning is to be applied to
them”348; “the sense of every word, that is ambiguous in itself, must, if possible, be
determined by reference to the rest of the instrument”349; “a contract must never, if it be
possible to avoid it, be so construed, as that any one of the parties to it, assuming him to
understand his rights, and to be of competent mental capacity to make obligatory
contracts, may not reasonably be presumed to have consented to it”350; “where the
prevailing principles and provisions of a law are favorable to justice, and general in their
nature and terms, no unnecessary exception to them, or to their operation, is to be
allowed”351; “be guided, in doubtful cases, by the preamble”352; “one part of the
instrument must not be allowed to contradict another, unless the language be so explicit
as to make the contradiction inevitable”353; “‘An act of congress’ (and the rule is equally
applicable to the constitution) ‘ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations,
if any other possible construction remains’”354; “all reasonable doubts must be decided in
favor of liberty”355; “instruments must be so construed so as to give no shelter or effect to
fraud”356; “we are never unnecessarily to impute to an instrument any intention
whatsoever which it would be unnatural for either reasonable or honest men to
entertain.”357
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The terms slave and slavery appear nowhere in the Constitution. Following the
above-given rules, we must interpret the phrase “We the people” in the preamble at its
broadest, that is, to mean all of the people. We cannot presume blacks to have consented
to a Constitution that made legal slaves of them. Accordingly, in the representation and
direct taxation clause under Article I, Section 2, we cannot construe the phrase “free
Persons” to mean nonslave” and “three fifths of all other Persons” as slaves. Rather, we
are compelled to take “free Persons,” as a technical term used in England and the
colonies, to mean “those persons possessed of the privilege of citizenship.”358 The phrase
“three fifths of all other persons” can then only mean, astonishingly, resident aliens, that
is, noncitizens living in the United States!359 Similarly, the phrases in Art. I, Sec. 8 and
Art. IV, Sec. 2 regarding importation of persons and those bound to service or labor
cannot be construed as referring to slaves. Without a constitutional basis, we can only say
that slavery has been tolerated in America, and “[t]oleration of a wrong is not law. And
especially the toleration of a wrong (i. e. the bare omission to punish it criminally,) does
not legalize one’s claim to property obtained by such wrong.”360
Abolitionists eager for political ammunition against the institution of slavery
eagerly welcomed The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. Spooner “insisted that the national
government directly abolish slavery in the southern states.”361 But most members of the
Liberty Party believed that the national government should simply cordon off slavery and
that abolition in the South would necessarily follow. Before long members of the “Whig
and Democratic Parties centered their political careers around antislavery stands right out
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of the Liberty Party’s Platform.”362 Spooner wrote another abolitionist work before the
Civil War titled “A Defense for Fugitive Slaves (1850),” in which he argues for the right
of jury nullification, i.e., that juries have a right to judge the facts and the law in a case.
This argument he expanded into one of his most famous works, “An Essay on the Trial
By Jury.”
Southerners were more worried about slave insurrections than they were of the
political influence of the abolitionists, however. And in 1858, Spooner, impatient with the
slow progress of politics and moral suasion, circulated pamphlets titled “A Plan for the
Abolition of Slavery” and “To the Non-Slaveholders of the South.” The former
“apparently influenced John Brown, who tried to implement Spooner’s plan in his
abortive raid on Harper’s Ferry, Virginia. After Brown had been captured and sentenced
to hang, Spooner hatched a plan to kidnap Governor Henry Wise of Virginia and hold
him as hostage in exchange for Brown.”363 Due to lack of funds the plan was never
carried out.
V.3 The War of Southern Secession
In 1860, Abraham Lincoln was elected to the office of President of the United
States. He carried every free state except New Jersey from which he received four out of
its seven electoral votes. He won only 40 percent of the popular vote and did not carry a
single slave state. “Within ten of them, he did not get a single recorded vote.”364
Nevertheless, Lincoln still won the election. For Southerners, the election of 1860
highlighted their minority position, a position they could only look forward to
deteriorating further. Lincoln was not an abolitionist and “promised to enforce the
362
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Fugitive Slave Law and respect slavery in the existing states.”365 Southerners, however,
were not reassured. A major faction of the “Republican Party did endorse further steps to
divorce the general government from slavery. Lincoln appointed at least two of these
radical Republicans: [William Henry] Seward as Secretary of State and Salmon P. Chase
[author of the Liberty Party’s 1844 platform] as Secretary of the Treasury.”366
Furthermore, the Republican Party now had firm control of the national government’s
patronage powers.
I have argued that the Civil War was prefigured in the compromises over slavery
in the Constitution, though it was not inevitable. Initially, the South benefited from the
compromises with an artificially enhanced representation in the federal government.
However, the Southern states soon lost their advantage due to the ban on the importation
of slaves in 1808 and the rapidly growing populations of the Northern states. The
extensive powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution to regulate
commerce (part of the slavery compromises) and the internal affairs of the several states
made secession by the Southern states, when they were consigned to permanent minority
status, almost inevitable.
Ironically, it was also the slavery compromises that helped to artificially prop up
the institution of slavery in the South. In Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men,
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel makes a compelling case that “[s]lavery flourished because the
country’s political and legal structure socialized its enforcement costs”; “the economic
viability of the peculiar institution rested on political power.”367 “Only one-fourth of
white households owned slaves, and about half of those owned fewer than five. The
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typical Southerner was a yeoman or herdsman. [P]olitical power was concentrated in the
hands of large planters[.]”368 Although slavery could achieve a higher output than wage
labor in some industries such as cotton production due to overworking the slaves, slavery
involved a great deal of deadweight loss (meaning loss due to changes in behavior).
Slaves would intentionally avoid work, break tools, feign incompetence, etc. Moreover,
on large plantations most slaves required overseers who needed to be paid.
The runaway slave was the system’s Achilles heel. Each fugitive slave did
more than deprive the slaveholder of a valuable capital asset; if running
away became easier, enforcement costs rose. This in turn reduced the
value of remaining slaves. Manumission through self-purchase would
become more appealing to slaveholders, but if they were to succumb to
this appeal, the dissolution would accelerate. More manumissions meant
more free blacks which further eased escape and raised costs until the
viability of the peculiar institution itself came into question.369
Slaveholders used their state governments to socialize enforcement costs by conscription
into slave patrols that largely fell onto small slaveholders and poor whites who owned no
slaves. Southern states also passed laws prohibiting manumission through self-purchase
and compelling deportation of free blacks, practices that a pro-slavery interpretation of
the Constitution tolerated. The fugitive slave clause in the Constitution and corresponding
Fugitive Slave Laws shifted onto the Northern states the cost of returning fugitive slaves
who fled to there. Yet, by 1860, political support for slavery in general and the Fugitive
Slave Laws in particular were declining sharply.370 Despite this decline, William Lloyd
Garrison was right that slavery was more secure in the Union than out of it.
It is commonly thought that the Civil War was fought to end slavery. Nothing
could be further from the truth. While the South probably did secede in order to protect
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its peculiar institution, if only because it made them extremely vulnerable to the
Republican mercantilist program; Thomas DiLorenzo provides strong evidence in The
Real Lincoln that the principal object of Lincoln’s war was to preserve the Union. The
editor of Lincoln’s Collected Works, Roy Basler, commented that Lincoln barely
mentioned slavery before 1854.371 Lincoln had promised the South, upon assuming
office, to respect the institution of slavery. He did consider slavery to be immoral but he
also saw blacks as an inferior race.
I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the
white and the black races. There is a physical difference between the two,
which, in my judgment, will probably forever forbid their living together
upon the footing of perfect equality, and inasmuch as it becomes a
necessity that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am
in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position. I have
never said anything to the contrary, but I hold that, notwithstanding all
this, there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the
natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled
to these as the white man. I agree with Judge Douglas he is not my equal
in many respects – certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or
intellectual endowment. But in the right to eat bread, without the leave of
anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal and the equal of
Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man.”372
He preferred, if possible, to “free all the slaves, and send them to Liberia – to their own
native land.”373 However, political expediency demanded that he settle instead for
blocking the expansion of slavery. Lincoln’s primary agenda upon assuming office was
the Whig economic agenda – the “American System” of his political idol, Henry Clay –
and after the South began to secede, to preserve the Union: “My politics are short and
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sweet…I am in favor of a national bank…the internal improvement system and a high
protective tariff.”374 In other words: “The American System…was the framework for a
giant political patronage system[,]” the policies of which “tend to generate a
centralization of governmental power[.]”375
The overwhelming desire of Lincoln and other Northerners to preserve the Union
at all costs, against the principles of the Revolution, insured the onset of the Civil War. In
his first inaugural address, he echoed Daniel Webster’s argument of thirty years previous,
by repeating a phrase from the discarded Articles of Confederation, “I hold that…the
Union of these States is perpetual.”376 He continued:
The Union is unbroken, and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, as
the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the
Union be faithfully executed in all the States.
There needs to be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless
it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be
used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the
Government and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may
be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using force
against or among the people anywhere.377
Rather than let the Southern states secede peacefully, as widespread sentiment in the
North favored prior to the attack on Fort Sumter by the Confederacy, an attack Lincoln
maneuvered them into for propaganda purposes, Lincoln was determined to fight a war to
keep them in the Union and carry out his economic agenda, if necessary.378 He
denounced secession as “an ingenious sophism” and argued that secession would destroy
the government and lead to anarchy; both claims were false.379
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In his Gettysburg Address, he “claimed that the war was being fought in defense
of government by consent, but in fact exactly the opposite was true: The Federal
government under Lincoln sought to deny Southerners the right of government by
consent, for they certainly did not consent to remaining in the Union.”380 Lincoln’s theory
of consent did not include the right to use popular sovereignty in support of chattel
slavery, and rightly so, but we have seen that he was not prepared to give blacks political
equality and he was more than willing to deny non-slaveholding Northerners and
Southerners their freedom.
DiLorenzo raises a crucial question: why didn’t Lincoln, a man widely regarded
as a master politician, apply his great skills to a serious effort at peaceful emancipation,
such as had been done in nearly every other country in the world, instead of so readily
going to war? The answer is that the issue of ending slavery was trotted out as a political
and military propaganda tactic, even Lincoln admitted as much. In a letter to Horace
Greeley he revealed his primary goal:
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either
to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any
slave I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving
others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored
race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union.381
The Emancipation Proclamation, for example, purported to free all of the slaves in
Confederate territory out of Lincoln’s control but did not free slaves in conquered
Confederate territory.382
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In the North, the American System was finally enacted in full during the war. The
first-ever national income tax in America was introduced in 1861. The Internal Revenue
Act of 1862 tried to tax nearly everything, requiring the creation of a large bureaucracy,
and was unprecedented at the time. “At the war’s close the United States could boast
higher taxation per capita than any other nation.”383 But taxes covered only one-fifth of
the war’s monetary cost, so the North had to resort to steep protectionist tariffs, heavy
borrowing, and monetary inflation. Internal improvement programs consisted of subsidies
and grants for railroad construction, agriculture, education (agricultural, mechanical, and
military related), and military related industries (the beginning of the military-industrial
complex). “Because the tax structure and contract awards tended to favor economically
integrated firms, the Civil War encouraged corporate concentration.”384
Hummel argues convincingly that while the Republicans practiced neomercantilism in the North, the Confederacy embraced full-blown war socialism. The
Confederacy, too, increased taxation and borrowed heavily but relied far more on
monetary inflation (to a point that dwarfed that of the North). The Commissary and
Quartermaster Bureaus would also confiscate food and other supplies from the people,
paying at officially fixed prices with depreciating paper money. The southern people
experienced great hardship as a result and “state governments attempted to step in and aid
suffering families” through social welfare policies.385 Unlike the North, the South lacked
a developed industrial base and the Confederate government compensated by establishing
government-owned military-industrial facilities. “When the authorities did purchase
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supplies from private firms, they dictated prices and profits.”386 This system of war
socialism necessitated the growth of a large central bureaucracy. “A North Carolinian
serving in the Rebel Congress complained toward the war’s close that the land was
‘alive’ with government officials, ‘thick as locusts in Egypt’.”387
Not only did the war’s economic policies on both sides violate the principles of
limited government, Lincoln all but suspended the Constitution during the war. In 1861,
he issued a decree suspending the writ of habeas corpus. He then proceeded to arrest
thousands of political opponents without due process. One political opponent,
Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, was even deported. He suppressed free elections
in Maryland and most other Northern states. He also suppressed the press that were not
supportive of the war by shutting down papers, preventing circulation, arresting editors.
Thomas DiLorenzo argues that Lincoln committed all, or nearly all, of the “train of
abuses” the Declaration of Independence accused King George III of committing.388 And
both the North and the South instituted conscription.
The war would have a lasting impact on American society and government.
Lincoln fought a successful war to suppress the rights of secession and state’s rights,
effectively destroying state sovereignty and making them mere subsidiaries of the federal
government. It is instructive to note that the practice of referring to the United States as
“it” rather than “them” began after the Civil War. The Union was “indissoluble”; not our
rights or states’ rights but the federal government, the State, was “unalienable.”

386

Ibid., p. 236.
Ibid., p. 238.
388
For full details, see DiLorenzo, The Real Lincoln, Ch. 6, pp. 130-170, especially pp. 149-153 for the
“train of abuses.”
387

135

Reconstruction also entailed severe costs for liberty. Not only had the Southern
economy been almost completely destroyed by their war measures and the Federal
military, Reconstruction imposed severe political and economic policies on the South.
Among other things, the Southern states were blackmailed by Congress into ratifying the
Fourteenth Amendment, which would have highly centralizing effects, “by prohibiting
congressional representation by those states” until and unless they ratified it.389 When all
initially refused, “Congress responded…by passing the Reconstruction Act of 1867,
which established a comprehensive military dictatorship to run the governments of each
of the ten states that were not yet restored to the Union” and made ratifying the
amendment a requirement for lifting the military rule.390 The centralizing, mercantilist
policies of the American System that were begun during the war were continued and
expanded by the Republican Party during and after Reconstruction.
The foregoing is the soil out of which grew both the welfare-warfare state and
modern radical libertarianism. The War of Southern Secession, popularly known as the
Civil War, is thought of by many libertarians and some conservatives as the turning point
in American history when the principles of the Revolution and the ideals of limited
government held by the Founders were discarded. However, even after the war, some
scruples survived for a time and, though government continued to grow, big government
as we have come to know it was decades off.
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The early Progressive Era of the late 1800s and early 1900s brought some
significant changes: namely, antitrust legislation (another term for corporate welfare), the
Federal Reserve in 1913, the 16th Amendment (which constitutionalized the national
income tax), and the 17th Amendment (which cut one of the last checks the states had on
the federal government). This era also produced the only constitutional amendment to
attempt social reform, the 19th Amendment. The Prohibition was unquestionably and
predictably a monumental failure.
Government growth can occur in both scale and scope.391 When the scale of
government grows, the resources allocated to existing governmental functions are
increased. Governments grow in scope when they take on new functions. The tendency of
government growth does not proceed at a uniform rate. In the twentieth century, Western
states have experienced an accelerated ratcheting up of the scale and scope of
government in response to crises, such as the World Wars and the Great Depression.392
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VI. A Radical Libertarian Critique of the State
Liberty: not the daughter but the mother of order.
– Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
Having given an overview of a radical libertarian natural law and natural rights
theory, having examined La Boétie’s analysis of the nature of tyranny and subjection, and
with the foregoing illustration of the conflict between liberty and power, I now turn on
these grounds to sketching out a critique of the State.
VI.1 Social Power vs. State Power
One libertarian thinker who experienced World Wars I and II and the Great
Depression (& New Deal) first-hand, at a time when most other defenders of classical
liberal ideals were dead or retired, was Albert Jay Nock. Indeed, Nock was instrumental
in spurring the development of modern libertarianism and conservatism. Nock saw the
rise of statism in Europe and America as appalling, and he was in a perfect position to
analyze the metamorphosis of Leviathan. Essentially, Nock, and subsequent libertarians
like Murray Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, came to see history as a race between
social power – “the productive consequence of voluntary interactions”393 – and State
power.
Echoing La Boétie’s analysis of tyranny, Nock notes in Our Enemy, The State
(1935):
It is unfortunately none too well understood that, just as the State has no
money of its own, so it has no power of its own. All the power it has is
what society gives it, plus what it confiscates from time to time on one
pretext or another; there is no other source from which State power can be
drawn. Therefore every assumption of State power, whether by gift or
seizure, leaves society with so much less power; there is never, nor can be,
any strengthening of State power without a corresponding and roughly
equivalent depletion of social power.
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Moreover, it follows that with any exercise of State power, not only the
exercise of social power in the same direction, but the disposition to
exercise it in that direction, tends to dwindle.394
Nock identifies three principal indices of the increase of State power. The first
index is the degree of centralization of State power. The second is the degree to which the
bureaucratic principle has been extended or expanded. The third is the degree to which
poverty and mendicancy have been erected into a permanent political asset.395 The
centralization of State power, not only into the federal government but also within it into
the executive branch, has occurred through what Nock calls a curious
American variant of the coup d’Etat. Our national legislature was not
suppressed by force of arms…but was bought out of its functions with
public money; and as appeared most conspicuously in the elections of
November, 1934, the consolidation of the coup d’Etat was effected by the
same means; the corresponding functions in the smaller units [the states]
were reduced under the personal control of the Executive.396
This centralization occurred concomitantly with a rapid expansion of the federal
bureaucracy that set about to regulate, subsidize, or actually run all manner of economic
and social functions, such as food production, communication, energy, charity, etc. The
executive bureaucracies consolidated under their control legislative and decision-making
powers formerly reserved to the national legislature, state and local governments, and
voluntary social institutions, with the necessary consequence of crowding them out or
making them subservient.
The proliferation of bureaucrats, subsidized farmers and businesses, and social
welfare recipients served to create a vast subsidized voting block that would have every
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incentive to maintain and increase the power and benefits of their new positions. The
inevitable result of this is that State power does not diminish. As the State consolidates its
power, it often has to modify its practices, such as by shifting from direct subsidy to
indirect control through legislation and regulations, and this often gives the appearance of
diminishing State power. But State power is expressed through laws and regulations as
much as it is through nationalized or subsidized industries and social welfare programs.
How and why does this accumulation of State power occur? One of the
mechanisms that Nock cites is that same danger Thomas Jefferson worried over: “the
consolidation [i.e., centralization] of our government by the noiseless and therefore
unalarming instrumentality of the Supreme Court.”397 Also, like La Boétie he recognizes
that politicians and even the people themselves use various devices – “certain formulas,
certain arrangements of words,…the rehearsal of poetic litanies” – to soften the image of
policies or glorify the State; these “stand as an obstacle in the way of our perceiving how
far the conversion of social power into State power has actually gone.”398
It has already been noted that the exercise of State power not only diminishes or
crowds out the exercise of social power but also the disposition to exercise it. Thus we
see the people, who, growing ever more accustomed to the State taking responsibility for
more and more functions formerly performed by society, increasingly look to the State to
solve any and all problems that may arise, even the problems that the State inevitably
causes due to its ineptitude in performing the functions properly left to society. Nock
cites a perceptive observation from Herbert Spencer that “when State power is applied to
social purposes, its action is invariably ‘slow, stupid, extravagant, unadaptive, corrupt
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and obstructive.’”399 It will now be fruitful to turn to theoretical work of scholars of the
Austrian school of economics to explain in part why this is so.
VI.2 Profit Management vs. Bureaucratic Management
In order to understand why the State is so unsuited to social purposes it is
important to distinguish between profit management and bureaucratic management. The
eminent Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises, teacher of Murray Rothbard and F. A.
Hayek, in his book Bureaucracy (1944) and in other works, argues that bureaucratic
management is the characteristic method of government and that it is appropriate only to
government (not business, for example). Likewise, profit management is characteristic of
the market and is not appropriate for necessary government functions (such as police or
military). Unlike his student, Rothbard, Mises was not an anarcho-capitalist, though he
came close with his arguments in favor of Jeffersonian local democracy and unlimited
right to secession.
In a capitalist system of production, the capitalists, entrepreneurs, and farmers are
beholden to the consumers. They must produce what the consumers want. “[I]f they fail
to produce at the lowest possible cost what the consumers are asking for, they lose their
office.”400 “Profit and loss are the instruments by means of which the consumers keep a
tight reign on all business activities.”401 Profit and loss accounting is made possible by
the system of market prices, which necessarily depends upon private ownership of the
means of production; the market price is also necessary to guide economic planning.
Without a common denominator to weigh the costs of pursuing one plan out of countless
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others, of utilizing one factor of production among countless others, economic calculation
would be impossible.
By its nature, bureaucratic management is incapable of economic calculation. It
“is the method applied in the conduct of administrative affairs the result of which has no
cash value on the market.”402 There is no connection between revenue and expenditure in
public administration; there is no market price for its achievements. The public services
are concerned with spending money only. They are supported in whole or in part by taxes
rather than sales. In the absence of the profit motive, it is necessary to impose thrift on
the bureaucrat by regimentation. Consequently,
bureaucratic management is management bound to comply with detailed
rules and regulations fixed by the authority of a superior body. The task of
the bureaucrat is to perform what these rules and regulations order him to
do. His discretion to act according to his own best conviction is seriously
restricted by them.403
With profit management, on the other hand, “[t]here is no need to limit the discretion of
subordinates by any rules or regulations other than that underlying all business activities,
namely, to render their operations profitable.”404
For obvious reasons, then, a public enterprise in a market system, if it is to be
operated without regard to profits, is also faced with the economic calculation problem.
Since the behavior of the public is no longer a criterion of its usefulness, since every
service can be improved by increasing expenditures, regimentation must be imposed
upon the manager of a public enterprise. Extensive rules and regulations are required to
guide the production of what, when, how much, and where. And unlike private
enterprises, it is not a mark of failure to operate at a loss.
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If the lack of any means of economic calculation is damaging to public enterprises
in a market system, so too is it to socialism.
Socialism, that is, full government control of all economic activities, is
impracticable because a socialist community would lack the indispensable
intellectual instrument of economic planning and designing: economic
calculation. The very idea of central planning is self-contradictory. A
socialist central board of production will be helpless in the face of the
problems to be solved. It will never know whether the projects considered
are advantageous or whether their performance would not bring about a
waste of the means available. Socialism must result in complete chaos.405
It is only because public enterprises exist within a country, and socialist states exist
within an international system, the greater part of which operates as a market economy,
that they are able to perform any kind of economic calculation at all. Under these
conditions they are able to use the prices established in the rest of the national or
international economy for their own economic calculation. Though even this mimicry is
no real substitute for genuine economic calculation. And if every state were to adopt
socialism, “there would be no more prices for factors of production and economic
calculation would be impossible.”406
Government interference and impairment of the profit motive lead to the
bureaucratization of private enterprise. There are a number of ways in which the
government can interfere with business and impair the profit motive. The government
may tax away all or most profits, fix prices, or limit profits in some other way. Such
policies inhibit innovation as they limit the benefits to the entrepreneur while leaving him
all the risks. The imposition of rules and regulations on private enterprise impose
operating costs as efforts are made either to comply with them or evade them. To the
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extent that private enterprise is driven to bureaucratization, it will become more
dependent upon government bureaus; it will have to spend more time engaged in political
competition, utilizing diplomacy or bribery, in order to gain an advantage over its rivals,
while its economic competitiveness is eroded and its incentive to compete economically
is decreased.
VI.3 Privately-Owned vs. Publicly-Owned Government
In Democracy – The God That Failed (2002), Hans-Hermann Hoppe, a major
Austrian economist and a colleague of Murray Rothbard, makes a distinction between
private ownership of government and public ownership of government. The characteristic
historical example of the former is hereditary monarchy, of the latter, democracy.407 A
privately-owned government is one in which the government is considered to be the
personal property of an individual(s). In contrast,
[d]emocratic rule—in which the government apparatus is considered
“public” property administered by regularly elected officials who do not
personally own and are not viewed as owning the government but as its
temporary caretakers or trustees—typically only follows personal rule and
private government ownership [historically].408
These two forms of government have systematically different effects on social time
preference.
The Austrian theory of time preference holds that, ceteris paribus, people will
prefer satisfaction of wants sooner rather than later. An individual with a higher degree of
time preference will be more present-oriented, while a person with a low degree of time
407
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preference will be more future-oriented or far-sighted. Under a privately-owned
government, the ruler and the people will tend to have relatively lower degrees of time
preference than they would under publicly-owned or democratic government.
Hoppe offers two interrelated structural/institutional factors that drive the
tendency towards higher time preference in democracies: “public” ownership of the
government and free entry into it.
A democratic ruler can use the government apparatus to his personal
advantage, but he does not own it. He cannot sell government resources
and privately pocket the receipts from such sales, nor can he pass
government possessions on to his personal heir. He owns the current use
of government resources, but not their capital value. In distinct contrast to
a king, a president will want to maximize not total government wealth
(capital values and current income) but current income (regardless and at
the expense of capital values). Indeed, even if he wished to act differently,
he could not, for as public property, government resources are unsaleable,
and without market prices economic calculation is impossible.
Accordingly, it must be regarded as unavoidable that public-government
ownership results in continual capital consumption. Instead of maintaining
or even enhancing the value of the government estate, as a king would do,
a president (as distinct from a king) has no interest in not ruining his
country. For why would he not want to increase his confiscations if the
advantage of a policy of moderation—the resulting higher capital value of
the government estate—cannot be reaped privately, while the advantage of
the opposite policy of higher taxes—can be so reaped? For a president,
unlike for a king, moderation offers only disadvantages.409
This, of course, applies not only to presidents or prime ministers in a democracy but also
to members of congress or parliament as well as to bureaucrats. Obviously not all
politicians act in the manner described above, or at least do not intentionally pursue
policies with such effects, but public-government ownership has the effect of
encouraging such tendencies.
Moreover, in a modern democracy, entry into government is in principle open to
everyone. In contrast, entry into government in a monarchy is restricted to the ruler and
409
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his family and friends. This has the effect of stimulating “the development of a clear
‘class consciousness’ on the part of the governed public and promotes opposition and
resistance to any expansion of the government’s power to tax.”410 Also, “government
attempts at territorial expansion tend to be viewed by the public as the ruler’s private
business, to be financed and carried out with his own personal funds. The added territory
is the king’s, and so he, not the public, should pay for it. Consequently, of the two
possible methods of enlarging his realm, war and military conquest or contractual
acquisition [e.g., marriage], a private ruler tends to prefer the latter.”411
Free entry into government blurs the distinction between the rulers and the ruled.
Anyone, in theory, can become part of the ruling class. The “class-consciousness” of the
ruled is blurred. Pressure groups will inevitably attempt to influence politicians and get
representatives elected in order to use the coercive power of the government apparatus to
satisfy their short-run interests at the expense of others. Consequently, “public resistance
against government power is systematically weakened.”412
The combined effect of these two factors – “public” ownership of government and
free entry into it – is conducive to a state of affairs, commonly used to refer to
environmental issues, that can best be characterized as a “tragedy of the commons.”413,414
Of course, the tendency of a higher social time preference under publicly-owned
governments relative to privately-owned governments should be understood in
conjunction with the tendency of government growth. The Jacobin-style, statist
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democracies have obviously won out over Jeffersonian-style democracy in the twentieth
century. The transition from monarchy to democracy in the West has been characterized
by rising public debt, high levels of taxation and inflation, increasing government
intrusion into our every day lives, and the advent of total war. This is especially evident
in the twentieth century. Consider, for example, the evidence presented by R.J. Rummel
in his book, Death by Government, that governments have caused the deaths of an
estimated 170 million civilians in the past century, not to speak of the number of soldiers
killed in war.415
VI.4 Government vs. the State
Most people use the terms ‘government’ and ‘the State’ interchangeably. I have
been doing so thus far. Given Nock’s analysis of social power and State power, it may
seem as if he makes a similar distinction between society and government as does
Thomas Paine in Common Sense. In fact, Nock carries the analysis further in two novel
ways. He distinguishes clearly between government and the State, and identifies the State
as being a fundamentally anti-social institution. Government, Nock argues in Lockean
fashion, “implements the common desire of society, first, for freedom, and second, for
security. Beyond this it does not go; it contemplates no positive intervention upon the
individual, but only a negative intervention.”416 He favorably cites, and notes that it
seems favorable to Paine as well, “the legendary king Pausole, who prescribed but two
laws for his subjects, the first being, Hurt no man, and the second, Then do as you please;
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and the whole business of government should be the purely negative one of seeing that
this code is carried out.”417
Government, then, is a natural part of society; the State, on the other hand, has an
altogether different origin and function. The State “did not originate in the common
understanding and agreement of society; it originated in conquest and confiscation. Its
intention, far from contemplating ‘freedom and security’…contemplated primarily the
continuous economic exploitation of one class by another.” The State’s primary function
is not to protect the natural rights of individuals through purely negative interventions but
to maintain the stratification of society into a plutocratic, exploiting class and an
exploited class through “innumerable and most onerous positive interventions.” The
order of interest it reflects is “not social, but purely anti-social; and those who
[administer] it, judged by the common standard of ethics, or even the common standard
of law as applied to private persons, [are] indistinguishable from a professional-criminal
class.”418
Nock remarks that throughout history government has only existed where
economic exploitation was either impractical or unprofitable. But where economic
exploitation has been practical and profitable, the State has prevailed. A compelling
reason for this is that economic theory tells us people will seek to satisfy their wants with
as little exertion as possible. Only two means exist for man to satisfy his needs and
desires.419 These are the economic means and the political means. The economic means
consists of voluntary production and exchange of wealth and services. The political
means, by contrast, consists of “the uncompensated appropriation of wealth produced by
417

Ibid., p. 46.
Ibid.
419
On the economic and political means, Nock has drawn from historian Franz Oppenheimer’s The State.
418

148

others[.]” As it is easier to take than to produce, men will, ceteris paribus, employ the
political means whenever and as far as possible – exclusively, if possible, or in
conjunction with the economic means. The State is the organization of the political
means. In its primitive form we see that it is employed “by conquest, confiscation,
expropriation, and the introduction of a slave economy.” In its modern form, the
merchant-State employs “the apparatus of tariffs, concessions, rent-monopoly, and the
like.” Thus corruption is unavoidable when the State apparatus is available.420
Nock notes that history shows that “the depletion of social power by the State can
not be checked after a certain point of progress is passed.” Exactly when that point is
reached in any given country or civilization it may be impossible to say until after the
fact, but history furnishes no examples of reversals once State power has accumulated to
a considerable degree. An excellent case study of this process is Rome. It became
increasingly centralized and bureaucratized, strangling its own economy, as it slowly
deteriorated. “Athens, on the other hand, collapse[d] quickly.”421 Nock is not sure, in the
1930s, whether America had yet reached that point, but the prodigious acceleration of
State power disturbed him greatly, particularly as there was no evidence then, nor is there
now in the twenty-first century, of any inclination to retard or reverse it. This leaves us
the question of how can the growth of State power be prevented in the first place? How
can we prevent the State from transforming into Leviathan? Or government from
transforming into the State?
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VI.5 The State as Territorial Monopolist
It is not completely clear from Nock’s Our Enemy, The State what form his ideal
government would take. All of the examples he offers are those of Native Americans and
other ‘primitive’ peoples. Roy A. Childs, Jr., in a 1989 review of the book asserts that
Nock was not an anarchist. One thing is clear, however; if Nock consistently believed in
the principles expressed in the Declaration of Independence, and in his own criticisms of
the State, then he would have to be classified as an anarchist. Any form of government
perfectly consistent with natural rights must necessarily be completely voluntary and
therefore anarchistic. This will become clearer if we establish an explicit definition of the
State.
In The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard defines the State, not inconsistently with
standard definitions, as
that organization which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost
always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by
physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compulsory monopoly
of force and ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area.
Both of these essential activities of the State necessarily constitute
criminal aggression and depredation of the just rights of private property
of its subjects (including self-ownership). For the first constitutes and
establishes theft on a grand scale; while the second prohibits the free
competition of defense and decision-making agencies within a given
territorial area -- prohibiting the voluntary purchase and sale of defense
and judicial services.422
Thus, if Nock was consistent, and I think he was, then he would not countenance any
institution purporting to be a government that did either (a) or (b) or both. Anarchism is
422
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not defined by a desire for no rules and no law. Rather, it opposes coercive monopolies
like the State. Nock’s definition of government seems perfectly consistent with
anarchism.
This anarchistic notion of government runs counter to mainstream theories of
political philosophers and political economists, however. The standard definition of the
State given above is what most theorists, and most people for that matter, think of as
government. If nothing else, it is thought, the State must have a monopoly over
legislation, internal and external defense, and the courts. It is argued that these are
“public goods” that the State must control in order to maintain law and order. Yet even
this “nightwatchman” or “limited government” version of the State possesses an inherent
contradiction.
As Hoppe, in The Myth of National Defense, cleverly puts it: It is widely accepted
that every
“monopoly” is “bad” from the point of view of consumers. Monopoly here
is understood in its classical sense as an exclusive privilege granted to a
single producer of a commodity or service; i.e., as the absence of “free
entry” into a particular line of production. In other words, only one
agency, A, may produce a given good, x. Any such monopolist is “bad”
for consumers because, shielded from potential new entrants into his area
of production, the price of his product x will be higher and the quality of x
lower than otherwise.423
This proposition is clearly incompatible with the one that the State must have a territorial
monopoly. Ought the first proposition be rejected? Economic theory and history have
shown the classical conception of monopoly to be correct. Is there something special
about the production of security that exempts it from this principle? Certainly the burden
of proof is on those who would answer yes. In the aforementioned book edited by Hoppe,
423
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Austrian economists and historians offer a compelling case, indeed I would say a decisive
case, that the answer is no.
If we cannot reject the proposition that every monopoly is bad, then we must
reject as false the proposition that law and order require government (or rather, the State)
to have a territorial monopoly. It is the very monopolistic nature of the State that enables
it to grow beyond any constitutional limitations placed upon it and eventually transform
into Leviathan before finally destroying itself. The first economist “to provide a
systematic explanation for the failure of governments as security producers” was Gustave
de Molinari (1818-1912), in his article “De la Production de la Securité (February 1849)”
His argument, which follows along the same lines as those already made here, is worth
quoting at length:
If there is one well-established truth in political economy, it is this:
That in all cases, for all commodities that serve to provide for the tangible
or intangible needs of consumers, it is in the consumer’s best interest that
labor and trade remain free, because the freedom of labor and trade have
as their necessary and permanent result the maximum reduction of price.
And this: That the interests of the consumer of any commodity whatsoever
should always prevail over the interests of the producer.
Now in pursuing these principles, one arrives at this rigorous conclusion:
That the production of security should, in the interests of the consumers of
this intangible commodity, remain subject to the law of free competition.
Whence it follows: That no government should have the right to prevent
another government from going into competition with it, or require
consumers of security to come exclusively to it for this commodity…
Either this is logically true, or else the principles on which economic
science is based are invalid. (Gustave de Molinari, Production of Security
[New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, 1977], pp. 3-4)
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If, on the contrary, the consumer is not free to buy security wherever he
pleases, you forthwith see open up a large profession dedicated to
arbitrariness and bad management. Justice becomes slow and costly, the
police vexatious, individual liberty is no longer respected, the price of
security is abusively inflated and inequitably apportioned, according to the
power and influence of this or that class of consumers. (Molinari,
Production of Security, pp. 13-14)424
VI.6 The Lockean Case Against Locke425
If the arguments given above are correct, then Locke’s argument for the State fails
on its own merits. According to Locke, all men are created by God, born equally free in a
state of nature. Man, born with a God-given
title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and
privileges of the Law of Nature, equally with any other man, or number of
men in the world, hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property
– that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries and attempts of
other men, but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others, as
he is persuaded the offence deserves…each being, where there is no other,
judge for himself and executioner…426
Locke argues that men will find it rational to voluntarily give up this equality of authority
by setting up a government to protect their rights because these rights are imperfectly
secure in a state of nature. Locke identifies “three principal defects of the state of natural
anarchy” as the reasons for this insecurity.427 Philosopher Roderick Long has insightfully
labeled them the legislative defect, judicial defect, and executive defect, respectively.
Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and
allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the
common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though
424
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the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet
men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of
it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding them in the application of it to
their particular cases.
Secondly, in the State of Nature there wants a known and indifferent
judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the
established law. For every one in that state being both judge and
executioner of the Law of Nature, men being partial to themselves,
passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much
heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness, make
them too remiss in other men's.
Thirdly, in the State of Nature there often wants power to back and
support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who
by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to
make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the
punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt
it.428
“Locke concludes that these three defects may be remedied by centralizing the
legislative, judicial, and executive functions in a constitutional government”429 that is
restricted to protecting the rights of its citizens.
Where Locke goes wrong is that he conflates the absence of the State with the
absence of law. Let us consider first the judicial defect. Locke argues that the state of
nature “wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences
according to the established law.”430 In other words, a third party is wanted as an
impartial arbiter as it is undesirable for men, being naturally partial to themselves, to act
as judge in their own case. Yet as a territorial monopolist the State must necessarily judge
in its own case when conflicts between itself and its citizens occur. It is no answer to this
charge to reply that with the separation of powers under Constitutionalism the judicial
branch can act as an impartial judge in conflicts between citizens and the other two
428
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branches. It is still a part of the State, and its judges are nominated and appointed by the
other two branches; as such it would be naïve to assume that its interests are entirely
pure. And, as Roderick Long points out, “What if the citizen’s complaint is with the
judicial branch itself?”431 The State, therefore, suffers from Locke’s judicial defect.
The State, too, suffers from the legislative defect. Locke argues that there “wants
an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the
standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies
between them.”432 Certainly this is desirable. But consider the tens of thousands of pages
of bureaucratic regulations and legislated laws that the United States government has
produced and continues to produce at a prodigious rate. The bureaucratic regulations are
not even subject to the electoral process as the bureaucrats are unelected officials within
the executive branch. No one can possibly know all of these laws and regulations.
Moreover, they tend to be vaguely worded so as to allow various arbitrary interpretations.
Many of them contradict other regulations and laws. And it cannot honestly be said that
the average citizen has consented to them. Virtually every modern democracy suffers
from this defect. But autocratic States do as well.
Why is it assumed that impartial arbiters and a commonly agreed upon set of laws
require a monocentric legal system? In the past century, historians have discovered that
the majority of legal systems have been polycentric rather than monocentric, meaning
that they had no central or monopolistic authority. Consider the case of early AngloSaxon customary law:
A system of surety, known as borh, provided the foundation of AngloSaxon law. Under the borh system a set of ten to twelve individuals,
431
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defined at first by kinship but later by contractual agreement, would form
a group to pledge surety for the good behavior of its members. The group
would back up this pledge by paying the fines of its members if they were
found guilty of violating customary law. A surety group thus had strong
financial incentives to police its members and exclude those who
persistently engaged in criminal behavior. Exclusion served as a powerful
sanction[.]
The Anglo-Saxon courts, called moots, were public assemblies of
common men and neighbors. The moots did not expend their efforts on
creating or codifying law; they left that to custom and to essentially
declaratory law codes of kings [declaratory because kings generally only
codified customs already existing in society]. The outcome of a dispute
turned entirely on the facts of the case, which were usually established
through ritual oath-giving. […]
Anglo-Saxon law had no category for crimes against the state or against
society – it recognized only crimes against individuals. As in other
customary legal systems, the moots typically demanded that criminals pay
restitution or composition to their victims – or else face the hazards of
outlawry and blood-feud. […]433
Anglo-Saxon law also recognized and respected property rights, to the point that higher
penalties were incurred for crimes in or about the home. The moot courts, like the borh,
depended on voluntary cooperation.
A favorite example of libertarians is the quasi-anarchistic legal system of
Medieval Iceland. In “The Decline and Fall of Private Law in Iceland,” Roderick Long
provides a good overview of the Icelandic Free Commonwealth:
In outline, the system's main features were these: Legislative power was
vested in the General Assembly (althingi); the legislators were Chieftains
(godhar; singular, godhi) representing their Assemblymen (thingmenn;
singular, thingmadhr). Every Icelander was attached to a Chieftain, either
directly, by being an Assemblyman, or indirectly, by belonging to a
household headed by an Assemblyman. A Chieftaincy (godhordh) was
private property, which could be bought and sold. Representation was
determined by choice rather than by place of residence; an Assemblyman
could transfer his allegiance (and attendant fees) at will from one
433
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Chieftain to another without moving to a new district. Hence competition
among Chieftains served to keep them in line.
The General Assembly passed laws, but had no executive authority; law
enforcement was up to the individual, with the help of his friends, family,
and Chieftain. Disputes were resolved either through private arbitration or
through the court system administered by the General Assembly.
Wrongdoers were required to pay financial restitution to their victims;
those who refused were denied all legal protection in the future (and thus,
e.g., could be killed with impunity). The claim to such compensation was
itself a marketable commodity; a person too weak to enforce his claim
could sell it to someone more powerful. This served to prevent the
powerful from preying on the weak. Foreigners were scandalized by this
"land without a king"; but Iceland's system appears to have kept the peace
at least as well as those of its monarchical neighbors.434
The primary reasons for its decline and fall were 1) the introduction of Christianity, and
2) that it was not private enough, though the system flourished for nearly three hundred
years. One of the principal flaws was that the number of chieftaincies were fixed by law
and, over time, with the aid of Church tithes (especially the Churchstead fees paid to the
private owner of the land each church was built on) as a guaranteed source of income, a
relative handful of families were able to buy up a majority of them.
Another prominent example of polycentric law is the Law Merchant, “a
transnational system of customary law enforced by informal courts,”435 which
spontaneously formed in late medieval Europe and “offered a more unified body of law
than did the governmental systems with which it competed.”436 Modern credit bureaus,
insurance companies, private arbitration firms, and the like serve similar functions of
surety and assurance. Economic theory and the experience of history suggest that, far
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from being chaotic, polycentric legal systems tended to be voluntary, to converge on a
relatively uniform set of law, and were far more adaptable than monocentric systems.
Now consider the executive defect, which the State also suffers from. Locke
argues that the state of nature “often wants power to back and support the sentence when
right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail
where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times
makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.”437
Why is it supposed that in a state of anarchy, an individual will have no recourse to
enforcing the law but himself? Consider such voluntary systems as the thief-takers’
associations of early nineteenth century England or the vigilance committees of the old
American frontier or the bohrs of Anglo-Saxon law. Voluntary citizen militias existed in
colonial America. The modern private security industry is currently a growth industry. In
contrast, a standing police and military are fairly unusual in history; indeed, the former is
a relatively modern invention. Whereas market competition will be able to better keep
private security and law enforcement in check, a State monopoly on the legal use of force
puts individual citizens at the mercy of an overwhelming force prone to corruption,
arbitrariness, and general inefficiency.
Unfortunately, it has by now become clear that competition within a republican
system of government, with the separation of powers and checks and balances of
Constitutionalism, merely simulates market competition within a fundamentally
monopolistic context and therefore does not provide an adequate check on ambition.
“There has been a sufficient convergence of interests among the three branches of
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republican government that, despite occasional squabbles over details, each branch has
been complicit with the others in expanding the power of the central government.”438
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VII. Conclusion
History is philosophy teaching by examples.
– Bolingbroke
This essay has been far reaching and I have no doubt bit off more than I could
chew for a Master’s thesis. I have attempted to sketch out to the best of my current
understanding, and as far as possible with limited space and time, a radical libertarian
theory of natural law and natural rights as well as a critique of the State in conjunction
with La Boétie’s analysis of the nature of tyranny and the psychology of subjection. I see
the history of mankind as a race and conflict between liberty and power, between social
power and state power, and I have attempted to illustrate that as well as the fundamental
role of ideology in revolutionary movements through a sketch of early American history.
Many, if not most or all, of the ideas presented herein have no doubt evoked
varying degrees of shock and skepticism. I myself would have reacted similarly a couple
of years ago. It was partly out of a desire for logical consistency and partly over the
puzzle of the seemingly never-ending cycle of nations and civilizations that led me to
explore such radical notions as these. Why do all States and civilizations seem to follow
the same cycle from liberty and prosperity to increasing centralization, tyranny, and
decay? The answer, of course, lies in human nature. But I think it also lies in the nature of
our institutions. Human beings possess the capacity for great good and great evil. The
incentive and disincentive structures of our institutions play a key role in channeling that
capacity. As Lord Acton once said, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts
absolutely,” so why put into the hands of fallible and corruptible human beings the
absolute power of a “compulsory monopoly of force and ultimate decision-making power
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over a given territorial area”?439 It seems to be a recipe for disaster, if not in the short-run
then at least in the long-run for our posterity. I am not naïve; I do not believe that
mankind will ever live in perfect peace and harmony. However, I do think that it is
possible to learn from our past mistakes and make improvements upon our institutions as
our ancestors tried to do. In the nature of the State there is an inherent contradiction that
cannot be reconciled. Radical libertarians like Rothbard et al. hold out an alternative. Is
anarcho-capitalism, or as Hoppe calls it, the Natural Order, viable? At the very least, I
think it is deserving of serious study. And even if it turns out not to be, and the State
really is a necessary evil, the Austro-libertarian analysis of the State can point us in the
right direction in our efforts to control its flaws. In the final analysis, it is ideas that drive
history, that uphold our institutions and unmake or remake them, that maintain the status
quo and undermine it, through human action.
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